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Abstract 
 One dominant scientific view holds that willpower is a type of muscle which 
can be weakened through use in the short term and strengthened through use over 
time.  However, evidence from neuroscience, social psychology and behavioral 
economics suggest that willpower is regional, subverted through desire and 
strengthened by strategy—these are features a muscular account would not predict.  
It is better to think about willpower as a skill with a physiological component.  
Willpower strategies extend the brute effort of self-control through the use of reason 
and have the practical effect of increasing self-regulation.  Willpower is "worth 
wanting" because there is a gap in our given desires and our evaluations.  In general 
willpower is the skill responsible for extending the motivational force of evaluations 
to overcome the motivational force of other interests.  Of course, willpower can be 
used in the service of evil, but in general it is a power we would prefer to have.   
 Interestingly, not all cases of weakness of will are, on balance, bad.  As a 
practical matter weakness of will is a crucial element of developing willpower skills 
over time.  Just as a skilled batter relies on failures to teach what is required for 
good hitting, willpower failures are an important element in developing habits for 
success.  Additionally, the motivational failure of evaluation built in to weakness of 
will requires a commitment to practical claim that one can choose how to act in ways 
not dictated by given desires.  This commitment to the importance and viability of 
evaluation is a crucial component of having a moral perspective in a natural system 
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and weakness of will is a signifier of this foundational element of a practical 
perspective.
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Introduction 
 There is a huge gap between the world as it is and the world as it ought to be 
and they are both important.  This dissertation is an effort to do philosophy in 
keeping with Wilfred Sellars' "synoptic vision" of orienting scientific knowledge and 
philosophical visions into a coherent arrangement sufficiently resonant with the 
linguistic community to support the practical effect of helping people to live well.1  
The world as it is cannot be explained by the way we happen to see the world, but 
we cannot abandon our own perspective in our pursuit of knowledge about the 
world. Since ancient Greece the aim of philosophy has been to extend knowledge in 
the natural sciences in the service of learning how to live well.  Working out how the 
sciences make a difference in human lives remains the basic role of philosophy.  
Philosophy is a naturalistic pursuit in that it seeks to move human understanding 
closer to the truths of the natural sciences.  Philosophy is also a practical matter 
because it seeks to answer the question "how should we live?"  
 This dissertation is about the gap between the gap between our judgment and 
motivation: it is about willpower and weakness of will.  Weakness of will is common 
but it is poorly understood.  My dissertation is an effort to respond to the issues of 
practical rationality raised by weakness of will in a way that is informed by modern 
scientific literature and in keeping with the philosophical tradition.  On my view the 
account offered here brings together the central philosophical questions and recent 
                                            
1 Sellars, Wilfred (1962)“Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man,” in Frontiers of Science and 
Philosophy, Robert Colodny (ed.) (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press): 35–78 
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science in a way that is relatively consonant with popular usage.  My central thesis is 
that willpower is best understood as a skill and this leads to some surprising insights 
about how willpower works strategically and how we might find value in willpower 
failures. 
 The leading account of willpower is based on the muscle metaphor--on this 
view willpower is like a muscle in that it is strengthened through use over time, but 
depleted through use in the short run.  The muscle metaphor is right in some 
important respects, but overall its strengths are not enough to make up for its 
weaknesses.  I discuss three central weaknesses of the muscle metaphor beginning 
with its advocates claims that willpower is global.  Here I present evidence that 
suggests willpower operates in a regional way suggesting an alternative view.  
Further, evidence about the ways that willpower fails through appeal or desire, as 
opposed to failure resulting from outside pressure, suggests that willpower my not 
work in the way a muscle would.  A third criticism of the dominant account of 
willpower is evidence that some of the strongest apparent cases of willpower 
success are rooted in strategies that seem to belie the sense of muscular strength.  
 In light of the weaknesses of the dominant account of willpower I argue that 
we should look for an alternative and suggest the view of willpower as a skill.  The 
skill account is able to accommodate the empirical results of willpower depletion 
often cited by opponents because skills require physiological resources which can 
be depleted.  However, a skill based account has the advantage of predicting 
regional strengths and weaknesses.  A skill based account is also able to 
accommodate findings that the strongest cases of willpower are not cases of brute 
3 
 
effort but involve willpower strategies.  I conclude that willpower is best thought of as 
a skill with a physiological component.   
   In the second chapter I offer an account of four distinct willpower strategies 
that augment a brute force account, including long-term, short-term, attention-based 
and avoidance-based strategies.  Each variety of willpower strategy has distinctive 
advantages and disadvantages, but the focus here is on outlining some options to 
serve as markers for the intellectual landscape.  There is some discussion here of 
the tendency to distinguish between self-management strategies and willpower 
strategies.  This distinction seems based on accounts of action and identity that  are 
somewhat restrictive in scope.  I argue that action conceived of broadly is better 
situated to incorporate human character as developed over time and that such an 
account is more in keeping with willpower strategies that incorporate findings of 
modern social psychology and behavioral economics.      
 Willpower is necessary because motivation and judgment can come apart.  
When we are more motivated by given desires or inclinations than we are by our 
evaluations of those states, we are prone to willpower failures.  In chapter three I 
argue that willpower failures take a number of forms and that we should not reduce 
weakness of will to any single variety.  In spite of this generally expansive account I 
take care to distinguish weakness of will proper from an "inverted commas" account.  
The expression 'weakness of will' is sometimes used as an excusing condition, but 
this way of speaking is not in keeping with either the philosophical tradition or the 
other varieties of weakness considered here.    
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 In the forth chapter I outline the main arguments in favor of the possibility of 
freewill and skepticism about freewill.  To begin with I explore the reasons for 
skepticism about free will and argue that those who are skeptical about freewill have 
a bigger worry than the particular trouble of explaining weak-will.  I go on to describe 
a leading version of libertarian incompatibilism and explain how weakness of will is 
commonly thought to be compatible with this view.  I also explain how weakness of 
will is thought to be compatible with compatibalist and semi-compatibalist positions 
on the freewill debate.  What I never do is to take a stance on the freewill debate, 
that would be outside the scope of this project. 
 In the fifth chapter I turn to the central issues of motivation and judgment; 
particularly the ways that they come apart.  I frame the discussion of weakness of 
will as on a continuum between compulsion and recklessness.  The reckless agent, 
like Aristotle's Brute, does not make evaluative judgments he acts from appetitive 
desires without reflection.  The compulsive agent may have some contrary 
judgments, but does not have the motivational capacity to act in line with judgment.  
Weakness of will happens when one is both making judgments about how to act and 
free to act in line with judgment, but does not do so. The debate between Mele and 
Holton has made clear that weakness of will can involve synchronic violations of 
judgment and violations of judgment that occur over time.  The difference between 
types of weakness of will is important, but not as important as what they share.  
Consider by analogy the difference between types of substance dependence; 
addiction to nicotine is radically different from addiction to morphine in terms of 
outcomes, psychology and physiology.  Nevertheless, there is good reason to keep 
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cases of substance abuse clustered together and a similar case can be made for 
clustering cases of weak-will.   
 One final consideration is that the ordinary account of weak-will suggests that 
it is entirely objectionable, but in fact there is something valuable to take away from 
weakness of will.  Since being weak-willed means at least making judgments about 
how to behave the akratic is at least participating in the basic normative work of 
practical rationality.  And, because the skill account of willpower allows that 
developing willpower is a practice developed over time, there is good reason to think 
that being akratic today is a necessary part of being strong-willed tomorrow.  But, at 
the very least, we can say that the weak-willed agent is at least not acting recklessly. 
This should mitigate feelings of guilt or shame and should be seen as an important 
step in character formation.   
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Chapter 1 
Willpower as Skill 
There are several popular models which seek to describe the nature of 
willpower.  The first part of this chapter focuses on the most popular of these 
models, the muscle metaphor for willpower. After some discussion I argue that there 
are serious limitations to the muscle metaphor.  My strategy is not to wholly reject 
the view, but to say that it tells, at most, part of the story — and not the most 
important part at that. Willpower is best thought of as a skill.  As Al Mele puts it in his 
recent Backsliding "In normal agents the capacity for self-control is not a mental 
analogue of brute physical strength...Our powers of self-control include a variety of 
skills and considerable savvy about which skills to use in particular situations."2  
Unfortunately, Mele never supports or explains his claim.  I argue here that while the 
exercise of any skill involves at least some muscular action, the muscular element of 
willpower is built into the notion of a skill.  Just as physical human strength is the 
skilled use of one’s muscles, frame, etc. strength of will a skill which calls upon many 
faculties.   
The Will and the Brain 
We should avoid the mistake of positing some mysterious occult power called 
“the will” which resembles an impenetrable black box of judgment or decision 
making.  The will is much less mysterious than all that.  For instance, it seems that 
                                            
2 Al Mele, (2013) Backsliding pp. 93-94 
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efforts of will can be hugely affected by trauma to the prefrontal cortex.  The seminal 
case of trauma to the prefrontal cortex occurred in 1848 when an accidental 
explosion sent a thirteen pound tamping iron through the frontal lobe of a railway 
foreman by the name of Phineas Gage.  By all accounts before the accident Gage 
was a steadfast man with good impulse control, was not prone to becoming upset, 
and was an excellent employee in his leadership position with the railroad.  
However, after the accident Gage’s primary physician, Dr. Harlow, describes Gages 
as “fitful, irreverent…capricious and vacillating, devising many plans of future 
operations, which are no sooner arranged than they are abandoned in turn for others 
appearing more feasible.”3   Although Gage was still physically capable of 
performing his work with railroad Gage had lost the demeanor and impulse control 
required to perform his former role. Gage’s case is of great interest because it shows 
that the prefrontal cortex plays an important role in affecting will power and trauma to 
this region of the brain has an extraordinary impact on the human volitional system. 
Of course, massive trauma to the brain’s prefrontal cortex is not the only way 
elicit measurable effects on human volition.  Much less violent and more temporary 
measures also produce significant results in brain functioning.  For instance, in a 
study measuring the relapse rates of recovering addicts it was found that one extra 
hour of sleep each night, shifting from seven to eight hours, was associated with 
significantly stronger resistance to relapse.4  The reason for this correlation, between 
                                            
3 Harlow, John Martyn (1868). “Recovery from the passage of a bar through the head.."Publications 
of the Massachusetts Medical Society 2:327–347 [Republished in MacMillan, M (2000) "Restoring 
Phineas Gage: A 150th retrospective". Journal of the History of the Neurosciences 9 (1) 42-62.]  
4 Britton et. al. (2010). “The contribution of mindfulness practice to a multicomponent behavioral sleep 
intervention following substance abuse treatment.”  Substance Abuse 
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additional sleep and increased will power, is explainable by comparing functional 
MRI scans of sleep deprived, people getting less than 6 hours, and a control group 
with seven or more hours sleep each night.  It turns out that sleep deprivation 
impairs cognitive functioning especially in the prefrontal cortex and leaves some 
mid-brain regions over-stimulated.  Because the prefrontal cortex is responsible for 
self-control and long range planning and the midbrain is associated more with basic 
impulses and instincts, the sleep deprived person is less capable of accomplishing 
high will power tasks.5 
Other research involving the use of functional MRI brain imaging has 
continued to locate significant elements of the human volitional system reliably in the 
brain’s prefrontal cortex.  Some analyses further suggest that there is a strong 
correlation between specific brain areas and distinct types of will power.  For 
instance, the left side of the prefrontal cortex shows the most significant activity 
when an individual is tasked with an activity which requires taking or continuing an 
action that is found to be difficult such as writing an essay or exercising.  On the 
other hand, the right side of the prefrontal cortex is most active in resistance to 
temptation such as refusing desert after dinner.  The middle section of the frontal 
lobe, the ventromedial area, focuses on evaluating choices and making long range 
plans such as how to best achieve health.6 These imaging studies reveal that there 
is an important role of the brain and especially of the prefrontal cortex in common 
instances of willing.  But they also suggest that it is a mistake to think about willing or 
                                            
5 (Yoo, Gujar, Jolesz & Walker 2007) 
6 Basten, Ulrike, et. al. (2010) “How the brain integrates costs and benefits during decision making.” 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 107 (50) 217-67 
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will power as if it was a monolithic block.  Rather, it seems that there is evidence in 
the brain for the conclusion that willing or will power occurs in several distinct ways 
associated with distinct regions of the brain.  However, in broad terms it does seem 
that the brain is of two minds in cases of willpower challenges—the impulsive middle 
brain pushes us toward immediate desires and the calculating prefrontal cortex 
evaluates more distant interests.    
In some ways the question of whether one will be weak-willed or strong-willed 
in any given situation comes down to a matter of which mind is currently ruling the 
brain.  Another way of putting this would be to say that the difference between 
strength of will and weakness of will is a matter of identity, dependent upon which 
person one is at the time.  When we are tired, hungry, drunk, preoccupied, or 
otherwise stressed it becomes increasingly likely that we will act in ways that we 
would ordinarily find unacceptable.  In such cases our empathic friends often excuse 
our behavior, saying “He’s not himself today.”  On the other hand our less sensitive 
friends may remark, “In vino veritas” suggesting that our ordinary demeanor is 
merely a mask hiding our true selves.  The tension here appears to be between the 
impulsive middle brained self and the more regulated self motivated by the prefrontal 
cortex.   
It is tempting to describe any action caused by the prefrontal cortex as strong 
willed and to describe any action caused by the middle brain as weak-willed, but that 
would be a mistake.  Imagine a man standing before a firing squad waiting for his 
execution.  The commanding officer offers the condemned man one last cigarette 
before he is shot dead.  The man thinks about it briefly and responds “No thanks, I 
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am trying to quit.”  If we suppose the condemned man is being sincere his statement 
is almost certainly a product of his prefrontal cortex and opposed to his impulsive 
self.  It is also clear that the condemned man’s reasoning is seriously flawed—he no 
longer has a long range interest in not smoking, because he no longer has long 
range interests.  The point is that strength of will is not simply resisting one’s 
immediate impulses; those impulses are quite important to our functioning as we 
should.7  Rather, strength of will is acting in accord with an appropriate weighing of 
one’s conflicting interests. Will power, like character is an achievement, not a given.  
If we can merge the different aspects of ourselves into a unified whole, then we have 
character and more likely, will-power. 
The Muscle Metaphor of Willpower             
According to one influential view willpower is analogous to muscular strength.  
On this view we can think about people who are strong willed as having similar 
features to those who are physically strong.  Some people are naturally stronger 
than others, but exceptionally strong people have typically done a tremendous 
amount of work to strengthen their muscles.  Sometimes this effort is designed to 
strengthen the body, but often it is the byproduct of some other activity which taxes 
one’s physical strength.  In the short term such taxing activities have the effect of 
weakening one’s muscles, but over time the effect is that one develops muscular 
endurance and increased strength.  Similarly, it has long been supposed that the 
willpower required for self-control is the kind of thing which can be depleted through 
use in the short term, while being strengthened with use in the long term.  Since 
                                            
7 For example people with damage to disgust or fear centers in the brain may sexually proposition 
family members or engage in wildly risky behavior. 
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1998, Roy Baumeister and colleagues have produced a steady stream of empirical 
data that seems to support many features of the muscle metaphor of willpower. 
Baumeister’s first study in the area of self-regulation aimed at establishing a 
phemenon he described as “regulatory depletion,” that is a relationship between 
engaging in a difficult task of self control and the weakening of self-regulation in 
subsequent tasks.8 In the first study researchers told subjects that they were 
involved in research on muscular strength.  Subjects were then instructed to 
squeeze shut a grip strength spring, holding a piece of paper between the handles.  
After the initial evaluation subjects were divided into three groups and instructed to 
watch a movie.  The groups included an increased emotional response group, a 
decreased response group and a control.  Subjects in the manipulated groups were 
told to try to either increase or decrease their emotional response to the film and 
instructed that they should also increase or decrease the emotional response of their 
facial expressions.  After completing the task of emotional self-regulation participants 
were again timed while holding a piece of paper between the handles of a 
commercially available grip developer.  The control group averaged nearly an 
identical time as before watching the film, average time decreasing from 60.09 
seconds to 58.52 seconds, only a 1.57 second difference.  However, both groups 
asked to regulate affect showed a significant reduction in willingness to exert effort 
at the task.  The group asked to decrease affective response for the film fell from an 
average time of 70.74 seconds to 52.25 seconds, a decrease of 18.49 seconds.  
More starkly the increased emotional response group began with an average time of 
                                            
8 Roy Baumeister, et. al. (1998) “Self-Control as Limited Resource: Regulatory Depletion Patterns” 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Vol. 74, No. 3, 774-789 
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78.73 and fell to an average of 53.63, a reduction of 25.10 seconds.  In a second 
study conducted to confirm these earlier results subjects were told about a white 
bear, some subjects were then told not to think about the white bear, while others 
were given no such instruction. After six minutes the experimenter returned and 
under the guise of a cover story had participants work on unsolvable anagram 
puzzles until they wanted to quit.  Those who suppressed thoughts about white 
bears averaged 563 seconds trying to solve the puzzle, while those with no such 
instruction averaged 758 seconds.   
In both studies participants were tasked with willpower intensive activities 
including controlling their thoughts and emotional states.  In both cases these high 
willpower activities were followed with a subsequent, but unrelated task of will 
power.  Subjects who had been previously engaged in self-control demonstrated 
less willpower on the subsequent tasks of working on a difficult puzzle or squeezing 
a grip strengthener. These results provide initial support for two theses; first they 
seem to show that our powers of self-regulation are depleted by exertion.  The 
subjects seem to have exhausted their resources of self-control on the earlier task 
and had less willpower left for the next task as compared with untaxed control 
groups.  And, second, these studies seem to show that different kinds of self-
regulation draw on the same capacity.  Both conclusions seem to illuminate the 
nature of willpower, and give us reason to adopt the muscle metaphor of willpower. 
For instance, this has an empirical leg up on one common model of will as 
exemplifying sustained “focus” or “attention.”  On this model, one would expect that 
simultaneous activities of willing to be mutually frustrating.  But, on the attention 
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model, once someone has stopped one task and turned her attention to another, 
there should be little or no residual depletion of focus. It likewise has more 
explanatory power than more Platonic views that treat will as having the right 
structure of knowledge.  On that account, we would expect earlier acts of willpower 
to prime or activate the relevant structure to produce increased will-power on 
subsequent tasks. To the contrary, on the muscle metaphor we would predict that 
earlier self-control would fatigue the relevant capacity and decrease expectations on 
subsequent tasks. This is precisely what the evidence shows.  Finally, the muscle 
metaphor correctly predicts that just as short term depletion of muscular strength 
produces long-term muscular gains, short term depletion of strength of will should 
also produce strength the will long-term.9  Again, this is what the evidence shows. 
In a series of studies on self-regulation exercises Oaten and Cheng have 
shown that the long term training of self-control has the effect of increasing willpower 
stamina and reducing fatigue following short term exertion of willpower.  In each of 
the studies subjects were given a visual tracking task (VTT) in which they were to 
follow three identical black boxes in field of six, looking away for even a moment 
would cause participants to lose track of “their” boxes.  This task was made more 
challenging by the fact that a distracting comedy reel played on a nearby screen.  
The VTT was performed a total of two times at the initial meeting, once as an initial 
baseline, and once again five minutes after a depletion exercise (not thinking about 
a white bear.)  Participants were then assigned to a variety of training regimes, for 
                                            
9 A long-term increase through use would also be predicted on the skill model of self-control. 
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instance one group enrolled in a two month physical exercise program10, another 
group enrolled in a four month financial monitoring program11, yet another group 
participated in studying exercises.12  Each group showed significant gains in the 
area of their training program, but according to the study hypothesis these long term 
training regimens should also exercise willpower and accordingly reduce fatigue or 
willpower depletion.  This hypothesis was confirmed in each study when after 
training participants returned to the visual tracking task.  Again participants engaged 
the VTT once as a baseline and then again following six minutes of not thinking 
about a white bear.  After the long term training regimen participants were 
substantially more successful in self-regulation following tasks of self-control.  This 
strongly suggests that strength of will can be improved through a consistent training 
regimen.           
Baumeister's claim is that the results of these studies (those of Oaten and 
Cheng, Baumeister et. al., and others) also indicate that there is unified reserve of 
willpower which is exercised in a variety of self-regulation tasks.  For instance, 
strengthening the will in activities of financial regulation helps to strengthen willpower 
against depletion on the white bear task and regulating one’s emotional response to 
a movie dramatically reduces one’s willpower in a grip strength exercise.  The 
evidence here points toward the idea that strength of will is not sub-divided by task.  
That is, we do not have strong will about doing the dishes and weak will about 
chocolate cake, nor does one have strong will at work and weak will at home.  
                                            
10 Oaten, M. & Cheng, K.  (2006) “Longitudinal gains in self-control from regular physical exercise.” 
11 Oaten, M. & Cheng, K.  (2007) “Improvements in self-control from financial monitoring.” 
12 Oaten, M. & Cheng, K.  (2006) “Academic study improves regulatory strength.” Basic and Applied 
Social Psychology. 
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Rather, willpower seems to be a single pool of mental energy from which we draw in 
the performance of various tasks of self-regulation.  Of course we often succumb to 
temptations at home which we would resist at work, and manage to do the dishes 
only to find ourselves eating chocolate cake before bed, but these differences can 
be explained in part by the fact that willpower is a limited resource—we choose 
which areas of life will receive the greater part of willpower. 
Problems With The Muscle Metaphor: Regional Control 
 Mele argues against the muscle metaphor on the grounds that "self control 
may be either regional or global, and it comes in degrees."13  Regional self-control is 
troublesome for a muscle-like conception of willpower because it seems as though a 
muscle can be applied toward different tasks.  This is one of the central reasons 
Baumeister offers in favor of his account.   If it turns out that willpower is regularly a 
regional phenomenon, one of the supports is removed from Baumeister's argument.  
And, on the other hand, finding that willpower is regional would support the idea that 
it is a skill specific to certain types of behavior or choice.  The trouble at this point is 
that Mele offers little support for his claim; he attributes this view to A.O. Rorty, for 
whom it seems to be an element of Aristotelean psychology.14   As much as one 
might appreciate Aristotle's sense of human psychology he would likely want more of 
us were he working today and many parts of his science should absolutely be 
shelved.   
 While we have limited data Mele is currently working with a group conducting 
experimental research on the subject. But there is some reason to believe that self-
                                            
13 Mele (2012) 
14 A.O. Rorty (1980) "Akrasia and Conflict" Inquiry 22:193-212 
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control is in fact distributed in regionally distinct ways based on animal research.  I 
hasten to add that there is tremendous difficulty extrapolating from rats to humans, 
but some research on rats suggests that the mechanisms for immediate impulse 
control and those for long term planning are distinct.  Rats were exposed to food 
towers which would dispense food if the rat put its nose in the bottom and press a 
button.  A second tower would dispense five pellets instead of the traditional one, but 
it came with a brief delay.  Researchers noted which rats were able to delay 
gratification in exchange for the increased reward.  Other rats were then taught to 
cancel the action of pushing the button by refusing to give the pellet if the button was 
pushed after a tone was sounded.  Some rats were very good at canceling the 
action, other continued to push the button in many cases despite indication that it 
would cause harm.  Researchers examined the neural circuitry involved in these two 
kinds of self-control and preliminarily report that the mechanisms are distinct.15 
Problems With The Muscle Metaphor: Failure through desire  
Joel Feinberg argues against the metaphor of willpower as a muscle because 
he thinks that this metaphor locks one into the idea that failures of self-control are 
the product of literally irresistible desires.  It is easy to see why such a concern might 
arise.  After all, if willpower is a limited resource and is depleted through tasks of 
self-control, eventually one might literally have no willpower left.  Feinberg writes, 
“The psychological situation is never—or hardly ever—like that of the man who dives 
                                            
15 Everitt, B. J., & Robbins, T. W. (2005). Neural systems of reinforcement for drug addiction: from 
actions to habits to compulsion. Nature neuroscience,8(11), 1481-1489.  
Robbins, T. W., & Everitt, B. J. (1996). Neurobehavioural mechanisms of reward and 
motivation. Current opinion in neurobiology, 6(2), 228-236. 
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from a sinking ship in the middle of the ocean and swims until he is exhausted and 
then drowns.  Human endurance puts a severe limit on how long one can stay afloat 
in ocean; but there is no comparable limit to our ability to resist temptation.”16 
Feinberg’s point is that in matters of willpower there is always something more that 
one could do, some amount of effort that would have proved successful beyond the 
point at which one’s self-control actually fails.  That is, Feinberg believes that in 
almost all cases where willpower gives out one would have been successful, if only 
one had tried harder. 
In part Feinberg is right, we often succumb to temptation in cases where we 
did have adequate willpower to resist and we are only occasionally in a state so 
depleted of strength that we could not resist an impulse.  Consider for example two 
cases of an addict, Jill, trying to quit using heroin.  In the first scenario Jill has been 
clean for nearly a day, she spent the majority of the day at work focusing on a 
monotonous and boring word processing task and in the early hours of the morning 
she has not yet been able to sleep due to withdrawal, add to this that Jill has not 
eaten a good meal all day.  Jill’s mental reserves are seriously depleted and she 
breaks down.  Jill scores a fix from Hank, her dealer, and returns home to shoot up 
in her apartment.  Now imagine the exact same scenario, but imagine that a police 
officer was at Hank’s house asking questions.  Would Jill still have tried to score 
from Hank, or, could she have resisted until the police had left?  In all but the most 
                                            
16 Joel Feinberg (1970) “What is so special about mental illness” in Doing and Deserving (Princeton 
University Press) pp. 282-3 
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extraordinary cases17 addicts can and do resist their urges when the addict 
recognizes a clearly hostile police presence.  This fact suggests that even those with 
seriously compromised willpower are left with adequate strength of will to respond 
positively to large incentives. 
 It turns out that strength of will is depleted through use, but it is not often 
completely depleted.  Baumeister compares this to muscular conservation of energy, 
pointing out that the muscle does not disappear completely, it simply weakens.  On 
an alternative to Baumeister's view there remains an adequate amount of willpower 
for most tasks, but the desire to exercise that strength of will is supplanted by other 
alternative interests like giving in to temptation.  As Gary Watson puts this point, 
“motivational obstacles work in part not by defeating one’s best efforts, but by 
diverting one from effective resistance.”18 Watson’s point is that willpower is not 
defeated by brute force, but rather a conflicting appeal.  This makes intuitive sense 
because strength of will is only possible when one is actively choosing between 
alternatives.  There is no need for willpower unless there are conflicting choices.  
This is one place where the muscle metaphor of willpower breaks down.  Muscular 
strength is often defeated by the brute force of external pressures.  For example, 
when packing my office I know to use only small boxes for books not because I 
won’t want to lift large boxes of books, but because I simply will not be able to do so.  
The weight of a large box of books is simply overwhelming.  On the other hand, I 
know that if I want cheesecake it would be best to buy only one slice, rather than an 
                                            
17 William James (1890,1950, 2:53) gives an account of addicts who reported that canon fire would 
not keep him from a keg of rum and another who drank the alcohol from six morbid specimen jars.  
18 Gary Watson (2004) “Disordered Appetites” in Agency and Answerability (OUP) p. 65  
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entire cake.  This is not because the entire cake will force itself on me in a way that I 
could not resist; rather, I will want to eat more than one slice.  It is typically internal 
motivations that defeat willpower, not the external pressures that defeat muscles. 
In opposition to a Watson-style account of willpower failures based on internal 
features, John Doris has marshaled a significant body of empirical research to the 
effect that situational pressures, not internal character traits, drive human action.19  
On Doris’s view character is so highly transitory and localized that he suggests 
character devolves into responsiveness to situational pressures.  Doris recounts 
prominent results from social psychology including Milgram’s results on obedience to 
authority, Zimbaro’s Stanford prison experiments, and several studies on an effect 
known as the diffusion of responsibility.  These action-guiding psychological 
phenomena represent in part situational pressures that are clearly capable of 
leading the vast majority of people to engage in morally reprehensible behavior.  
Milgram showed that ordinary people no different than you or I would shock other 
human beings to death simply because they were asked to by a researcher.20  
Zimbardo asked college students who had been screened for psychological stability 
to play prisoner and guards for two weeks, but the experiment was canceled after 
only a few days because the situation became too dangerous.21   Likewise, the 
diffusion of responsibility seems to account for a large number of people standing by 
passively while Kitty Genovese was murdered.22  Results like these lead Doris to 
                                            
19 John Doris (2002) Lack of Character (Cambridge Press) 
20 Milgram, S. (1978). Obedience to authority. 
21 Haney, C., Banks, C., & Zimbardo, P. (1973). Interpersonal dynamics in a simulated prison. 
22 Manning, R., Levine, M., & Collins, A. (2007). The Kitty Genovese murder and the social 
psychology of helping: the parable of the 38 witnesses. American Psychologist, 62(6), 555. 
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conclude that situational framing conditions shape human behavior far more strongly 
than do individuating global dispositions.  If Doris is right about the weakness of 
character in determining action and external pressures often guide our action, the 
muscle metaphor is strengthened against a Watson-style objection. If external  
pressures what defeats the will, then it would make some sense to describe the will 
as a muscle.  If internal pressures defeat the will, it seems less like a muscle. 
However, the muscle metaphor does break down when it comes to the sort of 
pressures to which willpower tends to respond.  Of course situational pressures 
effect our decision making process and these effects very often take place outside of 
our awareness, but they reflect a series of reasons for action about which we are 
typically unaware.  For instance, obedience to authority and the diffusion of 
responsibility mentioned earlier, could both be described as participating in a sort of 
in-group behavior that is a normal part of the human disposition—for better or worse 
we are a herd animal. Contrary to some misconceptions herd animals do not act in 
the best interests of the group at their own expense, rather they follow the leaders 
and others within the herd.  Sometimes this is in the interest of the individual and the 
group, sometimes it is in the interest of neither.23  Entire herds of buffalo following 
one another off the edge of a cliff is not exactly individuating behavior, but it is 
indicative of an internal motivation to stick with the group.  It should come as a shock 
to no one that the people are much more alike than they are different, so 
individuating characteristics will be significantly fewer than our similarities.  The real 
value of situationist results in social psychology is that they force us away from a 
                                            
23 Grandin, T. (1980). Livestock behavior as related to handling facilities design. 
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tendency to look at our interesting differences and to confront the often overlooked 
similarities in our motivational systems. Confronting these overlooked impulses is 
extraordinarily valuable because ceteris paribus we make better decisions with more 
complete evidence.  As we become more aware of the ways small situational 
differences can lead us to act badly we begin to have some hope of overcoming 
them. 
Problems With The Muscle Metaphor: Strategic Success 
A related consideration reveals a third difficulty with the muscle metaphor, 
specifically, it turns out that the most effective way to incorporate responsiveness to 
hidden motivational forces into our deliberation is to attend to the sort of situations 
into which we place ourselves.  In a recent book on willpower Baumeister and 
Tierney call this strategy “playing offense,” 24  John Doris calls it “avoiding ethical 
brinkmanship.”25 In both cases the recommendation amounts to an empirically 
based strategic implementation of willpower.  The most strong-willed people it 
seems are those who do not struggle and fight contrary inclinations the hardest, 
rather strong-willed people are those who fight effectively and fighting effectively 
often means avoiding conflicts before they arise.  But, this sort of strategy doesn’t 
sound much like the way a muscle operates; it is rather more like a skill.  
Consider the contrast between two people, Tom and Susan, each with an 
equal desire to drink heavily at a summer party with friends.  Both Tom and Susan 
also have other goals with which heavy drinking conflicts.  Tom decides that he will 
attend the party and drink moderately; Susan decides that it would be best to avoid 
                                            
24 Baumeister and Tierney (2011) Willpower (The Penguin Press; NY) 
25 Doris (2002) p.147 
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the party altogether.  Who is more likely to end up drinking heavily?  It is pretty clear 
that Tom is more likely to drink heavily.  Tom is engaging in risky behavior by 
attending the party despite his urge to over-indulge.  His strategy relies on the heavy 
use of brute strength of will—Tom’s strategy requires big "willpower muscles"—
especially if he intends to drink moderately which statistically would weaken his self-
control.  Susan on the other hand employs a risk averting strategy and dramatically 
lowers her chances of over-indulging.  Susan’s strategy relies not on big willpower 
muscles, rather the strength of her choice lays in employing a sound technique.  
Recent empirical research suggests that effective self-controllers are much more like 
Susan then they are like Tom.26  It seems that the effective use of willpower has 
more to do with strategic deployment, than it does with brute strength.    
In an important respect strong-willed people are like the people in strongman 
competitions, they exercise regularly, but they also develop techniques which 
maximize the effectiveness of their developed capacity.  Strongman competitions 
involve participants who attempt lift, carry, hold or throw extremely large and wieldy 
objects, such as beer kegs, tractor tires, telephone poles and cars.  These 
competitions involve tremendous physical strength which can only be developed 
over many years of training.  However, what distinguishes the best strongmen from 
the average ones is not that they are overwhelmingly stronger; rather, it is that they 
are familiar with the apparatuses and have developed a good technique.27  The 
strongest strongmen are just as strong as average strongmen, what sets them apart 
                                            
26 Baumeister et. al. (2012) “Everyday Temptations: An Experience Sampling Study of Desire, 
Conflict, and Self-Control” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Vol. 102, No. 6, 1318 –1335 
27 Or so the commentators, themselves strongmen, report.  Also, leverage&weight > weight.  
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is that they are more skilled at employing their muscular strength.  Likewise, what 
sets strong-willed people apart seems not to be that they have a more developed 
capacity for self-control, but that they are more skilled in deploying their resources. 
Is Willpower Just Sugar? 
Before discussing the skill of willpower, consider some recent work closely 
associating glucose levels with performance on strenuous tasks of self-control.  One 
might conclude that the will-power “muscle” is tied closely to adequate levels of 
glucose in the pre-frontal cortex.  In one such study participants were required to 
attend to a boring data feed while being tempted with videos of either classic skits 
from Saturday Night Live or a Robin Williams standup routine.  The operational 
variable in this study was the glucose, or sugar, levels available to support neural 
functioning.  Participants with low levels of glucose performed significantly worse on 
the demanding will power tasks.  However, half a can of soda was able to resolve 
glucose deficiency and produce improved results.28  These results have been widely 
supposed to indicate that blood glucose is an important mechanism of self-control.  
Further study of glucose levels on willpower reveal that acts of self-control have the 
effect of depleting subject’s levels of glucose and lowering their levels of self-control.  
It seems that willpower and failures of willpower are reliably linked to human 
physiology, or a willpower “muscle.”  But brute exercise of self-control is notoriously 
ineffective and serious efforts of self-regulation require more than a robust 
physiology, they require sound technique. 
                                            
28 Baumeister, Roy (2007) “The physiology of willpower: linking blood glucose to self-control” 
Personality and Social Psychology.  Vol. 9 No. 2 pp. 325-356 
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In short, although treating willpower as simply a metaphorical muscle is 
mistaken, it is not a mistake to treat the metaphor as capturing part of the story of 
willpower.  Its flaw is that it does not adequately account for the strongest type of 
self-control—the strategic avoidance of temptation.  Nor, does the muscle metaphor 
adequately describe the sort of pressures that tend to undermine strength of will.  
Rather, it is best to think about willpower as a skill reliant on a capacity one might 
describe as “muscle-like” but also dependant on the exercise of sound strategic 
planning.  Thinking of willpower as a skill with a physical component has several 
advantages.  First, the willpower as skill model is able to account for strategic 
instances of willpower.  Second, the skill model of willpower is more amenable to an 
explanation of weakness of will in terms of poor decision making as opposed to 
connoting irresistible forces.  Finally, thinking about willpower as a skill has the 
advantage that it describes self-regulation in terms which describe an activity or 
practice of agents, rather than a part of agent’s physiology. 
The Skill Model of Willpower 
Several researchers have argued that when it comes to examining the 
empirical data the skill model of self-regulation is at an explanatory disadvantage.29 
This claim is false, but warrants examination.  The trouble, they say, is that the skill 
is model would both, fail to predict the phenomenon of ego depletion, and, would 
predict distinct varieties of willpower applicable to different spheres of influence. 
Consider first the phenomenon of ego depletion.  As we saw earlier a person’s 
performance on tasks which require self-regulation can be manipulated for the worse 
                                            
29 Roy Baumeister, et. al. (1998) “Self-Control as Limited Resource: Regulatory Depletion Patterns” 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Vol. 74, No. 3, 777 
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by requiring them to exercises self-control before completing the task.  This is why 
not laughing at a Robin Williams skit makes it less likely you will be able to track 
objects on a screen.  Critics argue that someone who is skilled in a task does not get 
appreciably worse at the task as they perform it over several iterations.  The critic’s 
reasoning is that skill level remains essentially constant over multiple trials and 
should predict a relatively constant performance across iterative tests of self-control.  
They argue, that in the short-term muscle’s weaken through use, while in the short-
term skills remain constant through use and since willpower weakens through use in 
the short term it is better described as a muscle.  What these critics fail to consider is 
that it may be best to think of willpower not exclusively as either a skill or muscular-
type activity, but as a hybrid.  The exercise of willpower in the real world requires 
that people act and as has been shown people tire, even when they retain their 
basic skill set.  Putting skills into action requires the sort of exertion that depletes 
muscles and the supply of glucose to the brain.  But, this does not indicate that 
willpower is glucose or any other deplete-able element.  Rather, it means that 
willpower requires as an element of muscle-like capacities which are depleted 
through use.  
Take for example, the difficult time one might have resisting the temptation to 
eat all of the vegan coconut, cardamom and lime cupcakes sitting in the refrigerator.  
In part this resistance is governed by one’s available stores of mental energy in 
terms of rest, glucose and other factors.  But given enough time and the requisite 
urges, one is very likely to eventually become depleted and eat those cupcakes.  On 
the other hand, one might realize how difficult brute resistance will be and choose to 
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use his limited strength to make a decision with positive long-term effects.  For 
example, rather than simply fight the urge to eat a cupcake, one might bring the 
cupcakes in to work to share with colleagues. The act of giving away delicious 
cupcakes may be a challenging test of willpower, but it is a brief challenge on par 
with resisting eating the cupcakes for only a moment.  We would expect that both 
activities would lead to some ego depletion or weakening of the willpower “muscle.”  
However, in the case of giving away the cupcakes one’s efforts have been used far 
more efficiently and produce a significant advantage in terms of avoiding the 
cupcakes long term.  Once one has given the cupcakes away the problem of 
resistance is solved.  An advantage of the skill model of willpower is that it is able to 
incorporate strategic elements such as giving away the cupcakes. Suppose we ask 
“Who has more willpower or exhibits a greater degree of self regulation the person 
who sits for 5 minutes not eating the cupcakes, or the person who spends five 
minutes giving the cupcakes away?”  These may be basically indistinguishable on 
the view of willpower as a muscle—both require resisting a desire for 5 minutes.  
However, on the view that willpower is a skill we can account for the likely 
effectiveness of resistance and say that giving away the cupcakes exhibits a greater 
power of self-regulation.  This is important because strategic thinking is a crucial 
element of willpower. 
It turns out that, all things being equal, making decisions about how one ought 
to act also has the effect of depleting one’s capacity for self-regulation.30  This is in 
                                            
30 Vohs, K. D., Baumeister, R. F., Schmeichel, B. J., Twenge, J. M., Nelson, N. M., & Tice, D. M. 
(2014). Making choices impairs subsequent self-control: a limited-resource account of decision 
making, self-regulation, and active initiative. 
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part why sometimes all we want is not to have to decide about yet another issue.  If 
you have ever said, “I will eat absolutely anywhere or anything as long as you 
choose,” it may be that you where storing whatever reserves of self-control you had 
left for more important decisions.  This phenomenon is often described as decision 
fatigue and it explains why planning an ornate wedding, for instance, is so difficult.  
The sheer number of decisions to be made is literally exhausting to one’s willpower.  
However, some decisions tend to reduce the choices we will need to make in the 
future, while others leave future decisions to be made or even open more choices. 
When confronting a mountain of decisions a wise strategy for preserving one’s ability 
to effectively deliberate about that mountain of choices is to eliminate as many 
unimportant decisions as possible.31  By witling down the number of choices one 
confronts, it is possible to maximize the effectiveness of one’s powers of self-control.  
A process of explicitly making narrowing decisions in the face of overwhelming 
choices is a learned skill, but it is a skill which depends on adequate supplies of 
mental energy and which can therefore be depleted.      
The simplest way to understand the difference between strength of will as a 
muscle or a skill is to consider the parallel to physical strength.  What is the 
appropriate measure of physical strength?  It seems uncontroversial that physical 
strength (as opposed to health, endurance, etc.)  is best measured by the ability to 
lift heavy objects.  What it means to be physically strong is to able to lift heavy loads.  
But in any test of this capacity it is practically impossible to separate the skill 
associated with lifting from the muscular requirement.  This is not an artifact of 
                                            
31 Of course, limiting important choices is also a valuable strategy.  Odysseus' choice to lash himself 
to the mast, for example. 
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testing.  Rather, it is due to the fact that human strength is the skilled use of one’s 
muscles, frame, etc.  For lack of a better way to put it, our mind and bodies are not 
the sort of distinct entities that can be adequately understood independently of one 
another.  Similarly, we ought to ask the question, what is the appropriate measure of 
strength of will? Again, the answer will need to relate to how one is able to perform.  
What it means to be strong willed is to be able to regulate oneself in the service of 
regularly  making and implementing reasonable choices about action. Any test of 
willpower will involve both a strategic and physiological element.  Ego depletion 
highlights the physiological role of willpower, but we have at least two explanatory 
options.  Either we use the muscle metaphor and begin to reduce will power to the 
physiological, or we describe willpower as a skill of physiologically grounded beings 
incorporating both cognitive and physiological components. Both accounts explain 
depletion, but the skill account has the advantage of also explaining strategic 
decision making.   
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Chapter 2 
Willpower Strategies 
Because, willpower involves more than brute psychological force it is 
important to get some idea of the strategies that tend to generate strength of will.  
Fortunately there a number of strategies with demonstrated success.  It is helpful to 
think about the skills of willpower as dividing along two axes: long-term vs. 
immediate strategies, and strategies of engagement vs. strategies of avoidance.  
The strategies I mention here should not be taken as an exhaustive list, rather they 
are examples of the types of willpower strategies available.  Short term strategies 
include mindfulness and distraction, these are short-term in the sense that they 
require the agent to exert some effort at the time of temptation.  Of course, there 
may be some extended training in mindfulness or distraction at work, but the crucial 
element of immediate strategies is that they are deployed once a temptation arises.  
Long term strategies involve advanced planning for temptations that one expects will 
arise.  Examples of long term willpower strategies include avoiding temptation by not 
engaging in brinkmanship and implementing precommitment strategies to prevent 
oneself from succumbing to temptation.  Along the second axes the types of strategy 
divide differently.  Mindfulness and pre-commitment strategies operate by 
encouraging engagement, but implementing procedural safe guards against a 
temptation overwhelming one's resistance.  Conversely, strategies of distraction and 
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avoiding brinkmanship discourage engagement with temptation and operate by 
removing the temptation to the greatest degree possible. 
 
Willpower Strategies Immediate  Long-Term 
Engagement Mindfulness Precommitment  
Disengagement Distraction Avoidance 
 
Chart of Willpower Strategies, Fig. 1 
This chapter begins by describing the four types of willpower strategy 
mentioned above.  Each type of willpower strategy is explained both theoretically 
and using a non-fanciful example.  I then defend the idea that willpower can be 
extended over time.  My view is that willpower can be an anticipatory activity 
involving the preparation for expected temptations for three reasons.  First, skillful 
deployment of willpower is always linked to an agent whose interests and 
evaluations are extended over time.  Second, in the strongest cases of willpower the 
exercise of willpower now not only affirms one's values now, but helps make an 
agent strong-willed over time.  Third, if willpower is only thought of as immediate it 
seems that people who constantly walk on the edge of losing control actually have 
the most control.  To some this conclusion will seem absurd.  In any event, as a 
stipulative matter I see little harm in a technical vocabulary which distinguishes long-
term self control from willpower.  However, I argue that the terms "willpower" and 
"self-control" should be used interchangeably.  
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Distraction 
A series of studies conducted Walter Mischel in the late 1960’s set the stage 
for thinking about willpower in terms of effective strategies in addition to those 
already discussed.32  Mischel and his colleagues tested the self-control mechanisms 
of ninety two 3-5 year old children by offering them a marshmallow and then telling 
the children that they could have a second marshmallow if they would only wait 15 
minutes to eat the first one.  The children responded with a range of interesting 
strategies including paying close attention to the treat at hand including holding, 
licking or nibbling the treat, some studiously avoided looking at the treat, others 
looked for distractions such as available toys, some sang songs to themselves 
reminding them that they were supposed to wait and one particularly cunning 
youngster simply fell asleep.  Each of these strategies was effective in some cases, 
but there were some clear tendencies in terms of the effectiveness of strategies 
aimed at delaying gratification. Initially Mischel hypothesized that focusing on the 
expected reward would strengthen performance in the willpower task, but the results 
indicated just the opposite.  It turns out that focusing on the expectation of the 
second marshmallow usually led the children to give in to temptation and eat the 
marshmallow early.  On the other hand, children who distracted themselves by 
thinking pleasant thoughts or playing with toys were successful in delaying 
                                            
32 Walter Mischel (1970) “Attention in Delay of Gratification” Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 
Vol. 16, No. 2, 329-337 and (1972) “Cognitive and attentional mechanisms in delay of gratification.” 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol 21 No. 2 pp. 204-218. 
 
 32 
 
gratification better than half of the time.  Mischel’s results point to a promising 
strategy for self-control, distraction.   
 The overwhelming effectiveness of the sleep strategy in Mischel's study helps 
to explain why distraction can be such a powerful asset when resisting a desire.  The 
sleeping child was no longer tempted to eat the single marshmallow and was thus 
able to wait patiently without fatiguing his capacity for self-regulation.  Similarly, 
when we are trying to avoid eating that extra slice of pizza it is unwise to stare 
longingly at the leftover pizza.  We might more effectively resist the impulse to 
overeat by closing the pizza box and turning toward the dishes to be washed.  These 
actions help preserve our willpower by changing the way we view the situation in a 
way that requires significantly less self-regulation.  It is much easier to wash dishes 
than it is to resist eating pizza, and if we can see ourselves as doing the one and not 
the other this strategy can help increase effective willpower. Self-distractions are 
especially effective strategies for enhancing self-control when they shift our actions 
from brute exercises of self-control like watching a wanted marshmallow, to more 
engaging tasks.  By implementing distractions we take our minds off of the conflict 
we find difficult to manage and thereby preserve willpower.     
Of course, it is important to remember that not all distractions are valuable 
strategies for maximizing willpower; in fact a lot of distractions are highly detrimental 
to effective self-regulation.  Remember the white bear from Baumeister’s studies?  
The whole point of that bear was to distract people from the task at hand by asking 
them to instead focus on not thinking about the bear.  By distracting people from 
their primary task with another challenging task the white bear proved distracting in a 
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negative sense—it actually made the task of self-control harder.  Most people in the 
modern world have experienced this phenomenon in one way or another.  For 
example, when you are working hard to complete a project for work and email keeps 
coming in, your office phone rings, followed by your cellular phone, then a facebook 
message comes through, and all of a sudden you have utterly lost your momentum 
in the work project at hand.  Such distractions seriously tax ones reserves of 
willpower. 
The presence of willpower draining distracters gives us a hint that distractions 
work best as strategies of self-control when the willpower task at hand has to do with 
resisting a desire, as opposed to when the willpower challenge is to do something 
like accomplish a task.  However, it would be wrong to suppose that distractions are 
always helpful at resisting desires.  For example, Baba Shiv has shown that 
shoppers who are distracted were nearly 20% more likely to choose a  product being 
marketed through taste testing than where less distracted shoppers.33  Shiv had 224 
people remember either a two digit number (low distraction) or an eight digit number 
(high distraction) and then had them each sample Lindt chocolate.  The subjects 
were then asked to choose between a Godiva chocolate and a Lindt chocolate.  
Those with eight numbers to remember chose the Lindt at 66.1%, while those with 
only 2 numbers to remember chose Lindt at only 46.4%.  The result contradicts the 
expectations of 92% of marketing executives who presumed that taste testing would 
be most effective without distractions.   A second study provided added information 
                                            
33 Shiv and Fedorikhin (1999) “Heart and Mind in Conflict: The interplay of affect and cognition in 
consumer decision making.”  Journal of Consumer Research vol. 26 pp278-292. 
Shiv and Nowlis (2004) “ The Effect of Distractions while Tasting a Food Sample” Journal of 
Consumer Research vol 31 pp. 599-608. 
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to the subjects by telling half of them that Gourmet magazine had recently voted 
Lindt Europe’s best chocolate. This information should lead to more people choosing 
the Lindt, and it does so in the low distraction group with the percentage choosing 
Lindt increasing from 46.4% to 69.6%.  But the high distraction group shows an 
insignificant change from 66.1% to 65.4%.  It seems that when distracted consumers 
not only are impacted by the marketing ploy at a greater level, but they are also less 
sensitive to information relevant to the choice at hand.  Of course, we mostly want to 
make our own decisions based on good information and not marketing, but it seems 
that distractions weaken our resolve in this regard.  Shiv associates this weakening 
of resolve with the power of distraction to emphasize pleasurable affective 
experience at the expense of considering other relevant information.   
The idea that distractions can heighten rather than lessen affect is unusual 
given the widely supported research conclusion that distraction can lessen pain.  In 
numerous studies it has been shown that among individuals in painful conditions 
those who are distracted report lower levels of experienced pain, while those who 
are undistracted or told to focus on the pain report higher levels of experienced 
pain.34  However, research on the effectiveness of distraction in relieving pain is 
equivocal.  For example, in a recent study eighty one 9-18 year old children took part 
in a cold pressor task and divided into an undistracted group and a group involved in 
an attention demanding tone detection task.  The children in the distraction group 
                                            
34 McCaul, K. D., & Malott, J. M. (1984). Distraction and coping with pain.Psychological bulletin, 95(3), 
516., Kleiber, C., & Harper, D. C. (1999). Effects of distraction on children's pain and distress during 
medical procedures: a meta-analysis. Nursing research, 48(1), 44-49., Gold, J. I., Kim, S. H., Kant, A. 
J., Joseph, M. H., & Rizzo, A. S. (2006). Effectiveness of virtual reality for pediatric pain distraction 
during IV placement.CyberPsychology & Behavior, 9(2), 207-212. 
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attended to the distracting task, and reported paying less attention to the painful 
sensation, but also reported experiencing higher levels of pain by ending the task 
sooner.  This finding was significant across the group, but was especially the case 
for children who on an earlier measure tended to exaggerate the experience or 
importance of pain.  So it seems that for children prone to catastrophizing distraction 
may enhance the experience of pain.35  
Mindfulness 
It is unclear exactly how and when distraction increases or decreases 
willpower, but some have begun to suggest an alternative strategy of attending to 
difficult challenges such as resisting cravings or sticking with the cold pressor task.  
The strategy here is known as "mindfulness" and has the substantial advantage of 
applying to many traditionally challenging situations in which distraction would be 
either unreliable on unviable.  Sarah Bowen has helped to develop the strategy of 
mindfulness, which she describes as “surfing the urge."36  Mindfulness involves 
focusing on the details and nuance of experience involved with a difficult task 
without trying to hide or obscure the phenomena.  The process is composed of three 
distinct elements, first accepting or attending to the urge or temptation; for example, 
this could mean paying close attention to the bodily sensation of wanting a cigarette.  
Second,  take a deep breath and use this moment to pause and plan a response to 
the urge.  And finally, look to your broader set of interests and look for the first 
opportunity to recommit to your goal. 
                                            
35 Verhoeven, et. al. (2012) “Pain catastrophizing influences the use and the effectiveness 
of distraction in school children.” European Journal of Pain, Vol 16(2) pp. 256-267. 
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As a test of mindfulness training Bowen asked a group of active smokers to 
abstain from smoking for twelve hours and then to sit in a room with no distractions 
and to stare at a pack of their favorite cigarettes.  They were then asked to pack the 
cigarettes, then to slowly unwrap the cellophane, then to slowly open the pack and 
to take time to smell the cigarettes, then to remove one cigarette and hold it for a 
while, then to rest a cigarette in their mouths, then to remove a lighter.  This process 
took over an hour and the smokers were never allowed to light-up.  Half of the 
smokers had received earlier mindfulness training, and half had not.  After their 
training the smokers were asked simply to record the number of cigarettes they 
consumed in the subsequent week.  They were not instructed to “surf the urge” nor 
were they instructed to cut back on their smoking.  However, by the end of the week 
the group trained in mindfulness had reduced their consumption of cigarettes by 
37% while the control group had not reduced their intake at all.  In follow up studies 
involving the training of those in residential substance dependence programs Bowen 
had similar results with those trained in mindfulness showing an increased 
resistance to relapse.37   
Another study directly compared mindfulness training with distraction as 
strategies for emphasizing self-control.  In this study ninety eight students were 
asked to carry around a clear plastic box of Hershey’s kisses for 48 hours and told 
that they should try not to eat any.  The students were divided into three roughly 
equal groups.  One group was trained in distraction techniques and instructed to 
                                            
37 Bowen, S. et. al. (2009) “Mindfulness-Based Relapse Prevention for Substance Use Disorders” 
Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology Vol. 78 pp. 295-305 See also, Witkiewitz and Bowen 
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distract themselves whenever they had the urge to eat a kiss.  The second group of 
students was trained in mindfulness and instructed not to suppress their desire, but 
to notice how the desire felt in their bodies, to pause and then to recommit to their 
goal.  And the finally the control group was not instructed with any specific control 
strategy.38 The results of this study were that most of the people who ate kisses 
came from the control group, with half as many in the distraction group eating 
kisses.  The acceptance based group ate fewer kisses than the control, but more 
than the distraction group.  However, the acceptance group did perform the best 
among those who reported high levels of cravings.  
It seems that one effective strategy for self-control is to learn to accept one’s 
inner conflicts and allow them to pass without acting on them.  Underlying this 
counter-intuitive strategy may be the simple truth that we cannot eradicate our urges 
through distraction. In fact sometimes trying not think about the white bear, makes 
that almost impossible.  Exercises of self-control are difficult in part because they 
keep coming to our attention despite (and sometimes because of) attempts to 
suppress them.  At one time or another one must confront one’s inner conflicts and 
when doing so it is best not to rely on brute willpower, but to have a strategy for 
effective implementation.  Mindfulness training provides such a strategy.     
It may be helpful to see how mindfulness works to compare it with the 
common advice of positive psychology to "visualize success."39  The idea is that by 
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visualizing oneself performing the difficult task it will become easier to actually 
perform the task.  However, recent research suggests that visualizing successes of 
willpower can lead to failure.  Two things go wrong when we visualize success.  
First, we visualize succeeding, but not the steps we take and obstacles that we must 
overcome in order to reach success and second, we recall earlier successes and 
bask in them, coasting on our present challenge.  It turns out that effective self-
regulation is bolstered by imagining the ways that we might be challenged rather 
than imagining ourselves simply succeeding.  Mindfullness training focuses on 
attending to exactly those impulses and urges which stand in the way of effective 
resistance.  Imagining success is important in a motivational sense because it can 
help to overcome our inertia.  But it is more important that the imagination of 
success be realistic and not an impoverished fantasy of success, otherwise the 
visualization becomes an impediment to progress. 
A pair of researchers working in US business schools provides some 
compelling research on the way in which idealizing the future hurts our willpower and 
the degree to which we are prone to such idealizations.40 Robin Tanner and Kurt 
Carlson asked people how much they planned to exercise in the upcoming week.  
They then asked another group how much they would exercise in the upcoming 
week in an ideal world.  The two groups reported the same expectation of exercise, 
which Tanner and Carlson interpret as meaning that the default framing about the 
                                                                                                                                       
D.R. Gould (Eds.), Foundations of sport and exercise psychology (4th ed.). Champaign, IL: Human 
Kinetics. 
40 : Robin J. Tanner and Kurt A. Carlson (2009) “Unrealistically Optimistic Consumers: A Selective 
Hypothesis Testing Account for Optimism in Predictions of Future Behavior” Journal of Consumer 
Research, Vol. 35, No. 5 pp. 810-822 
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future is in idealized terms.  This means that when we imagine our future selves, we 
fail to recognize the commitments of time, stresses and conflicting desires that will 
affect us then.  Recall, that this same difficulty arises when people are asked to 
contribute to a savings program for retirement or to delay gratification for a larger 
reward.  Tanner and Carlson further these findings by showing just how resistant 
people are to viewing the future realistically.  In one version of their study 
participants in the non-idealized group were asked specifically “Please do not 
provide an idealistic prediction, but the most realistic prediction you can.”  
Participants were then interviewed two weeks later to see how much they had 
actually exercised.  The results showed an overly optimistic outlook in the early 
predictions.  But how would new predictions come out if participants had this 
information.  When asked to make another prediction about future exercise the 
participants predicted even higher rates of exercise than they had initially.  When 
confronted with the hard truth that they had unrealistic expectations people did not 
adjust their expectations down, they adjusted them up to make-up for the failure—
this is a strategy for failure.   
Mindfulness training takes the basic insight of positive psychology, that 
focusing on pathology will never lead to a meaningful life and co-opts what has been 
previously pathological into the meaning of one's life.41  Personalizing the 
experience of temptation and resistance can strengthen will not by increasing the 
brute force of resistance, but by developing a sense of the resistance as meaningful.  
By attending to the embodied discomfort of resistance the cigarette smokers took 
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ownership over the sensation.  Further, the attention paid to ritual and detail of 
activity allowed the smokers to disentangle a cluster of smoking bhaviors and 
sensations into constituent elements.  This exploded view of a routine allowed the 
smokers greater control over their own behaviors.   
It is important to note that the concept of mindfulness in resisting impulses 
with which an agent disagrees could develop into a sentimental account of 
temptation.  One might mistakenly believe that temptation is somehow to be sought 
because resisting it gives life meaning.  As I consider this potential mistake I cannot 
help but compare thinking about mindfulness of pain to the 16th century's "noble 
savage."  It was thought by some that the "uncivilized" conditions of Native 
Americans and others allowed for the unadulterated communion with their own 
natural goodness.  This reification of the natural was a romantic notion in the same 
way reifying pain or temptation would be.  The experience of temptation is not itself a 
good; rather temptation is a necessary obstacle in living a life of one's choosing.  On 
this account mindfulness is a strategy of attending to the details of the life one 
chooses in an effort to take control.   
Avoidance (Avoiding Brinkmanship) 
Brinkmanship is a cold-war term used to describe going to the edge of conflict 
in order to extract some gain or concession from an opponent.42  But being on the 
brink need not involve the possibility of nuclear war, indeed one can be on the brink 
of losing in an internal conflict with oneself.  John Doris gives an example in which a 
colleague "with whom you have had a long flirtation invites you for dinner, offering 
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enticement of interesting food and elegant wine...with the excuse that you are 
temporarily orphaned while your spouse is out of town."43  If we presume that marital 
infidelity is undesirable it is probably wise to avoid this situation.  Even though you 
may sincerely value fidelity you may also "recognize that situational pressures may 
all too easily overwhelm character and avoid the dangerous situation."44  The idea is 
that one can more effectively resist the impulse to infidelity while sober in the cold 
light of day, than would be possible with wine in candle light.  A willpower strategy of 
avoiding brinkmanship means making the decision to avoid temptation before the 
temptation arises in full force.   
It is not hard to see the value in taking steps to avoid temptation before it 
arises, we have all succumb to a predictable temptation. Of course, one could 
probably just exercise brute resistance in the case of a flirtatious co-worker, but 
avoiding difficult situations makes the task easier and shifts the odds in favor of 
success.  Still an avoidance strategy can be important in ways beyond making a 
choice easier or improving the odds, it can make a difference in cases where we 
absolutely could not act as we believe we should through brute exercise of will 
power.  There are some willpower challenges about which brute exercise 
approaches being useless because the trouble is with our own implicit judgments.  In 
these cases we explicitly judge that one course of action would be best, but our 
judgment is regularly subverted by a contrary implicit bias. "Unlike explicit bias 
(which reflects the attitudes or beliefs that one endorses at a conscious level), 
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implicit bias is the bias in judgment and/or behavior that results from subtle cognitive 
processes (e.g., implicit attitudes and implicit stereotypes) that often operate at a 
level below conscious awareness and without intentional control."45     
Implicit association tests (IAT) work by measuring the "differential association 
of 2 target concepts with an attribute. The 2 concepts appear in a 2-choice task and 
the attribute in a 2nd task.  When instructions oblige highly associated categories to 
share a response key, performance is faster than when less associated categories 
share a key. This performance difference implicitly measures differential association 
of the 2 concepts with the attribute."46  For example, a subject might be asked to 
consider images of people of different races followed by positive or negative words.  
The rate differential between the time it takes to associate each race with positive or 
negative words is thought to give a measure of the subject's implicit racial bias.  If 
these tests in fact measure what they report to measure, it seems that there is 
substantial implicit racial bias.  Other versions of the IAT attempt to measure gender 
bias, age bias, disability, weight bias, sexual orientation bias and other categories.47  
These tests have become quite popular and results seem to indicate that most of us 
have at least some implicit biases with which we explicitly disagree.   
No one who takes an IAT on race wants to discover that they are strongly 
biased against faces of African origin, but that is the most statistically common 
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result.48    IAT's reveal an especially difficult problem with implicit biases, namely that 
bias persists in our choices despite our explicit commitments and efforts to the 
contrary.  As with other phenomenon, racial bias is not alleviated simply by 
awareness of the bias combined with the desire to act otherwise.  This is not the 
kind of problem that is susceptible to correction through brute force of will.  One 
could give oneself a moral hernia trying to lift the weight of racism to no avail.  A long 
term strategy beyond moral strain is needed to overcome implicit biases.    
Consider the sorts of situation in which an implicit bias may be particularly 
pernicious, in hiring for example.  In a recent study participants were asked to 
imagine that they were a newly elected mayor seeking to root out police corruption 
by hiring a new chief of police.  They were presented with applications including the 
names Brian and Karen.  In the first condition Brian was described as well-educated 
and skilled in administration, but as having little ‘‘street’’ experience in terms of 
making arrests and pursuing criminals.  Karen was described in opposite terms.  In 
the second condition roles were reversed and Brian was "streetwise" and Karen was 
well educated.  In both conditions the study participants overwhelmingly chose Brian 
over Karen.  In the first condition participants claimed that education was clearly the 
most significant qualification for the job.  In the second condition participants argued 
that experience was the most salient qualification.  But, it seems that the 
qualification participants most valued was gender.49 
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Participants in the "Hiring a New Police Chief" study agreed to act objectively 
when making their choice, but their implicit gender bias crept into their decision 
making nonetheless.  Other studies reveal similar biases in housing with respect to 
stereotypically white and black names such as "Tyrone" and "Bradly."50  Further 
evidence exists that this effect exists for teachers as well.51  Brute intention and even 
anti-discrimination laws are not enough to achieve fair decision making.  We also 
require long-term strategies to make our intentions effective.  One example of this 
sort of strategy would be to remove irrelevant identifying information such as race, or 
gender from job applications, housing applications and the like.  This strategy works 
by allowing the decision maker to decide in advance what sorts of information is not 
relevant and then precluding consideration of that information by making it 
unavailable.  By avoiding irrelevant information the decision maker who would be 
unable to resist her implicit biases through brute force is able to do as she judges 
best.          
Avoidance strategies usually are not complete in the sense that they ensure 
or guarantee that self-avowed better reasons are acted upon.  More typically an 
avoidance strategy simply increases the odds that one will be able to exercise 
control in the direction one favors at the moment of action.  An avoidance strategy 
typically involves coordinating one’s activities to avoid temptations and to choose 
instead situations which support our goals.  Part of what this means is being aware 
of the physiological constraints on willpower and scheduling activities and goals 
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accordingly.  For example, because we know that hunger is a sign of low glucose 
and low glucose especially inhibits the self-control area of the prefrontal cortex, we 
should try to avoid making serious decisions (or grocery shopping) while hungry.52  
Similarly, inadequate sleep causes the brain to process glucose in efficiently and 
leads to what some psychologists have called “temporary cognitive dysfunction.”53  It 
is best to make difficult choices when well rested.  A related consideration is that 
throughout a day of simply being awake, making even mundane choices, controlling 
one’s affect, directing one’s thoughts, etc. the physiological basis of willpower 
becomes depleted.  For this reason it is often an effective willpower strategy to 
arrange one’s day so that the most challenging activities come early in the day when 
one is at one’s strongest. 
Precommitment Strategies 
 It is of course not always possible to rearrange things to avoid temptation, so 
it is important that we can plan for predictable failures of brute willpower in other 
ways.  Thomas Schelling won a Nobel Prize in economics for his work on the cold 
war which argued that given entirely open options temptations would be 
insurmountable.  On his view the only way to avoid these temptations was for a 
nation to limit its options through a strategy of precommitment.54  Precommittment 
strategies close off options, make some options more costly, delayed or difficult than 
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they would otherwise be in an effort to keep an agent from acting against her own 
better judgments.  
 The classic example of a precommitment strategy is the case of Ulysses 
ordering his men to strap him to the mast and then plug their own ears with wax.  
This way Ulysses imagined he would be able to hear the sirens song, but would be 
unable to fail himself and his men by wrecking on the island.  Ulysses didn't want to 
avoid the sirens, but he also couldn't resist them by brute force of will. Having 
himself tied to the mast committed him to not wrecking the ship, while allowing him 
the preferred engagement with the sirens. This case is so central to the literature on 
precommitment that arrangements of this type have come to be known as "Ulysses 
contracts."  The trouble with this classic case is that it seems unrealistic and may 
mischaracterize strong will as only about overcoming an individual temptation.    
 Consider instead the very real case of heroin addicts who opt for methadone 
maintenance treatment (MMT) as a strategy for overcoming addiction.  Methadone 
treatment facilities work by substituting methadone (a synthetic opioid) for heroin.  
This substitution strategy works to reduce heroin use because methadone provides 
a similar high to heroin, cutting back or eliminating withdrawal, and at high enough 
doses the use of methadone effectively blocks the high of heroin—so junkies cannot 
reliably use both drugs.  However, the real key to MMT is that a medical professional 
is in charge of administering the daily dose.55  In MMT the patient is lashed to the 
proverbial mast and turns over the job of navigating to the treatment center staff. 
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The point of this strategy is to avoid the frequently overwhelming temptations of 
addiction and to do so in a way that moves toward greater and greater self-control.   
 Of course, when we involve others in our precommitment strategies we do not 
normally expect that they will guide us as completely as Ulysses' men.  Typically 
when precommitment strategies involve others they do so through what Howard 
Becker calls a "side bet."56  As Ainslie describes the concept "We may just let a 
friend know that changing a certain behavior is important for us, so that the friend 
will be disappointed if we don't actually change it."57 This strategy eschews physical 
compulsion for the more subtle controlling influence of social pressure.  We desire 
the love and respect of those close to us and the idea is that by announcing our 
commitments in advance we may change the calculus of succumbing to temptation 
later. By making a public commitment when it is relatively easier we can make a 
harder choice down the road easier.  In one sense the later choice becomes easier 
because the agent has more at stake than she otherwise would.  But in a deeper 
sense the precommitment of publicity ties the agent to a community of support and 
helps to place the later decision in the context of the agent as she sees herself as a 
member of a larger social network.58 
 Other precommitment strategies link the agent's future self more closely to 
the evaluations of her past self through the formation of personal rules.  Personal 
rules are resolutions designed to maintain a course of action despite the fact that 
certain temptations are likely to arise.  The trouble with personal rules is that they 
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seem to be derivative of brute exercise of will.  As Ainslie puts it "This may be the 
most common way that people deal with temporary preferences, but also the most 
mysterious."59 Elsewhere Ainslie asserts "personal rules operate most effectively 
with countable criteria."60  As precommitment strategies personal rules are different 
because whereas Ulysses contracts rely on "external" controls, personal rules are 
"internal."  Of course, this is why personal rules often fail and to the extent that they 
work it may be that the monitoring of "countable criteria" represents a pseudo 
external locus of control.  In any event, the very notion that an individual self is rigidly 
distinct from her milieu is part of the problem to which situationist literature alerts us.  
Self-Management, Self-Control or Willpower 
  In conversation with other philosophers it seems the majority philosophical 
opinion is that long-term strategies like strategic avoidance and Ulysses contracts 
are somehow distinct from short term examples of willpower.61  Among those I have 
discussed the matter with many favor the terms "self-control" or "self-management" 
for strategies that confront expected or long-term challenges.  The term 'willpower,' 
they think, should be reserved for cases of overcoming unexpected difficulty whether 
through brute force of will or a short-term strategy like mindfulness.   Because 
expected difficulties are typically planned for in advance, the labels "self-control" or 
"self-management" would be applied to what I have called "long-term" strategies.  
Conversely, because unexpected challenges cannot be combated in advance, what 
is labeled "willpower" might correspond to what I have called "short-term" strategies.  
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I think this standard way of talking is wrong, but understandable, given traditional 
conceptions of identity and  philosophical skepticism about weakness of will. 
 I suspect that at the root of the supposed distinction between "self-
management" and "willpower" is a worry about the implications of "self-
management" for the conception of the self.  In my view it is helpful to think about 
extended willpower strategies like prosthetic devices; they are not always to be 
thought of as part of oneself, but when sufficiently integrated into a life they become 
as authentic a part of oneself as any other.  It is very difficult to suppress our 
cognitive biases and we use strategies like avoidance and Ulysses contracts as 
thinking tools to make our lives more like the lives we imagine for ourselves.  Using 
tools to work around our short comings is not a gimmick to be considered external, 
coercive, or somehow less authentically a matter of will.  To the contrary, we are 
deeply integrated with our tools to the point that they become part of ourselves. 
In one way this is an argument by analogy, long-term strategies are thinking 
tools or devices which we integrate into our decision making in the same way that 
prosthetic legs are integrated into our walking or artificial hearts are integrated into 
the circulation of our blood.  Language is perhaps the most powerful and widely 
used mental tool used to enhance willpower.  Brute force of will often includes the 
strategic use of language as in case of chanting or repeating a mantra, perhaps, "I 
think I can. I think I can."  The use of social tools, like identifying student exams with 
numbers rather than names, or calling on students using a random number 
generator, serve to work against implicit biases by incorporating tools into action.  
These may feel artificial at first, but so does an artifical leg.  Over time willpower 
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strategies like these become incorporated, some more than others, and some 
become so central that they fit seamlessly into one's identity.     
Chalmers and Clark have argued persuasively that there is no principled 
distinction between the mind contained within our body and our mind extended in 
various ways.62  They write, "Could my mental states be partly constituted by the 
states of other thinkers? We see no reason why not, in principle."  Some of the long-
term willpower strategies described here, such as announcing ones intentions to 
friends, seem to effectively recruit others into the act of willpower.  This sort of 
strategic integration seems awkward if we are operating with an enlightenment view 
of the self, but it is powerful in the practical sense and coherent with a more 
permeable sense of identity.  Cognitive bias can be very hard to suppress, but long-
term willpower strategies operate not by suppressing neural pathways we oppose, 
but rather by strengthening pathways around our biases.   
 Precommitment strategies and long-term avoidance strategies have at their 
root work done by behavioral economists and game-theorists working mainly on 
problems of nuclear deterrence.  Models of "self-management" typically presume 
"rational actors"63 and  "state actors"64  in ways that are disembodied and mistaken 
about human rationality.  It is reasonable to worry that these strategies reflect an 
automatic mechanism more than they do human character.  But we should not fall 
prey to the genetic fallacy. Work in behavioral economics and game theory can help 
chart ways around the coercive and worrisome elements of situationism and develop 
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what Rodgers and Warmke call a "prescriptive situationism."  This form of strategic 
willpower is  "forward looking self-control based on controlling one's situation as 
opposed to controlling one's character at the time of temptation."65  Of course we 
could call this sort of forward thinking strategy "self-management" and describe it as 
opposed to "exerting willpower" but to do so has odd results. 
Consider the case of two people who are tempted to become smokers.  Alice 
and Robert each think that smoking will make them seem sophisticated and cool.  
Both Alice and Robert are self-aware enough to know that they are motivated almost 
entirely by appearances.  As such they are both only interested in becoming social 
smokers; that is, they both want to smoke primarily when they are around other 
smokers and want to avoid smoking regularly.   Of course, the fact of the matter is 
that social smoking is very likely to lead to nicotine addiction and a destructive 
pattern of future smoking.  Alice realizes that the odds of her becoming only a social 
smoker are quite low and takes steps to resist her desire by avoiding friends and 
situations where social smoking would be appropriate.  She does not step outside 
for "fresh air" with the smokers at the office and her dating profile is arranged so that 
only non-smokers are suggested as potential romantic partners. On the other hand 
Robert is able to follow through on his idea and becomes a social smoker: he 
smokes socially for a decade and never falls into addiction.  To me it would be odd 
to claim that Robert is strong-willed and Alice is not.  However, some will argue that 
because she is only using avoidance strategies to keep from smoking she is not 
strong-willed but rather just a prudent self-manager. 
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On my view both Robert and Alice are exercising willpower but in different 
ways.  Alice wanted to become a social smoker but decided it wasn't a good choice 
because the odds of remaining only a social smoker weren't good.  This means that 
Alice has to resist her desire to smoke socially.  Alice employs two techniques, first 
she resists the urge to light up with co-workers by not stepping outside with them 
when they go to smoke.  This is an avoidance strategy.  It is easier for Alice to 
politely decline to step outside when asked than it would be not to smoke once 
outside with the smokers.  Alice wants to go outside with her co-workers, but she 
chooses not to because making this choice now will make things easier in the future.  
Indeed, over time things will become even easier because eventually the smokers 
will stop inviting Alice outside when they go to smoke. Alice's second strategy is to 
set up her online dating profile so that it is only displayed to non-smokers; this way 
she avoids any dates with smokers and her romantic partners will not tempt her to 
smoke.  Importantly Alice wants to find a suitable romantic partner and she is not 
adverse to smokers.  She knows that it would improve her chances of finding a mate 
if she made her profile available to smokers, but it would also make becoming a 
smoker more likely.  Alice's choice to eliminate part of the dating pool is based not 
on her desires about a mate, but on her judgment about risk.  Again, Alice employs a 
strategy of avoidance. 
This gets us to another key difference those who distinguish long-term and 
short-term strategies may be drawing.  Perhaps the idea is that when Alice resists 
the urge to step outside there is a feeling of difficulty, a feeling of strain, and that 
feeling is what some associate with willpower.  In the case of checking the "non-
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smokers" box on her online profile it is hard to imagine that Alice feels much difficulty 
or strain.  This qualitative difference is perhaps what is essential to the proposed 
distinction between willpower and self-management.  If this is what the distinction 
comes to it is a "hard problem" indeed, but not an impossible one.  It is possible to 
retain the idea that there is feeling associated with willpower and to see it as 
strategic. 
First, it is hard for many of us to see Alice's dating profile as providing much in 
the way of feeling.  It may help to imagine that Alice was a lifelong smoker, that all 
the people she had ever been romantically interested in were also smokers, for her 
checking the "non-smoker" box could be an emotional commitment, an act of 
defiance and self-assertion in a qualitative sense.  But the general idea that 
technological interfaces can provide qualitative feedback is not so distant.  The 
feeling of a prosthetic leg can be emotional for an amputee, likewise the feel of a 
guitar in the hands of a player can provoke a range of emotion.  The point is just that 
someone's using an external scaffolding for their own behaviors does not mean that 
the behavior loses its emotional or qualitative relationship to the agent.  A strategy 
for action, even one involving extended mechanisms, can be personal.   
Of course, one could reject "external" mechanisms and the hypothesis of 
extended cognition and still maintain that strategic mechanism are central to an 
identifiable will in strictly of the training they provide.  Mechanisms like computer 
algorithms can work to train behaviors to be more in keeping with our best 
judgments.  Alice might use an app that helps her avoid smoker friendly restaurants 
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for instance.  Doing so is not turning over her will to the app, rather it is training 
herself to act more in keeping with her own judgment.  
Second, the point of Alice's not stepping outside with her co-workers was to 
avoid a more qualitatively difficult choice further along.  The entire point of a 
willpower strategy is to make one's judgment effective.  It seems very odd to say that 
a strategy is no longer based on willpower because it is too effective.  If Alice judges 
it best not to smoke and overcomes her desire to smoke without serious emotional 
strain, that seems like strength of will.  Dating smokers, and fidgeting nervously 
while talking to her coworkers on their smoke break may also be strong willed.  But 
in the long run a strategy of avoiding the brink is more prudent because it develops 
the right sorts of habits.  And it seems odd to say that someone who prudently 
controls her desires is not being strong-willed.     
Conclusion 
Willpower is a skill of self-regulation, one that we develop over time and that 
doesn't come easily to the young or the unpracticed.  This is part of why the Greeks 
thought that the education of the young in the correct habits was so important.  
Learning how to choose the best paths around and through human psychology is a 
difficult matter and without a strategy the task of living well is impossible.  
Developing willpower means learning to choose routes through one's own 
psychology and one's environment that end up in keeping with one's judgment.  Of 
course, the gentler and more fortunate the environment, the less concern one need 
have over strategy.  But, for most of us, having the right kind of will, involves having 
the right strategies.    
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On Doris's view the primary motivation for human action is the stimulation of a 
situation.  He thinks that character has very little impact on behavior, if character 
exists at all. This leads him to conclude "Given the practical risks there seems to be 
little reason for favoring strategies emphasizing 'steadfast exercise of the will' over 
strategies of 'skilled self-maniplation.'"66  In truth strength of will, and especially its 
strategic facet, is more concerned with developing an agent's positive habits than it 
is with incorporating external forces of control.  The techniques of extending 
willpower through strategy should be seen as a sort of scaffolding that allows human 
character and willpower to extend beyond the glitches of our reasoning.67  Of course 
we have character, but it is something earned over time.  Character is forged 
through the regular acts of willpower that lead us to check this box, or refuse to 
smoke with those people.  When set out strategically seemingly insignificant choices 
collect and bundle together to create a character.  This result is an act of will itself 
and so it should not come as a surprise that there are many people with very little 
character.  Exercising willpower effectively is hard and it is complicated, but it is 
required for forming a character.    
  
                                            
66 Doris J (2002) Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior. Cambridge University Press, 
New York p. 149 
67Sterelny, Kim (2010) "Minds: extended or scaffolded?" Phenomenology and the Cognitive 
Sciences, Volume 9, Issue 4, pp 465-481 
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Chapter 3 
Weakness of Will 
Weakness of will is commonplace in our everyday experience, but it is poorly 
understood.  Recently Neil Levy argued that "weakness of will does not correspond 
to a useful explanatory category."68  On Levy's view what we call weakness of will is 
really just a single type of ego depletion.  He suggests that we would do better to 
focus on the ways that self-control based in the pre-frontal cortex can be impeded 
and overridden by the more primitive impulses of our lower brain.  Levy is right that 
we should focus on the ways that our self-control is overcome by fatigue, hunger 
and the like.  However, he is wrong that the concept 'weakness of will' is reducible to 
one necessary condition.  Levy's view that weak-will is not a useful explanatory 
category is based on the reduction to one type. If the concept is not reducible in the 
way he suggests, we have good reason to reject his claim about its usefulness.  
Further, since part of Levy's argument is that no evidence supports a broad account 
of weak-will, I offer some supporting evidence from the study of addiction.  The aim 
of this chapter is to show that addiction research and a little bit of experimental 
philosophy can combine to shed light on a longstanding trouble in the history of 
philosophy. 
The argument presented here is that ordinary language, theoretical reasoning 
and empirical evidence collectively suggest that there is no paradigmatic type of 
                                            
68 Neil Levy, Resisting Weakness of the Will. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2011): 
134-155 
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weakness of will.  Weakness of will is best understood as a polythetic or cluster 
concept.  I begin briefly discussing definitions to show how a concept (especially of 
complex behavioral traits) can be meaningful without having necessary and 
sufficient conditions.  The second section reviews the philosophical thinking about 
what weakness of will is and the range of characteristics are associated with the 
concept.  The third section reviews linguistic evidence about the ordinary (everyday) 
use of the expression "weakness of will."  An analysis of ordinary language shows 
that "weak-will" is used in a variety of ways best understood as a cluster concept.  
The final section presents evidence from addiction studies and treatment practice 
supporting the practical efficacy of treating willpower failure as a cluster of related 
phenomena. 
 
Complex vs. Reductive Definition 
My central thesis is that there is no paradigmatic case or type of weakness of 
will.  This leads some people to conclude that the concept must be either 
amorphous, useless, or both.  This is not true, but it is an understandable reaction 
and so it is worth offering some prefatory remarks about definition.  The standard 
model of class definition follows the Aristotelian logic of setting primary and 
secondary conditions for natural kinds.  For example, a bachelor is an unmarried 
man.  Therefore, to be a bachelor it is necessary that one be unmarried and a man.  
Meeting both conditions is sufficient to describe a person as a bachelor.   This 
example is a stipulative definition and is the sort that is especially useful for 
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mathematics.69  However, we are not looking for a stipulative definition, instead we 
want to provide an explicative definition--that is we want both to respect language as 
it is used and to offer some direction as to how language can be clarified and 
improved. As Carnap put it, "The task of making more exact a vague or not quite 
exact concept used in everyday life...We call this the task of explicating, or of giving 
an explication for, the earlier concept." 70 
Mill wrote about language that it is "not made but has made itself: it requires 
continual mending in order to be passable."71 An explicative definition of weak-will is 
bound at least to some extent to the ordinary use of the term, but it is also expected 
to "mend" thinking about the concept.  On Mill's view improving the messiness of 
ordinary language entails that, 
"a meaning must be found for the name, compatible with its 
continuing to denote, if possible all, but at any rate the greater or the 
more important part, of the things of which it is commonly predicated. 
The inquiry, therefore, into the definition, is an inquiry into the 
resemblances and differences among those things: whether there be 
any resemblance running through them all; if not, through what portion 
of them such a general resemblance can be traced: and finally, what 
are the common attributes, the possession of which gives to them all, 
or to that portion of them, the character of resemblance which has led 
to their being classed together."72   
 
Mill's call for definitions to bring together characteristic resemblances does not rely 
on a concept like weakness of will having a single unifying thread.  Rather, the idea 
                                            
69 Frege (1914) argued that only stipulative definition was appropriate for mathematics. 
70 Carnap (1956) Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic p. 7-8 
71 Mill System of Logic, Bk. 1, Chapter 8 pg. 118 http://www.gutenberg.org/files/27942/27942-
h/27942-h.html#toc23 
72 Ibid. pg. 119 
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is that some concepts are only useful when understood through a cluster of related 
attributes.    
By the mid-twentieth century some members of the scientific community were 
beginning to develop reasoning about classes along the lines Mill suggests.  For 
example, Morton Beckner writes,  
"A class is ordinarily defined by reference to a set of properties 
which are both necessary and sufficient (by stipulation) for 
membership in the class. It is possible, however, to define a group K in 
terms of a set G of properties f1, f2, . . . , fn in a different manner. 
Suppose we have an aggregate of individuals (we shall not yet call 
them a class) such that 
  
(1) each one possesses a large (but unspecified) number of the 
properties in G; 
(2) each f in G is possessed by large number of these 
individuals; and 
(3) no f in G is possessed by every individual in the 
aggregate."73 
 
Beckner is pointing out that natural class distributions are not always 
represented by the neat categories of formal systems.  He describes such groupings 
as "polythetic" by which he means that they share a number of characteristics that 
occur commonly in members of a group or class, but none of which is essential for 
membership of that group or class.  This is in contrast to monothetic groups which 
are identified by universally common characteristics.  Beckner argues that the 
existence of polythetic classifications is a typically biological phenomenon; not 
standard for say geological classification, but normal for living systems.   Eleanor 
Rosch extended the idea of polythetic classifications into cognitive science by 
introducing evidence that children form concepts about the world through 
                                            
73 Beckner, Morton (1959) The Biological Way of Thought Columbia University Press, New York p. 22 
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resemblances of features, not necessary and sufficient conditions.74  More recent 
work has confirmed the resemblance method of classification or concept 
development and has shown that this model is also primary in other primates.75   
The key difficulty in polythetic classification is to set limits for what counts as a 
sufficient resemblance.  In other words, how much resemblance must two things 
have to be counted as members of the same class?  We will not come to a complete 
answer here, but the general strategy is to group classifications by strength.  For 
instance, Rosch asked 200 students to rate, on a scale of 1 to 7, whether they 
regarded an item as a good example of the category furniture.  The students 
responses reflected a range of association from the most furniture-like object 'chair,' 
to 'stool' which was less furniture-like than chair and to the least furniture-like object 
on the list, telephone.76  Each object fits more or less in the class "furniture" so that 
the class is based on the degree of correspondence between members and 
membership is not strictly binary.  Rather, some things fit in a given category well, 
while others do not, based largely on the ordinary use the classification. 
However, it is important that the use of a polythetic definition does not entail 
that the ordinary use of a classification is unambiguously correct.  It is possible to 
maintain that the common classification of a thing is incorrect, or, at least that the 
association of the thing and the class is weaker or stronger than has been commonly 
thought.  The grounds for such linguistic "mending" might in some instances be 
                                            
74 Rosch E. and Mervis, C. (1975) Family resemblances: studies in the internal structure of 
categories, Cognitive Psychology 7, 573-605; 
75 Couchman, Justin J.; Coutinho, M. V. C.; Smith, J. D. (2010). "Rules and Resemblance: Their 
Changing Balance in the Category Learning of Humans (Homo sapiens) and Monkeys (Macaca 
mulatta)". Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes 36 
76 Eleanor Rosch (1975) Cognitive Representation of Semantic Categories Journal of Experimental 
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related to the need for stipulative categories.  For example, if an institution requires 
separate budgets for fruits and vegetables it will need to class tomatoes in one 
group or another.  In such cases the distinction will likely be purely nominal.  More 
often, mending linguistic usage will have to do with the correspondence of a 
particular classification with some real impact.  For example, there are many 
reasons to classify a potato as a vegetable, but it may be more effective in 
conveying nutritional impact to class potatoes with grains.77 
 As a philosophical example of a polythetic category consider the concept 
'critical thinking.'  Critical thinking can be defined in some very general ways, but it is 
really an amalgam of independent elements that cluster around related activity.  
Consider the following definition, "Critical thinking is the intellectually disciplined 
process of actively and skillfully conceptualizing, applying, analyzing, synthesizing, 
and/or evaluating information gathered from, or generated by, observation, 
experience, reflection, reasoning, or communication, as a guide to belief and 
action."78  This sort of definition is helpful because we know that someone who is 
having difficulty reasoning to sound conclusions might benefit from the study of 
critical thinking.  However, until we know what specific sorts of trouble a person is 
having all "critical thinking" help will take a shotgun approach.  We still need to know 
whether the problem is with statistical arguments, game theory, etc.  The broad 
                                            
77  'Potatoes are botanically classified as a vegetable, but they are classified nutritionally as a starchy 
food,' Department of Health Spokesperson quoted at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-
1372728/The-great-potato-debate-Nutritionists-insist-spuds-ARE-vegetables.html#ixzz3Gkfb8u2u  
78 Michael Scriven & Richard Paul,  at the 8th Annual International Conference on Critical Thinking 
and Education Reform, Summer 1987 
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concept is useful because it points toward a range of narrow considerations, not 
because it is reducible to just one of those considerations.   
Defining Weakness of Will  
At this point it will not come as a surprise to hear that there is more than one 
way to be weak-willed. Definitions of 'weakness of will' are varied and have a long 
history in philosophy dating from ancient Greece where the term used was akrasia.  
The ancient account of weak-will turned on a distinction Aristotle made between 
weakness of will that occurred because an akratic agent was disconnected from his 
sensibilities and weakness of will that occurred while the akratic agent was in full 
command of his faculties.  In the first type of case the akratic agent is overwhelmed 
by his passions, maybe he is angry, in love or perhaps just drunk; let's call this 
drunken akrasia.  In the latter type of case the akratic agent sees things clearly, but 
nevertheless decides to do something that he knows he shouldn't; let's call this 
clear-eyed akrasia.  I discuss these at length in chapters three and four respectively, 
but some preliminary discussion is important here. 
Clear-eyed akrasia is the sort that Socrates had in mind when he describes 
acting in a way that one knows is less than best.  The clear-eyed akratic recognizes 
the wrongness of her action at the time she acts.  There is no confusion or ignorance 
at play for the clear-eyed akratic. Rather, her weakness of will is a matter of her own 
judgment about what it would be best to do not being sufficiently motivational.  
Clear-eyed akrasia seems odd because there is clearly a connection between 
judgment and motivation.  When I judge that I ought to do something, I am 
judgmentally motivated to do it.  However, being motivated by judgment does not 
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entail that that will be sufficient to lead me to act appropriately.  In clear-eyed akrasia 
a judgment about what would also be good to do, though not the best thing to do, 
wins the motivational struggle. 79  
Drunken akrasia is the sort of weakness that occurs when one is 
incapacitated or overcome in the way that occurs when drunk.  Instances of drunken 
akrasia do not require that an individual is literally drunken.  Rather, drunkenness is 
a metaphor for a motivational element distinct from one's judgment which leads to 
action through an independent process.  The drunken akratic has some judgment 
about what would be best to do but is led away from that course of action by a 
process which subverts the agent's judgment.  It is not that the agent has conflicting 
judgments, or that her judgment shifts, rather on this model something overwhelms 
or subverts her judgment.  Of course, just as one can be responsible for drunken 
acts, one can be responsible for weak-willed acts that are caused by a culpable or 
predictable subversion of judgment.80    
The sorts of structures or entities required to make good on drunken or clear-
eyed akrasia are also plural.  In the case of drunken akrasia there are several 
common pressures described as subverting an agent’s judgment about how to act 
and thereby leading to weakness of will.  For instance, a heroin addict may plausibly 
judge it best not to use, but be overcome by her addiction.  A parent may judge it 
best to have her children brush their teeth, but under the sway of several glasses of 
wine forget to enforce the rule.  A priest may plausibly judge it best to help his fellow 
man, but running late for a meeting fail to recognize an opportunity.  What these 
                                            
79 I discuss the possibilities and issues surrounding clear-eyed akrasia at length in chapter three. 
80 I discuss the issues surrounding freewill and culpability at length in chapter four. 
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cases have in common is that an agent judges it best to do one thing, and yet does 
another.  The weakness in these cases comes not from an effect on judgment per 
se, but from some other source bypassing judgment. 
Cases of clear-eyed akrasia require a closer look at the mechanisms 
responsible for an agent's judgment itself.  The most basic form of this is sometimes 
called the Humean account of judgment.  On the Humean model judgment consists 
of a combination of belief and desire.  An augmented version of this account 
includes intentions, which typically result from the combination of beliefs and desires 
and lead to action.  The clear-eyed akratic might, as Al Mele suggests, form a 
decisive better judgment based on all relevant beliefs and desires and yet fail to form 
the appropriate intention.  On Mele's view the motivational force of lesser beliefs and 
desires may act directly on the intention.  This would cause weakness of will 
because the agent would assert that her better judgment suggests one course of 
action and yet be most motivated toward another.   
Among philosophers it has become fashionable to distinguish between 
"weakness of will" and akrasia.  Akrasia is a Greek word meaning incontinence, or 
the inability to control one's excretions.  It also has a broader connotation of a lack in 
self control.  Traditionally, akrasia was translated as weakness of will.  The 
philosophical distinction en vogue at present is to describe akrasia as a peculiar, 
perhaps possible, curiosity of motivational failure, and to describe weakness of will 
as a common form of human fallibility. The basis of this distinction is that akrasia 
requires one act against her own beliefs while weakness of will requires that one 
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temporarily revise her beliefs despite a commitment not to do so. Historically, these 
would both have been called weakness of will.    
The distinction between akrasia and weak-will is based largely on Richard 
Holton's innovative thinking about motivational failure.  On Holton’s view weakness 
of will is best characterized by a failure to act on one’s resolutions, one’s 
commitment to future action that one recognizes will be motivationally challenging. 
Hence, on his view, resolutions are “contrary inclination defeating intentions.”81 A 
contrary inclination defeating intention is just an intention designed to address 
certain anticipated motivational difficulties.  If, for example, Charlie forms the 
intention to stop using cigarettes and does so knowing that he will surely have an 
inclination to smoke, his intention is designed to defeat the inclination to smoke. 
  Of course, it cannot be the case that just any reason for failing to follow 
through with an intention is weak-willed.  Intentions broadly considered are 
controlling in the sense that they standardly lead to action, but even stable intentions 
are open to revision based on highly significant features of the emerging situation.  
For example, if Charlie were to discover that smoking another cigarette would 
actually improve his health he would not be weak-willed for revising his intention.  
Simply reconsidering an intention in light of important new information is not 
something Holton wants to call weakness of will; rather he argues that only changes 
of resolution due to certain causes count as weak-willed.  Specifically, one is weak-
willed on Holton’s view only if she revises her intention based on reasons her 
resolution was designed to defeat.  Thus, on Holton’s view, Charlie is weak willed 
                                            
81 Richard Holton (2009) Willing, Wanting, Waiting (Oxford: Clarendon Press) p. 250 
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only if he violates the intention to quit smoking due to contrary inclinations that his 
resolution was designed to defeat. 
One way to understand Holton’s view is to contrast it with the well-known, and 
more traditional approach taken by Al Mele.  Mele’s view is described as “strictly” 
akratic to distinguish it from earlier accounts of akratic action, especially Donald 
Davidson’s.  Where Davidson described weakness of will as possible when so called 
prima facie judgments led to action at the expense of “all things considered” 
judgments, Mele maintains that weak-willed actions can be violations of 
unconditional judgments.  As Mele puts it, strict akratic action requires an act be 
“performed intentionally and freely and, at the time which it is performed, the agent 
holds a judgment to the effect that there is good and sufficient reason for his not 
performing it.”82  Thus, Mele maintains that weakness of will occurs when one 
violates an all out judgment and thus knowingly and freely peruses a lesser path.   
Consider the following example to understand the contrast between Holton’s 
and Mele’s views.  An imaginary Benjamin, a friend of Charlie’s who also believes it 
would be best to quit smoking.  On New Year’s Eve Ben and Charlie are talking 
about their resolutions and they both express a genuine belief that they should 
resolve to quit smoking.  However, whereas Charlie affirms his belief and forms a 
resolution to quit, Ben demurs quietly acknowledging that he should form a 
resolution but steadfastly declining to do so.  Mele of course allows that Ben is 
weak-willed, but on Holton’s view only Charlie is weak-willed, Ben is something 
else—akratic.  The difference between the two is that Ben acts against his own 
                                            
82 Al Mele (1987) Irrationality (OUP) p. 7 
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better judgment, while Charlie revises his judgment despite his resolution not to do 
so.   Holton’s aim to exclude cases of strict akratic action from the realm of what is 
called weak-willed is something of a revision of how anglophone philosophers have 
ordinarily used the term weak-willed.  Because of this linguistic revisionism and 
because Holton’s account of weakness of will depends on the revision of a 
resolution I deem Holton’s view  “revisionist weakness of will.” 
 Holton offers both empirical and theoretical arguments in support of the 
primacy of revisionist weakness of will.  The most persuasive theoretical argument is 
that the revisionist account can explain cases of weakness of will that apparently do 
not  involve an agent’s having inner conflict.  Since the traditional account of strict 
akratic action can only accommodate cases of weakness of will involving inner 
conflict, if cases exist without such conflict, then the revisionist case appears 
plausible.   Consider an example:  James believes that he ought to stop smoking 
and resolves to do so.  James knows that quitting will be difficult as he has tried to 
do so on many previous occasions.  In the past he has always kept right on smoking 
when he has tried to taper off his consumption and only met with some success, 
three months without smoking, when he quit cold turkey.  James knows that going 
cold turkey will be tough, especially for the first several days, but decides that it is his 
best bet.  However, only twelve hours after waking up James finds himself desperate 
for a cigarette and decides that what would really be best is for him to gradually 
reduce his cigarette consumption, of course, this change allows James to smoke a 
cigarette now.  The trouble with the traditional account of weakness of will as strict 
akratic action is that James does not appear to be weak-willed.  If we take James’s 
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change of mind seriously, that is, if we presume that he really has changed his mind 
about what method would be best, his behavior is not strictly akratic and thus not 
weak-willed.  This is troubling because it seems that the individual who decides to 
quit smoking and then blithely changes his mind when the going gets tough is being 
weak willed. 
 However, the explanatory advantage that revisionist accounts of weak will 
enjoy come at a price.  The revisionist account depends on a murky answer to the 
question "What constitutes an unwarranted revision of a resolution?" On one hand 
resolutions are a special kind of intention designed specifically to resist 
(unwarranted) revision and it would seem that they are only useful to the extent that 
they do resist revision.  On the other hand blindly remaining on any given course of 
action is a recipe for disaster, new situations and information arise with great 
regularity and it is foolish not leave open the possibility that one’s previous 
judgments were in error.  Holton follows Bratman maintaining that it is “rational to 
reconsider an intention just in case doing so manifests tendencies that it is 
reasonable for the agent to have.”83  The tendencies that Holton has in mind here 
seem to be related to recognizing new and important information gleaned from 
emerging situations.  This sort of response initially seems persuasive, but it is 
somewhat too vague to be of real use, as Holton himself admits.84   
                                            
83 Holton (2009) Ch 4, p. 3 
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Holton’s rules of thumb for warranted resolution revision include revising “if one believes that 
circumstances have changed in such a way that they defeat the purpose of having the intention…if 
they [the intentions] can no longer be carried out…they will lead one to great suffering when that 
suffering was not envisaged.”84  He also offers several rules of thumb for when it is reasonable not to 
reconsider a resolution, including “in circumstances that prevent clear thought if those intentions were 
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 Holton’s advice then is to err on the side of non-reconsideration.  His 
suggestion is that barring rather extraordinary circumstances one ought to refrain 
from even reconsidering one’s resolutions.  This is a powerful message and one 
carried widely and echoed loudly by the various “twelve step” programs, AA, NA, 
GA, etc.  These programs require that one “turnover” one’s life and trust the 
program.  Rather than depending on the individual’s judgment, which they suggest is 
deeply flawed, these programs admonish the individual to “work the steps.”  The 
value in this advice is that the individual need not make decisions about how to 
proceed and thus has apparently fewer opportunities for failure.  The reasoning is 
that with fewer decisions made about a difficult topic, there are correspondingly 
fewer occasions for weakness.  This is perhaps good practical advice in some 
situations, but, this solution to the problem of akratic resolutions merely moves the 
trouble back a level.  A new problem arises in deciding when reconsideration is 
reasonable.  Holton rightly says that when the reconsideration of a resolution is 
rational will be heavily dependent on the type of resolution, the individual’s 
dispositions, situation, etc. and the matter is likely to remain a difficult matter of 
practical psychology.  This is challenge particular to Holton’s account and is not 
mirrored in the more traditional account of strict akratic action.  
This history supports the earlier point about the nature of definition: there is 
no single paradigmatic version of weak will. Rather, the concept has historically 
involved several types and mechanisms. While there is no one core feature of all 
                                                                                                                                       
made in circumstances that allow clear thought [and] intentions that were expressly made in order to 
get over one’s later reluctance to act.”84   
 
 70 
 
instances of weakness of will, it is possible to isolate some of the more prominent 
features.  Weakness of will tends to involve a separation of judgment and motivation.  
The thing that one thinks he ought to do, or what he thinks he ought to do when he is 
thinking well, is not the thing that ends up happening.  A central characteristic of 
many cases of weak-will it thus a sense of regret, or a sense that one has failed to 
live up to one's own expectations.  Of course, self-deception can be quite complete 
in some instances, and passionate failures are often easy to overlook, so it is often 
the case that we do not notice our own weakness.  The point is just that weakness of 
will involves failing to live up to  our own judgments, sometimes synchronically, 
sometimes in retrospect and sometimes we never notice our failure at all.  Classing 
these different events together is a historical reality in philosophy, and turns out to 
correspond with ordinary language as well. 
Weakness of Will: The Ordinary Use  
In addition his theoretical arguments for the importance of revisionist 
weakness of will Holton offers that “Whenever I have asked non-philosophers what 
they take weakness of will to consist in, they have made no mention of judgments 
about the better or worse course of action.  Rather they have said things like this: 
weak-willed people are irresolute; they don’t persist in their intentions; they are too 
easily deflected from the path they have chosen” (1999, p.241).  Holton concludes 
that strict akratic action is less common and warrants the relatively foreign term 
akrasia.  Albeit anecdotal, Holton’s empirical claim has led to a growing body of 
substantive research about the expression ‘weakness of will’ in the ordinary use of 
language. 
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For instance, Al Mele conducted a series of 4 surveys based on the ordinary 
use of weakness of will by Florida State University undergraduates.  Mele’s first 
survey asked 72 subjects Holton’s question “What is weakness of will?” only one 
mentioned Holton’s revisionist view, while 11 mentioned Mele’s traditional view.85  In 
a second study Mele asked 119 subjects to answer the following question: 
We’re interested in what the expression “weakness of will” means to you. 
Please answer the following question by circling your answer. 
Which of the following descriptions of weakness of will is more accurate in  
your opinion?       
 
A. Doing something you believed or knew you shouldn’t do (for 
  example, going to a party even though you believed it  
  would be better to stay home and study). 
B. Doing something you decided or intended not to do (for  
  example, going to a party even though you decided to 
  stay home and study). 
C. Neither.  The descriptions are equally accurate or   
  inaccurate. 
 
In response 49% of subjects gave the “believed/knew” response Mele correlates 
with his traditional view, 33% gave the “decided/intended” response Mele ascribes to 
the revisionist view and 18% gave the third response. (2009, p.6)  Mele suggest that 
on their face studies 1 and 2 seem to suggest that the traditional view is more 
ordinary than the revisionist account.  
Joshua May suggests that we ought to heavily (if not entirely) discount 
studies 1 and 2 based on the unreliability of theoretical definitions offered by 
ordinary people in brief experimental conditions. He is probably right.  People are 
notoriously bad at providing theoretical definitions for concepts with which they can 
competently use. However, research indicates that people are significantly better at 
                                            
85 Arguably 13 others described the traditional view, but Mele discounts them for various reasons in a 
footnote p.6.  
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identifying good theoretical definitions than providing them, think about 
understanding a foreign language compared with speaking it.  So although we might 
heavily discount study 1, Mele’s study 2 seems to provide some compelling 
evidence that the traditional view is more common that the revisionist view.   
Mele’s third and fourth studies satisfy worries about theoretical abstraction (at 
least somewhat) by offering some context within which subjects were asked to 
evaluate the presence of weakness of will.  In the third study 25 subjects were given 
the following story: 
Joe believes that it would be best to quit smoking cigarettes. He is thinking 
again—this time on New Year’s Eve—about when to quit. He knows that quitting will 
be hard and unless he picks a good time to start he will fail. Joe judges that it would 
be best to smoke his last cigarette tonight and to be smoke free from then on. When 
he reports this to Jill, his wife, she asks whether this is his New Year’s resolution. He 
says, ―Not yet. I haven’t yet actually decided to quit. Making that decision will be 
hard. To make it, I’ll really have to psych myself up. I’ve been smoking for forty 
years. I believe I can quit, but I would definitely miss smoking.  In the end, Joe fails 
to decide to quit smoking. Tomorrow, he smokes less than usual, but he has his first 
cigarette minutes after he awakes, as always. However, he could have decided to 
quit, and if he had he would have quit. 
Subjects were given a 7 point scale with 1 labeled “strongly agree” and 7 
labeled “strongly disagree” and asked to report their degree of agreement with the 
statement “Joe displays some weakness of will in this story.”  In the story Joe does 
not make a resolution to quit smoking so if Hotlon’s revisionist view is ordinary we 
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should expect to see results tend toward 7 (Strong disagreement with the attribution 
of weakness of will.)  However, the response average was 2.68 and 80% of subjects 
answered between 1-3; this seems to indicate agreement with an attribution of 
weakness of will in keeping with the traditional view.   
Similarly, in his fourth study Mele presented 100 subjects with the same story 
about Joe and asked them to circle yes or no to answer the following question: 
“Does Joe display any weakness of will in this story?”  Of the 100 subjects, 73 
answered ‘yes’ (attributing weakness of will) and 27 said ‘no.’  Mele’s explanation for 
this is that Joe’s judgment that it would be best to quit combined with his failure to 
quit indicate a traditional form of weakness of will.  Thus, Mele’s studies 3 & 4 
apparently reveal a strong (80% and 73% respectively) ordinary use of weakness of 
will in the tradition fashion. 
However, May brings up two reasonable objections to Mele’s interpretation of 
the data.  First, May argues that Joe’s situation might be reasonably interpreted as 
involving a resolution-violation.  On May’s proposed reading Joe has not resolved to 
quit, but he has “resolved to decide to quit.” (May, p.6)  If Joe actually has formed a 
second order resolution to resolve to quit it is violated by his not actually resolving to 
quit.  In such a case those who attribute weakness of will could be doing so on the 
basis of the revisionist view of weakness of will.  I have several problems with this 
objection.  First, there is little (if any) reason to think that Joe has resolved to form a 
resolution to quit for the New Year, he seems to be merely toying with the idea of 
quitting—thinking about what it might take and whether now is a good time.  In the 
event that one focuses on Joe’s telling his wife “Not yet” when asked if he has 
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resolved to quit, one might think that Joe has formed a second order resolution.  
This is also supported by the early claim that Joe is thinking “about when to quit.”  
Note that Joe is not thinking about if he should quit.  Apparently Joe has resolved to 
resolve quit, but, importantly, his second order resolution does not set a time for 
quitting.  Thus, Joe’s failure to resolve to quit on New Year’s day is not a revision of 
his second order resolution and should not produce false positive results in Mele’s 
study.  Nevertheless it is always possible that people have read Mele’s example as 
May thinks they might. 
May’s second objection to studies 3 and 4 is on the basis of the relative 
weakness of the claims being tested, namely, “Joe displays some weakness of will 
in this story” and “Does Joe display any weakness of will?”  It is, of course, easier to 
get some to agree that “Joe displays some  weakness of will” then that “Joe displays 
loads of weakness of will.”  May’s view is that the weakness of Mele’s attribution 
requirement accounts for the 80% agreement found with statements about Joe’s 
weakness of will.  This is almost certainly right, but may be beside the point.  All 
Mele really needs to show is that a large number of people think that Joe’s case is 
an ordinary use of the expression weakness of will and even low amounts of 
weakness of will should qualify as appropriate subjects of the term. 
As an alternative to Mele’s studies 3 and 4 May suggests relying on Mele’s 
footnoted 3a in which he provides Joe’s story and the prompt “Joe does not display 
any weakness of will.” Subjects responded to 3a with about 58% disagreement 
(attribution of WOW) and 38% agreement.  May contends that 3a is likely a more 
accurate reflection of ordinary usage because the attribution requirement is 
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comparatively strong.  I disagree.  If Joe displays trace elements of weakness of will 
one should be equally willing to both, agree that he has some weakness of will, and, 
disagree that he does not have any weakness of will.  Affirming that a person, p, has 
some WOW is logically identical to denying that p does not have any WOW.  The 
gap in results between Mele’s 3 and 3a still warrant explanation, but something 
further is required. 
If we take Mele’s results from studies 2-4 as I believe we ought to we would 
see them as reliable small scale studies about the way ordinary people use the 
expression weakness of will.  On the basis of these studies I think that it is safe to 
preliminarily conclude that Holton was wrong about our ordinary use of the 
expression weakness of will in at least one sense.  The traditional view of weakness 
of will as intentional action against one’s better judgment captures well an ordinary 
use of the term.  However, Mele’s studies say very little about other ordinary ways 
that weakness of will is used and some (2 and 3a) suggest that the revisionist view 
of the expression ‘weakness of will’ is also appropriate in ordinary use.   
In a follow-up study May surveyed 97 people in and around the University of 
California, Santa Barbara and randomly assigned them to one of four conditions 
(stories) that follow:   
1. “Newman’s Diet” involves Newman, an agent who is weak-willed in 
both the traditional and revisionist sense.  Newman believes it best to 
go on a diet, resolves to do so, and despite some apparent success 
succumbs to temptation and eats one each of his favorite doughnuts.   
2. “Christabel’s Affair” involves Christabel, an agent who is weak-
willed in the traditional but not the revisionist sense.  Christabel is a 
married woman who believes it best not to have an affair, but who 
resolves to have an affair anyway and having so resolved begins an 
affair with William, a man who is not her husband.   
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3. “Rocky’s Loss of Nerve” involves Rocky, an agent who is weak-
willed in the revisionist but not the traditional sense.  Rocky has 
promised his mother he will not play tackle football and thinks it best 
not to play yet he resolves to play anyway.  When the time comes 
Rocky loses his nerve and violates his resolution but acts as he thinks 
best.   
4. “Kima’a Affair” involves Kima, an agent who is not weak-willed in 
either the traditional or the revisionist senses.  Kima doesn’t much care 
about her husband’s feelings and is attracted to Omar, Kima seduces 
Omar and they have an affair.   
 
Using a seven point scale subjects were asked to rate their agreement or 
disagreement (this time with 7 being strongly agree and 1 being strongly disagree) 
with the following questions based on the assigned condition: “Newman displays 
weakness of will in eating the doughnuts. Christabel shows weakness of will in 
having the affair.  Rocky displays weakness of will in not showing up for the game.  
Kima displays weakness of will in having the affair.” 
May’s analysis of the results focuses on the average response between 1 and 
7 for each of the four conditions.  In condition one the average response was 5.57, 
meaning that on average people agree that Newman exhibits weakness of will in 
eating doughnuts when he thinks it best to lose weight and has resolved to do so.  In 
condition four the average response was 3.08, meaning that on average people 
slightly disagree with descriptions of Kima’s affair (which violates neither her 
judgment nor her resolve) as weak-willed.86  In condition two the average response 
was 4.29 and in condition three the average response was 4.19, this means that on 
                                            
86 Considering the fact that neither contender for weakness of will are present in this condition 3.08 
should be an unexpectedly weak disagreement with the attribution of weakness of will.  May attributes 
this unusual result to subject’s desire to attach stigma to Kima’s affair and/or an inclination to accept 
propositions generally.  I would add that Kima’s affair likely violates a commitment to monogamy 
culturally implied by her marriage and might plausibly be read as the unwarranted revision of a 
resolution.     
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average Christabel’s failure to act as she judged best and Rocky’s failure to do as he 
resolved are viewed only very mildly as weak-willed.   
The results of May’s study suggest that the ordinary use of weakness of will is 
consistent with either Holton or Mele’s view, with corresponding test conditions 
averaging 4.19 and 4.29 respectively.  This might make it seem as though Mele’s 
account is more in keeping with ordinary use than Holton’s, but the slight distinction 
here is not statistically significant. It seems Holton’s claim that the ordinary use of 
the term weakness of will is exclusively revisionist is off the mark, but perhaps more 
interesting is the strength of the responses.  After all, 4.19 and 4.29 are only 
fractionally higher than a neutral response of 4.0.  The relatively strong 5.57 average 
response in the case of Newman’s Diet provides good reason to think that weakness 
of will is more strongly attributable in cases which involve violation of both intention 
and judgment.  This leads May to conclude that “both variables are necessary, 
neither is sufficient.” (May, p. 13)  Thus, May describes the ordinary concept of 
weakness of will as a conjunctive cluster concept, requiring both violation of intention 
and evaluative judgment.     
The notion that violations of both intention and judgment in a single case 
contributes to a stronger attribution of weakness of will than either one alone should 
not be surprising.  If anything what surprises is that the attribution is so low, only 
5.57, one wonders ‘if Newman isn’t weak-willed then who is?’  However, the 5.57 
average response is somewhat misleading.  May reports that 74% of subjects 
agreed that Newman displayed weakness of will (providing answers between 5 and 
7).  Although May does not supply the exact figures 74% agreement with an average 
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of 5.57 suggests that those who did not agree were often on the fence (around a 3), 
and, those 74% tended to agree rather strongly (averaging around 6).   This 
suggests that nearly everyone was at least somewhat comfortable with a description 
of Newman as weak-willed. 
If we consider the percentages rather than average responses in conditions 2 
and 3 we find that 50% of responses agreed with an attribution of weak-will 
(between 5 and 7), around 30% disagreed (between 1 and 3), and around 20% were 
neutral (4).  This means that in each case around 70% of people would not object to 
an attribution of weakness of will and half would agree with such an attribution.87  If 
70% of people would not object to the attribution of weak-will to Christabel or Rocky, 
we should think that either condition would be sufficient for attribution, though neither 
should be considered necessary. 
Of course, one might object to characterizing the neutral 20% as not objecting 
to attribution.  If we suppose that the study treats weak-will as a binary property—it 
exists or it does not (in whatever degree)—then a neutral response should be seen 
as a disavowal of knowledge about weakness of will in the case at hand.  On this 
view the neutral subject doesn’t know if a weak-will is displayed or not and so would 
object to both attribution and denial of weakness of will.  In any event 50% 
agreement with attribution represents a vast majority when compared with two other 
candidates garnering 20% and 30% respectively.   It seems that ordinary people are 
66% more likely to agree with attributions of weak-will than they are to disagree with 
                                            
87 Here I presume that neutral responses represent a neutrality about how strongly weak-willed the 
characters in question are.  This presumes that subjects interpret the survey in a way May specifically 
aims to avoid, but one which I think is quite natural given the survey. 
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such attributions and they are 150% more likely to agree than they are to declare 
some form of neutrality.  Construed in this way the results seem to indicate that 
ordinary people find either unwarranted revision of a resolution or violation of one’s 
better judgment a sufficient condition for attribution of weakness of will.  Thus, I 
propose that we consider weakness of will a cluster concept, but not a conjunctive 
concept with two necessary conditions.  Rather, if May’s findings were 
representative of all people, then weakness of will seems to be a cluster concept 
along the lines of an inclusive disjunction; both unwarranted revision of a resolution 
and violation of one’s better judgment are sufficiency conditions, neither is 
necessary and the concept is strongest when both are included. 
Thus far the research into ordinary use of the term weakness of will has been 
restricted to the traditional and revisionist interpretations.  If the preceding account is 
correct we should see both traditional and revisionist accounts as sufficient to 
warrant attribution of weakness of will on the ordinary account.  Further, we should 
think it especially appropriate to describe behaviors meeting both conditions as 
weak-willed.  However, there is a prominent third perspective on weakness of will 
offered by Gary Watson, which warrants further testing.  Watson describes 
weakness of will as a normative judgment that one has failed to develop the 
capacities of resistance commonly expected of competent adults.  On Watson’s 
account weak-willed agents are psychologically incapable of resisting the urges to 
which they give in but could have resisted if only she had developed normal 
capacities of resistance and thus the weak-willed agent is culpable for their 
compulsion in a way that merely compulsive agents are not. 
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I think that it is quite natural for people to use the expression weak-willed in 
the sense of normative failure that Watson has in mind.  
Weakness of will should be thought of as a polythetic concept along the lines 
of an inclusive disjunction—that is in ordinary language weakness of will has many 
conditions none of which is necessary.  Each of the following: unwarranted revision 
of a resolution, violation of better judgment, and the failure to develop normal 
capacities of resistance, are sufficient to warrant the ordinary use the term weakness 
of will.  However, none of these are necessary—one could rightly be called weak-
willed despite lacking any one or two of these conditions.  Of course, there is likely to 
be much debate about what revisions are unwarranted, in what better judgment 
consists, and what constitutes a normal capacity for resistance, but that these 
questions all pertain to what we ordinarily call weakness of will seems clear.  
Addiction Research and Weak-Will 
As described earlier polythetic classes are sometimes used to offer 
explicative definitions in an effort to both conform to ordinary language and to help 
shape or clarify concepts.  So far we have seen that there is strong evidence 
suggesting a cluster view of weak-will including revisionist akrasia and strict akrasia.  
But, is there any reason to think that the historical and ordinary uses of the concept 
'weak-will' are problematic or somehow less useful than an alternative definition 
might be?  To the contrary I believe that there is good reason to think that the 
philosophical and common understanding of weak-will is useful because of its 
breadth and not in spite of it. 
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 To explain why I think this account of weakness of will is useful I want to 
briefly review the research on addiction and show how it illuminate the nature of 
addiction and gives us some guidance on how to best treat it.  I do not mean to 
suggest that addiction and weakness of will are identical, but the two are sufficiently 
related that it appears that  research on addiction could illuminate the concept of 
weakness of will.  This final thrust toward a polythetic conception of weak-will 
involves two elements a review of some of the various theories about addiction and 
an account of the success rates of treatments based on these views.  In this section 
it becomes clear that there is a significant relationship between addiction and 
weakness of will.  The treatment success rates also reveal that addiction treatment 
is most successful when addiction is treated as a range of problems and that 
narrowing out conception of addiction decreases the success of preferred 
treatments.  If we can extrapolate this evidence to weakness of will, it suggests that 
a broad account of weak-will is more useful. 
 As far as we can tell people have been drinking alcohol and taking drugs 
forever, but early thinkers tended to attribute substance abuse to immoral choices 
stemming from of sinful appetites.  This sort of moral approbation did little to 
advance thinking on substance dependence, but it provided a singular and simple 
explanation of a set of relatively unusual behaviors.  Treatment consisted of moral 
rectification, usually through the auspices of the church.   Become a better person 
and your drinking will stop.  This model of addiction remains prominent in today’s 12 
step programs, which continue to treat addiction as a moral failure which can only be 
resolved through the grace of God.   
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Unsurprisingly, the success rate of twelve step programs such as Alcoholics 
Anonymous (AA) is not high.  According to one internal report the typical success 
rate of those enrolled in such programs is about 5%.88  Compare this to the 
spontaneous recovery rate of addicts of about 5% and it begins to look like AA does 
not have a measurable effect on recovery.89  Perhaps worse, there are some studies 
that indicate that AA’s commitment to an addict’s inability to control his or her 
addiction may lead to worse results than no treatment program at all.90 Nevertheless 
the twelve step approach is appealing in its simplicity: the addict’s sinful nature has 
failed her and salvation is possible only through communion with a higher power. 
Fortunately, beginning in the 19th century and paralleling the expansion of 12 
step programs there has also been an explosion in research on addiction as a 
medical phenomenon.91  This research has tended to move along two branches of 
thought.  First, there is a robust literature on the psycho-social motivations toward 
addiction.  This literature investigates the ways that psychological trauma such as 
childhood abuse, violent participation in war, etc. might cause substance abuse .  It 
                                            
88 George Vaillant (1995) The Natural History of Alcoholism Revisited, (Harvard University Press; 
Cambridge, MA). 
89  R. G. Smart calculated that the spontaneous remission rate for alcoholism was between 3.7 and 
7.4 percent per year.  For supporting evidence see Charles Bufe, (1998) Alcoholics Anonymous: Cult 
or Cure? (Sharp Press, AZ) 
90 Brandsma et al., The Outpatient Treatment of Alcoholism: A Review and Comparative Study, 
Baltimore: University Park Press, 1980 and Ditman et al., "A controlled study on the use of court 
probation for drunk arrests," American Journal of Psychiatry, 124:160-163, 1967. 
91 Because of the stark shift from very limited discussion of alcohol and narcotics abuse before the 
19th century to wide confrontation with such abuse some believe that addiction is a modern invention.  
On such accounts substance addiction is a product of the hostility and desolation of modern western 
life, or, a faux difficulty exaggerated in an effort to obscure the real sources of social and personal 
malaise.  To my mind these critiques are important in that they reveal the importance of our 
emergence into modernity for addiction.  In this emergence we confront the death of God and what 
were once sacraments become pedestrian.  But we should be careful not to suggest that the 
historical etiology of addiction fully explains its character or mitigates its harms.  Addiction is very real 
despite the fact that it is socio-historical construction.     
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also identifies correlations between social and environmental cues and addictive 
behaviors.  This body of research suggests that a substantial number of addicts are 
engaged in a process of self-medication and that significant numbers have trouble 
with addiction only in certain circumstances.   
Of course, addiction doesn’t have to be associated with PTSD or trigged by 
particular social occasions or environments.  The psycho-social aspects of addiction 
take many forms, but carefully attending to the particulars of this type of impulse can 
lead to effective strategies for resistance.  For example, George Ainslie (1992) and 
Jon Elster (1984) report that the formulation of specific private rules or 
precommitment strategies have been effective in resisting addictive behaviors.  It 
has also been reported that elevation of circumstance from poverty to relatively 
comfortable living standards often has the effect of reducing addictive tendencies.  
Importantly, these strategies require specific knowledge about the triggers and 
dispositions of specific addicts; they are not a one size fits all approach to recovery.  
The other main current of successful addiction treatment research has been 
the study of brain states and the effects of specific substances on the physical and 
chemical functions of the brain.  Research along this line has produced a number of 
valuable and effective pharmaceutical treatments of addiction.  One particularly 
promising therapy is use of the drug Naltrexone which blocks the high associated 
with alcohol and opiates.  In clinical trials those taking Naltrexone were twice as 
likely as those on placebos to abstain from alcohol consumption.  However, 
Natrexone is useless in preventing cravings associated with cocaine or nicotine, and 
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may even make them worse.  The point being that there is no one brain state 
associated with all addictions, and no one chemical which can treat them.   
 The fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual recognizes the 
complexity of addiction and describes substance abuse as meeting three out of 
seven criteria within a one-year period.  The criteria include tolerance, withdrawal, 
overuse, unsuccessful efforts or desire to cease use, spending a significant amount 
of time finding, using or recovering from the substance, reeducation of important 
social, occupational or recreational activities because of use, and continued use 
despite having knowledge of harms caused by continued use.  This is hardly a single 
marker and as it stands the DSM IV includes only psycho-social elements, none of 
the neurological elements associated with addiction are listed.  This definition 
captures the part of the complexity of addiction by defining a cluster of conditions a 
number of which are sufficient and none of which are necessary.  Robert West 
(2006) goes even further calling for a “synthetic theory of addiction that recognizes 
that addiction can involve any or all aspects of a motivational system that involves 
fine levels of operation.” (2006 p.192)  In other words, West proposes a broad 
analysis, including internal, drug based, and external motivational stimuli to account 
for addictive behavior.  
The result of admitting to a complex definition of addiction multiple elements 
of brain function and behavior is that there is conceptual space for a variety of 
treatment options.  It is of course much simpler to suppose that one explanation and 
one solution are appropriate to everyone, but this is simply not the case.  As 
addiction research has accepted the complexity of addiction and moved away from 
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simple moral condemnation it has become more effective at understanding and 
treating addicts.  This is an important lesson for the related philosophical inquiry on 
weakness of will.  Not only do we get closer to the truth of people’s experiences by 
conceptualizing weakness of will as a cluster concept, but we also move closer to 
overcoming a troubling phenomenon in people’s lives. 
Conclusion  
I have attempted here to show how addiction research and a little bit of 
experimental philosophy can combine to shed light on a longstanding trouble in the 
history of philosophy.  The account here is aimed at urging others to consider the 
real possibility that the right way to look at weakness of will is as a complex cluster 
concept.  The aim is to move philosophical thinking about weakness of will closer to 
the medical view of addiction.  If this transition is successful, it will mean in part that 
we treat weakness of will as reflecting the myriad ways that people take action and 
not as a possible key to uncovering the one way that practical judgments are made.  
It is also worth noting that correlating weakness of will with the medical model 
of addiction may have some practical advice to offer those of us who occasionally 
watch TV when we should be grading, or who decide to contribute to Oxfam and 
then do not, or even to those of us who want to vegetarians but cannot seem to 
make the step.  We need not think that these failures all come from the same sort of 
difficulty, nor must we be committed to the claim that each of them has the same 
treatment.  I have not argued for this thesis here, but I suspect that attending to the 
particular nature of each problem and finding specific solutions will be the best way 
to make real moral progress. 
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Chapter 4 
Freedom and Weakness of Will: The Compatibility Problem 
 
A central attack against those who regard weakness of will as possible has 
been to argue that weakness of will is better understood as a form of coercion.  I 
want to show that defenders of weakness of will need not get bogged down in 
debates over the existence of free will.  First, I will briefly show that those who deny 
the existence of free will will also deny the existence of weakness of will, but since 
they do not offer any special reasons to object to WOW, we can set that aside for 
the purposes of this thesis.  Then I show any plausible account of free will is 
compatible with the notion of weakness of will.  I do not endorse each of the 
accounts of freedom described here, in my view some are quite suspect.  
Nevertheless, these are the main accounts of freewill and I show that each is 
compatible with the existence of weakness of will.  
 
The “Consequences Argument” 
Pierre Simon Laplace writes, 
 “We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past and 
the cause of its future. An intellect which at a certain moment would know 
all forces that set nature in motion, and all positions of all items of which nature is 
composed, if this intellect were also vast enough to submit these data to analysis, it 
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would embrace in a single formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the 
universe and those of the tiniest atom; for such an intellect nothing would be 
uncertain and the future just like the past would be present before its eyes.”92  
Laplace's demon is important because it would seem to undermine our 
ordinary belief in free will.  Of course the actual existence of such a demon is not 
important, the force of the argument rests on the possibility of understanding all 
future events completely through earlier ones.  If the history of the physical world 
leads inexorably to definite future events, the world is deterministic and determinism 
is at odds with our ordinary conception of freewill.  Freewill is usually understood as 
incompatible with all of our actions having been determined by some earlier state.    
Peter Van Inwagen describes determinism in simple terms as “the thesis that 
the past determines a unique future."93  On Van Inwagen's view the truth of 
determinism is incompatible with freedom and responsibility because determinism 
does not allow agent’s to cause events.  Van Inwagen describes his central 
argument for incompatibilism as the “consequence argument.”  The consequence 
argument proceeds as follows: "If determinism is true, then our acts are the 
consequences of the laws of nature and events in the remote past. But it is not up to 
us what went on before we were born, and neither is it up to us what the laws of 
nature are. Therefore, the consequences of those things (including our present acts) 
are not up to us."94  The meaning of an action being “up to us” is somewhat unclear, 
but at root Van Inwagen believes that it requires an event not be caused by any 
                                            
92 Leplace, Pierre (1814 (Translation 1902)). A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities. London: John 
Wiley & Sons. 
93 Van Inwagen, Peter (1983) An Essay on Free Will, (Oxford: OUP) p. 2 
94 Ibid. p. 16 
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other object, i.e. physical process.  The general challenge to freewill comes from the 
possibility of automatic physical processes, determinism, undermining the possibility 
of agents effectively making decisions about events. 
Skepticism About Freewill 
Both determinists and causal indeterminists are prone to be skeptical about 
the possibility of genuine human agency, because they are often skeptical about the 
possibility of human freedom.  The argument from determinism or causal 
indeterminism to skepticism about free will is relatively straightforward.  Skeptics 
argue as follows: If all human action is caused by antecedent events, people cannot 
cause actions.95  (Here causing an action is taken in the ordinary direct sense.  In 
some sense human actions are all a part of antecedent conditions, but this “butterfly 
effect” is not what we ordinarily mean when we talk about causing an action.)  All 
human actions are caused by antecedent events.  So people cannot cause actions.  
If people cannot be the ultimate cause of actions, then on some prominent accounts 
they are not free willed agents.96  Therefore, people are not free willed agents.   
Skeptics about free will are plentiful and they make a compelling case in 
physicalist terms, but they are not the primary audience for a defense of the 
possibility of weakness of will.  Those who are skeptical of free will are skeptical of 
all intentional human action, not just one particular variety.  We should expect that 
skeptics of free will would be skeptical of weak willed action, but only as a much 
larger subset of action generally.  Philosophers who argue that purported cases of 
                                            
95 Further along I address the possibility of regional as opposed to global determinism. 
96 Call this the “agent-causation” view of free will.  This view is discussed in greater detail further 
along. 
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weak willed action are really compulsive or unfree suppose that other actions are 
free—this is the force of their claims against the possibility of weakness of will.  So 
for our purposes here we will focus on accounts of free will without undue concern 
for addressing general skepticism about freedom.  If it turns out that free will has 
been an illusion all along, then the possibility of weak willed action is the least of our 
concerns.  
Two Theories of Free Will  
 Among theories of free will there are two basic varieties, libertarianism and 
compatibilism.  Libertarianism about freedom should be sharply distinguished from 
the political ideology by the same name—the two are not related.  Libertarianism 
about free will, sometimes called metaphysical libertarianism, is perhaps the most 
common pre-theoretical view.  Proponents of libertarianism maintain that people are 
free in a way that allows for moral responsibility and that this freedom is 
incompatible with either determinism or causal indeterminacy (and also 
randomness).  The compatibalist agrees with the libertarian’s first belief, which is 
that people are free in a way that allows for moral responsibility.  But, the 
compatibalist rejects the libertarian’s second belief, that freedom entails the falsity of 
determinism and casual indeterminacy.  For this reason compatibilism is sometimes 
called “soft determinism.”97  On the compatibalist view, human freedom is 
compatible with determinism (although it need not embrace determinism,) while on 
the libertarian’s view freedom and determinism are incompatible.  
Libertarian (Incompatibalist) Freewill   
                                            
97 James, William (1884) "The Dilemma of Determinism," republished in The Will to Believe (New 
York, Dover 1956) p. 149 
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 The strength of libertarian incompatibilism begins by accepting some forms of 
determinism as compatible with some forms of freedom.  For example, being 
imprisoned is a form of coercion or un-freedom which is compatible with the 
opposite.  Which is to say it is possible for some people to be unfree in the sense of 
being imprisoned while others are free in the sense of not being imprisoned.  So, 
some forms of freedom and un-freedom are compatible on all accounts.  But, the 
libertarian asserts that there are some types of freedom which are incompatible with 
the truth of determinism, we should think of these as the central cases of contention 
in the dispute about free will.  
The type of freedom which is incompatible with determinism is present in the 
future being “up to us.”98  At its core Libertarian free will requires that an agent 
genuinely have alternative possibilities.  Having alternative possibilities simply 
means that although an agent acts in one way the agent can do otherwise or has the 
power or ability to do something different.99  The principle of alternative possibilities 
holds when a person is free to choose between acting on alternative courses of 
action—this indicates that freedom involves a counter-factual ability or power to act 
in a way that is different from the way one actually acts.  This is sometimes referred 
to as the ability to have done otherwise.  On this condition, an agent’s action is free if 
and only if it is possible that she could have acted differently.  Thus, on the 
possibility of acting otherwise is a necessary condition for an action’s having been 
free.   
                                            
98cf.  Van Inwagen 
99 Ibid. p. 33 
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Harry Frankfurt challenges the principle of alternative possibilities writing, “A 
person may well be morally responsible for what he has done even though he could 
not have done otherwise.”100  Consider Ellen Smith who intentionally crashes her car 
in an effort to defraud her insurance company.  While she chooses to crash her car 
at a particular time, the conditions on the road that evening combined with the 
condition of her car make it such that she would have crashed at that time with or 
without having made such a decision.  In this case there is no malevolent agent 
conspiring to coerce any behavior or action.  Smith is responsible for crashing her 
car in an effort to defraud her insurance company, and this despite the fact that she 
could not have done otherwise than crash her car.  Smith is responsible because 
she chose to crash her car notwithstanding the slickness of the road or her poor 
brakes.  If this seems too fanciful still, consider that the best time to fake an accident 
would be precisely when one has bad brakes and the road is wet—these conditions 
make Smith’s fraud more believable and they force her crash even if she were to 
change her mind.101   
 What stories of this sort, so called Frankfurt-style examples, are meant to 
show is that the principle of alternative possibilities is irrelevant to moral 
responsibility.  This thesis is sometimes called the irrelevance thesis and is a 
fundamental problem for incompatibalists because it presents a challenge to the 
                                            
100 Frankfurt, Harry (1969) “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,” reprinted in The 
Importance of What We Care About (New York; Cambridge University Press) p. 1 
101 Some people intentionally construct such situations explicitly to combat the possibility of their 
failure of nerve.  Consider the addict who chooses to quit using drugs and implements a failsafe 
mechanism by burning bridges with her suppliers.  If she quits successfully without ever trying to 
score more drugs we should say that she is directly responsible for quitting.  On the other hand, if she 
succumbs to temptation and tries to score more drugs she will be denied and will avoid using despite 
her own immediate choice.  Of course, in the failsafe scenario the addict may be responsible for 
arranging the failsafe and thus derivatively responsible for quitting.   
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linking of alternative possibilities with moral responsibility.  If one can be morally 
responsible without having alternative possibilities, the consequences argument 
about determinism is irrelevant to the issue of moral responsibility.  Since most of 
the historical defense of libertarian free will is based on the consequences argument, 
Frankfurt style cases represent a serious challenge to one argument for both 
libertarian free will and determinism.   
Daniel Dennett endorses the idea that Frankfurt style cases can be defended 
against objection(s), but suggests that they do not go far enough in providing a 
convincing refutation of the principle of alternative possibilities.  On Dennett’s view 
“whatever ‘could have done otherwise’ actually means, it is not what we are 
interested in when we care about whether some act was freely and responsibly 
performed.”102 His suggestion is that the principle of alternative possibilities has 
been mistakenly presumed to be a metaphysical stipulation on freedom and thus by 
extension a requirement for moral responsibility.  Viewing the principle of alternative 
possibilities as a metaphysical condition is mistaken because it would be both 
unanswerable and would violate the sense that we are responsible for our 
characters.  Thus, Dennett argues, when we inquire about alternative possibilities 
we really mean something more like, “how did I make my decision and was that 
process adequate?  Can I modify my process to make it better?” 
On Dennett’s view the trouble with the question “could I have done 
otherwise?” stems from the fact that many of our actions stem from firm convictions, 
beliefs, and characters.  Dennett uses himself as an example, suggesting that he 
                                            
102 Ibid. pp. 131-132 
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could never be persuaded to torture another human being for a thousand dollars.  It 
is, he claims, impossible that he do otherwise than reject the torture for money offer.  
This lack of alternatives is not because he is out of control, coerced or otherwise 
unfree, rather it is “because I see so clearly what the situation is and because my 
rational control faculty is not impaired.”103  Dennett maintains that he would 
responsible and perhaps praiseworthy for his action (refusing to torture) because “a 
considerable part of being a responsible person consists in making oneself unable to 
do the things one would be blamed for if one did them.”104  Of course, having the 
responsibility of arranging ourselves such that we could not do otherwise in some 
certain situations implies that the principle of alternative possibilities is false. 
The question “could I have done otherwise” opens the possibility of reflecting 
on what went wrong with an earlier action and this reflection is vital to self 
improvement.  On Dennett’s view it simply doesn’t matter whether we were 
metaphysically free to otherwise or not.  “Who cares whether…I could have done 
something else?  I didn’t…and it’s too late to undo what I did.”105  Contra-causal 
freedom is on Dennett’s view simply not a kind of freedom worth wanting because in 
it cannot ever matter to one’s actual actions.  The sorts of freedom worth wanting 
are freedom from coercion, freedom to participate in the political process, not the 
freedom to do what one doesn’t actually do. 
Kane argues that what is important in the question “could I have done 
otherwise?” is not only the possibility of taking corrective action, but also attributing 
                                            
103 Ibid. p. 133 
104 Ibid. p. 135 
105 Ibid. p. 142 
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responsibility for our past.  This additional consideration is key to the libertarian 
(incompatibalist) response is the condition on freedom Kane describes as “ultimate 
responsibility."  Ultimate responsibility requires that an agent be personally 
responsible for causing an action.  Ultimacy is a “backtracking” or historical condition 
about the origin of an agent’s action.  Ultimate responsibility requires that an agent’s 
action ultimately or originally stems from a voluntary contribution or willing action.  
As Kane puts it, “ultimate responsibility lies where the ultimate cause is.”106  This 
means that an agent is free only to the extent that her actions are ultimately caused 
by her own choices about actions, character, etc.  
 The condition of ultimate responsibility suggests the importance of looking 
backward in an effort to determine responsibility.  Kane argues that some agents 
without genuine alternatives at time Ɵ could be free at Ɵ because they are ultimately 
responsible for their character at Ɵ due to voluntary actions at Ɵ -1.  Such an agent 
would be free at Ɵ because she had alternative possibilities at Ɵ-1 and her choice at 
Ɵ -1 is ultimately responsible for her action at Ɵ. In this way Kane thinks, “we 
salvaged the AP condition in response to Dennett by invoking the UR condition” and 
suggests “incompatibalists about moral responsibility should do the same in 
response to Frankfurt.”107   
Recall the Frankfurt-style case of Smith whose actions crashed her car under 
conditions which would have led her car to crash anyway.   Kane argues that Smith 
is responsible because she puts herself in this situation "by virtue of other actions or 
                                            
106 Ibid. 
107 Ibid. p. 42 
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choices in the past with respect to which (s)he could have done otherwise."108  This 
strategy requires that some actions may be both free and violate the condition of 
alternative possibilities, because the situation itself arises based on a having a 
character that the agent could have chnaged.  Thus, in situations without genuine 
alternative possibilities the agent may be thought to be free in the incompatibalist 
sense when she bears ultimate responsibility in virtue of having had alternative 
possibilities in relevant past situations. 
If, as Kane believes, the libertarian account of incompatibilism hangs on the 
notion of ultimate responsibility challenges to its possibility are central to a 
preference between incompatibilism and compatibilism.  Here I offer two main 
objections to the notion of ultimate responsibility as Kane articulates it.  First, the 
ultimacy condition is an elusive condition to pin down, a sort of unmoved mover, and 
the arche of an agent’s action.  If an agent's freedom is dependent upon earlier free 
choices one will wonder how responsible an agent could be for the development of 
their character at ever earlier stages.  At the limit this line of thinking may produce a 
vicious regress of the kind supposed in the cosmological argument for God.  
Second, even supposing the ultimacy condition is both possible and identifiable, 
there is some serious concern about the base responsibility condition in a number of 
Frankfurt style cases.  If accurate, either one of these objections is sufficient to derail 
the libertarian account of freewill articulated here.  
Nevertheless, libertarians believe that many cases of action include both an 
agent’s ultimate responsibility and genuine alternative possibilities.  There are 
                                            
108 Ibid. 
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plausible reasons to believe that an agent sometimes is both ultimately responsible 
for her actions and could have done otherwise.  There are also plausible arguments 
against such possibilities.  As I said earlier on my aim here is not to offer a thorough 
accounting of those arguments, nor certainly to settle the debate.  Rather my aim is 
to sketch the main positions and controversies in the free will debate in an effort to 
see how they relate to discussion of weakness of will.  Let us suppose for the sake 
of argument that the Libertarians are successful in defending the adequacy of both 
proposed conditions, the principle of alternative possibilities and ultimate 
responsibility.  Further, let us suppose that Libertarians show us that there are cases 
of action which meet both conditions.  In such a world we should all be prepared to 
admit that freedom exists and is (in an important sense) incompatible with 
determinism.  But what would the truth of libertarian incompatibilism mean for 
weakness of will? 
Accounts of weakness of will typically rely on a division in the desires, 
judgments, intentions, beliefs, etc. of an agent, with the effect of leading the agent to 
act in a way that she experiences as failing herself.  The weak willed agent believes 
that she should do one thing, but does another.  Moreover, the weak willed agent’s 
failure is the result of an internal division, not external coercion or internal 
compulsion.  Such an action can only be free on the libertarian account only if the 
agent is both free to have done otherwise, and ultimately responsible for the weak 
willed action.  To see how this is possible first note that the weak willed agent’s 
failure comes from a tension in her own judgments, intentions, beliefs, etc, what 
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Kane calls “internal motivational points of view.”109  This suggests that an agent’s 
failure to act as she thinks best is an action for which the agent is ultimately 
responsible, because it is her inclinations that ultimately support both the preferred 
and inferior course of action.   
Further, the weak willed agent’s internal tension between options leads to 
uncertainty about which course she will pursue.  Kane writes, “uncertainty in the 
minds of agents…is reflected in the indeterminacy of their efforts to overcome 
temptation and in the consequent indeterminacy and unpredictability of the 
outcomes.”110  The conflicted agent’s actions are indeterminate because of the 
tension in her evaluative process.  This tension and the resulting indeterminacy 
entails that she could act on either her better or inferior inclinations.  It is the tension 
in the agent’s evaluation that allows her a plurality of options for action—evaluative 
tension allows that she could act otherwise.   Thus, the tension experienced by the 
weak willed agent leads to the satisfaction of the condition of alternative possibilities.  
Where the decision between possibilities is made based on the agent’s 
decision of “strong willed” options and “weak willed” options, it is her decision which 
“makes the difference” in her action.  Of course, not all cases of action involving a 
conflicted agent are resolved on the basis of the agent’s decision, sometimes 
coercive influences, or immutable psychological forces “make the difference.”  But, 
there is no reason to suppose that all failures or weak willed actions are of this latter 
type, any more than we should suppose that all actions are of the latter type.  One’s 
better judgment has a clear motivational force, but better judgment is not the only 
                                            
109 Ibid. p. 132 
110 Ibid. p. 132-133 
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thing with motivational force; lesser judgments are motivational as well.  The point 
here is that what an agent voluntarily causes may stem from both better or inferior 
motivations and the agent still be thought ultimately responsible.  To sum up, the 
libertarian position is that an agent’s inner conflict can lead to indeterminacy of 
action, the possibility of doing otherwise, and that the final action either way may be 
based on the agent’s decision, making her ultimately responsible.  Thus, if correct, 
on the libertarian account “free will requires the recognition that failures or weakness 
…can occur and need not always be compulsive or determined.”111 
Compatibilism: Determinism and Freedom 
Donald Davidson once wrote, "Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Moore, Schlick, Ayer, 
Stevenson, and a host of others have done what can be done, or ought ever to have 
been needed, to remove the confusions that can make determinism seem to 
frustrate freedom.” 112  While many of us are willing to accept that the argument for 
determinism is inductively strong, this usually leaves us unfazed in our support for 
concepts like freedom and moral responsibility.  Compatibilism is at root the view 
that freedom and moral responsibility are compatible with the truth of casual 
determinism.  The view shared by all compatibalists is that if determinism turns out 
to be true, this will not negate all genuine accounts of free agency nor moral 
responsibility.  The allure of compatibilism is the promise of showing how our 
intuitive sense of freedom can reasonably coexist with the possibility of deterministic 
forces.  The main difficulty of advancing compatibilism is that determinism seems to 
rule out an agent's having genuine alternative possibilities.  Thus, the compatibalists'  
                                            
111 Ibid. p. 155 
112 Watson p. 173 citing Davidson, Donald (1980) p. 63 
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strategy is to show that the truth of determinism does not entail the absence of 
alternative possibilities.113   
Hume's early compatibilism continues through the work of G.E. Moore and 
A.J. Ayer, each of whom argued that the existence of alternative possibilities is 
compatible with determinism.114  The style of argument employed by Ayer and 
Moore focused on a particular understanding of the concept “could have done 
otherwise.”  If one sees the counterfactual could have acted otherwise as indicating 
something about the actual world, both argued, then one has gone astray.  In fact 
the counterfactual condition, “could have acted otherwise,” they thought, should be 
understood as referring to another possible world.  On this view saying that 
someone could have acted other than she did amounts to saying “had she wanted to 
act differently, then she could have acted other than she did.”  The move here is to 
focus on the conditional aspect of a counterfactual. 
The key to conditional analysis is the idea that a determined agent has 
alternative possibilities when she could have done otherwise if she had wanted to.   
On this account, the free agent is not actually free to do otherwise at the time of her 
action, rather she might have done otherwise provided that things earlier in her 
causal chain had gone differently.  The trouble with this defense of compatibilism is 
that it seems to play kick the can with the burden of alternative possibility.  The worry 
is that an agent’s disposition is linked causally to some earlier and also determined 
                                            
113 Some call this "strong compatibalism" because if successful the strategy produces a broad view of 
freedom.  Campbell, Joseph Keim (1997) “A Compatibalist Theory of Alternative Possibilities,” 
Philosophical Studies, 88:3 pp. 319-330  
114 See David Hume (1748) Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding reprinted (1995) Prentice 
Hall, p. 104, G.E. Moore (1903) Principia Ethica Ch. III, Online at: http://fair-use.org/g-e-
moore/principia-ethica/chapter-iii  and A.J. Ayer (1954) “Freedom and Necessity” Online at: 
http://www.unc.edu/~dfrost/classes/Ayer_FreedomandNecessity.pdf Accessed: June 20, 2011. 
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event.  Thus, in order to alter one’s dispositions it seems one must be able to alter 
earlier events in the causal chain. And to alter those events, one must be able to 
alter still earlier events, and so on.  
Donald Davidson argued that dispositions are not governed strictly by earlier 
events, but are states determined in part by natural laws, so no earlier event is 
required for the existence of alternative dispositions.115  The idea is to avoid a 
regress by demonstrating the existence of two distinct types of possible action, 
determinate causal action, and intentional agent causal action. For example, 
imagine Moshe who naturally prefers bagels to bacon.  If Moshe chooses either 
breakfast food he will always choose bagels if he intentionally chooses either.   
However, given an unusual turn of events Moshe might choose a breakfast with 
bacon over one with bagels, just not intentionally.  Davidson thinks that  given 
Moshe's natural disposition it would be reasonable to say that he could have  could 
have done otherwise--that is, he could have intentionally chosen the bacon 
breakfast.  Moshe is free, just not very free.  He is determined to eat the bacon, but 
he has alternative possibilities because if he had a different disposition he could do 
so intentionally.  
In his 1956 essay “If and Cans”  J.L. Austin describes kicking himself for 
missing a very short putt and thinking that he could have holed it in conditions 
precisely as they were.  Of course, he tried to hole the putt, but he missed.  Here 
Austin is using ‘could have’ to mean that he both has the capacity to intend to hole 
the putt and ordinarily has the capacity to physically hole the putt.  As Austin puts it 
                                            
115 Donald Davidson (1973) “Freedom to Act” reprinted in Davidson (1980) pp. 63-81 
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‘cans’ are constitutionally ‘iffy.’  the point here is that there are two conditionals at 
work in a counterfactual statement about what one could have done.  First, there is 
an implicit “if I had tried, intended, etc.” and second, “if I ordinarily had the capacity.”  
Davidson’s account focuses on the iffyness of intention formation and works through 
the possibility of producing intentions to act in ways that the physical circumstance 
apparently precludes.  This reliance on iffyness leads Austin to reject compatibilism, 
but others offer an alternative conception focusing on dispositions.  
 A dispositional account of freedom supports compatibilism by focusing  on 
the second leg of Austin’s worrying putter example.  Rather than highlight the 
golfer’s intent, dispositionalists focus on the fact that the golfer ordinarily holes the 
putt.  The general strategy is to focus on what might have occurred in other nearby 
possible worlds and to describe possibility in terms of what David Lewis calls 
“maximally similar” worlds.116  This shift gives the dispositional analysis an edge in 
explaining difficult cases117 and expands the notion of “alternative possibility” to 
include alternative actions, not merely alternative intentions about the same action.  
For example, if Moshe would ordinarily notice the bacon in his quiche, it is possible 
that he could have acted otherwise and eaten the bagel instead. 
In advancing and defending compatibilism on a dispositional account Michael 
Smith offers the example of failing to say something witty at an appropriate moment 
in response to an objectionable argument.  According to the consequences 
argument, one should think that if determinism is true, it was literally impossible for 
                                            
116 David Lewis (1986) “Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow” reprinted in Philosophical 
Papers OUP pp.32-52. 
117 I have in mind here McKenna's case of Danielle who must choose between a black and blonde 
lab. 
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you to have offered a witty response to the argument.  But, Smith maintains, in such 
cases you are able to offer a witty response just in case “the possible worlds in 
which you think of the better response are nearby, or very similar to, the actual world 
in which you don’t.”118  The idea is that if in other possible worlds with highly similar 
laws and histories, you would have done otherwise, then it is possible that in this 
world, with these laws you might have done otherwise as well.  Smith clarifies, “the 
crucial point is that we do not need to imagine a massive transformation of your 
nature in order to imagine you thinking of a better response.  We need simply to 
imagine you, pretty much as you are, but giving a better response.”119  
Extending Smith's dispositionalism Jeanette Kennett writes “the reasons so 
far given for thinking that there is no such thing as weakness of will are crucially 
flawed.”120  Kennett and Smith offer an account of weakness of will focusing on 
dispositions as a ground for self-control.  The idea is that an agent can exhibit 
freewill by controlling her dispositions about her actions, even when her actions are 
out of line with those dispositions.  In such cases our actions may be pre-empted by 
deterministic forces, but we control our dispositions with respect to the action.  This 
requires a distinction between our normative judgments, themselves evaluations of 
our dispositions or "idealized desires", and our motivations.121    
   Consider an example Kennett and Smith adapt from Gary Watson’s Free 
Agency.  The mother of a screaming infant is at the end of her rope and finds herself 
                                            
118 Michael Smith (2004) Ethics and the A Priori (Cambridge University Press; New York, NY) p. 91 
119 Ibid. 
120 Jeanette Kennett and Michael Smith (1997) “Philosophy and Commonsense: The case of 
weakness of will” reprinted in Ethics and the A Priori (CUP) p. 59  
121 Ibid. p. 63 
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wanting to leave her screaming child to drown in the bathwater.  Should she do so, 
we would rightly say that the mother intentionally drowns her child—she acts on 
motivational reasons she holds, frustrations, exhaustion and the like.  However, such 
an explanation is not a justification and it would not be right to say that she acts on a 
normative reason.  Rather, the mother who out of frustration drowns her infant acts 
contrary to her normative reasons for action—she does not value her child’s being 
drowned, she is simply frustrated with his crying.122  The point to which Smith and 
Kennett use this account is to emphasize that our ordinary conception of reasons for 
action contains an ambiguity between motivating reasons and normative reasons.  
The exhausted and frustrated mother they suggest has motivational reasons for 
drowning her child—frustration and exhaustion—and normative reasons to dry and 
clothe her child and leave it in a safe place while she calms down—the value she 
places on her child’s life.  A distinction between motivational reasons and normative 
reasons is useful in that it helps to make sense of internal conflict in a commonsense 
way.   
Watson himself extends the example of the deranged mother in a similar way 
describing the mother as like others in ordinary situations who are “estranged from a 
rather persistent and pervasive desire.”123  On Watson’s view such desires generate 
reasons for acting toward “getting rid of the desire” and “hence this kind of reason 
differs importantly from the reasons based upon the evaluation of the activities in 
question.”124  Here Watson agrees that the source of an agent’s desires is important 
                                            
122 For more on this point see Watson 2004 p. 22 
123 Gary Watson (1982) “Free Agency” reprinted in his Agency and Answerability (OUP; 2004) p. 19  
124 Ibid. p. 20 
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in determining the content of the reasons such desires generate.  But, Watson, of 
course, does not think that the possibility of conflict between what we value and 
what we desire leads to the possibility of strict akratic action.  On Watson’s view the 
irrationality (or nonrationality) of acting on what we desire at the expense of what we 
value represents an impediment to our free agency.  On Watson’s view those 
passions, appetites, or acculturated desires which override, blind, or subvert our 
judgment are compulsive and thus undermine free agency.  Using the language of 
Kennett and Smith, Watson finds motivational reasons compulsive and normative 
reasons the ground of free agency.  As Watson himself puts the point, what makes 
us responsible agents is normative competence, a minimum responsiveness to 
reasons.  This leads Watson to the view that “God is the only free agent sans 
phrase.”  By this Watson means, since God is the only perfectly knowledgeable and 
perfectly powerful agent, only God has perfect normative competence, and thus only 
God is perfectly free.  People, Watson claims, “are only more or less free agents, 
typically less.”125 
Kennett and Smith disagree with Watson because they believe that it is 
misguided to suppose that acting in accord with one’s normative reasons is the only 
way to have free agency or self-control.  According to Kennett and Smith, “Some 
exercises of self-control must themselves be, not actions, but rather manifestations 
of our cognitive dispositions.”126  Here Kennett and Smith attempt to avoid a regress 
of putatively self-controlled actions by suggesting that self-control can be manifest in 
something other than an action.  The sort of manifestations that Kennett and Smith 
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have in mind includes things like thoughts about what one ought to do.  The idea is 
that an agent whose motivational reasons conflict with her normative reasons may 
express her normative reasons, and thus her freedom, not only through action, but 
through certain cognitive dispositions.  On this view it is possible to be free in virtue 
of having certain cognitive dispositions, while acting in a way that is contrary to one’s 
own values.  That is one’s cognitive dispositions might indicate one’s freedom, while 
her actions go against her better judgment.    
Imagine, for example, that both Peter and Paul judge it best to give to the 
hungry, but being less than fully rational desire to buy lattes more than to give to the 
hungry.  Both Peter and Paul have a conflict in reasoning between normative and 
motivational reasons for acting.  Peter and Paul differ however in that Peter’s 
cognitive dispositions are such that he ordinarily thinks through his commitments 
and these thoughts ordinarily lead him to act on his better judgment, while Paul’s 
cognitive dispositions are such that he rarely thinks about his commitments and so 
often acts contrary to his better judgment.  However, on this occasion both Peter and 
Paul fail to act as they think best and in the end both buy lattes rather than slip their 
cash into an envelope for UNICEF.  On Kennett and Smith’s account we ought to 
consider Peter free to have done otherwise and Paul unfree.  In this case Peter is 
merely weak-willed, but Paul was literally compelled by his desire.  The difference 
between the two is that Peter has cognitive dispositions which can and ordinarily do 
lead him to resist his desires and these dispositions make Peter free.  Meanwhile 
Paul has no such dispositions and this lack leaves him unable to resist his desires 
even when he judges that he should.   
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Importantly, having dispositions which can and ordinarily do lead one to act 
on one’s better judgment does not entail that one will always act on normative 
reasons.  What such dispositions entail is that one has developed the mechanism 
required to act on normative judgment in those hard cases where normative reason 
conflicts with motivational reason.  But having the requisite mechanism only entails a 
capacity to act on normative reasons in hard cases and this capacity is the freedom 
to act on normative reasons, not a requirement to act on those reasons.  It is 
perfectly possible, on this view, for one to both have the capacity for bring oneself to 
act on normative reasons and fail to exercise this capacity in a particular instance.  It 
is for this reason that Kennett and Smith argue one can be both free to do otherwise 
and fail to exercise self-control, and thus they claim the existence of weakness of will 
is theoretically plausible. 
Other compatibalists worry that the notion of "nearby" possible worlds will not 
withstand much scrutiny and shift the dispositional account to a broader one.  Kadri 
Vihvelin offers the following, “a fragile glass is a glass that is liable to break; that is, it 
is a glass that can break, even if it never does.”127  Vihvelin's point is that 
dispositional compatibalists can rely on unmanifested dispositions (tendencies, 
casual powers, capacities) to act in certain ways to support genuine alternative 
possibilities.   The force of this claim lays in two main points, first, the view that 
counterfactual dispositions are compatible with the truth of determinism and, second, 
the view that counterfactual dispositions imply a counterfactual ability. Thus, a 
                                            
127 Kadri Vihvelin (2004) “Freewill Demystified: A Dispositional Account,” Philosophical Topics, 32: 
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person’s unexpressed attributes can make her capable of acting contrary to a 
casually determined outcome.   
 Vihvelin goes on to affirm the possibility of weakness of will in the following 
example: 
 “Person X lies to Customs officials.  When questioned later, X 
agrees that breaking the law is wrong but candidly explains that he did 
it because he did not want to spend hundreds of dollars on import 
duties.  X acted contrary to his better judgment about what he ought to 
do; so he acted against what he most valued.  But there is little reason 
to suppose that he acted unfreely.” 128 
    
On the compatibalist view acting freely in cases like this simply means that the agent 
could have done otherwise given her dispositions.  Of course, the facts of the 
situation might determine some other outcome, but the agent herself has features 
which would allow alternative action.  The point is not that the agent could actually 
do otherwise, only that her dispositions allow that she could do otherwise.      
The dispositionalist account might be parodied "If it weren't for all these pesky 
facts I could do X.  After all, there is nothing about me that prevents X, it's just the 
world that won't let me."  Fischer and Ravizza report that a person in a locked room 
might have the disposition to open the door, after all he is capable of opening doors 
and has often done so.  Nevertheless they say, he is not free to open the door, it is 
locked.  However, the point for my purposes here this is that  among those who 
defend compatibilism there is a significant sense that weakness of will is a distinct 
possibility.  Thus, if the dispositionalist account of freedom is eventually vindicated, 
there is good reason to believe that the truth of weakness of will would follow 
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closely.  In what follows I consider another compatibalist view about freedom and 
responsibility and discuss its implications for the possibility of weakness of will.  
Semi-Compatibilism 
 Semi-compatibilism is the final view of freedom I will consider here.  As a 
working short hand it is helpful to think about semi-compatibilism as maintaining that 
“causal determinism is compatible with moral responsibility, quite apart from 
considerations pertaining to "could have done otherwise."129  Semi-compatibalists do 
not argue that determinism is compatible with both freedom and moral responsibility. 
They acknowledge that the truth of determinism might eliminate the possibly of 
freedom understood as having genuine alternatives.  However, semi-compatibalists 
argue that moral responsibility is separable from freedom and defend the 
compatibility of determinism and moral responsibility.   
 The seperability thesis of semi-compaitbalism is based on P.F. Strawson’s 
view that the final answer to the question of whether humans are free is far less 
significant than the fact that we believe ourselves to be free.  As one writer puts it, 
“Strawson made a contribution to the free will versus determinism discussions by 
pointing out that whatever the deep metaphysical truth on these issues, people 
would not give up talking about and feeling moral responsibility, praise and blame, 
guilt and pride, crime and punishment, gratitude, resentment, and forgiveness.”130  
Feelings such as praise, blame, guilt, resentment, gratitude, indignation, love, 
                                            
129 John Fischer Garden of Forking Paths  Online at: 
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seemed to Strawson a basic and inalienable part of the human description of the 
world and thus he thought that these “reactive attitudes” were “facts” of human life 
independent of the truth of determinism.131   
Strawson saw reactive attitudes like moral praise, blame, indignation, 
gratitude, etc. as appropriate only in interaction with other human beings.  This limit 
on the appropriateness of reactive attitudes is something Strawson saw as divulged 
from the use of natural language.  For example, though one might jokingly blame a 
bird for defecating on one’s car, it would be inappropriate to be indignant or to 
seriously blame a bird for such an action.  This is because a bird is not an 
appropriate candidate for such reactive attitudes.  A morally responsible agent on 
the Strawsonian view is an agent who is an appropriate recipient of reactive attitudes 
such as praise or blame.  It does not follow that reactive attitudes actually must be 
attributed to morally responsible agents, other considerations may limit actual 
attribution.  The point is simply that morally responsible agents are apt candidates 
for reactive attitudes.  As he puts it, "It matters to us whether the actions of other 
people…reflect attitudes toward us of good will, affection, or esteem on the one 
hand or contempt, indifference, or malevolence on the other.”132  It is taking or 
holding such attitudes toward one another that ultimately constitutes our having 
responsibility for our actions.  Watson describes Strawson’s view, “as natural and 
primitive in human life as friendship and animosity, sympathy and antipathy.  It rests 
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on needs and concerns that are not so much to be justified as acknowledged.”133 
This is to acknowledge that a whole range of reactive attitudes constitute 
responsibility.  As Fischer and Ravizza put the point “The Strawsonian approach 
holds that being morally responsible just is being an apt recipient of these attitudes 
and a participant in the associated practices.”134 
The “question unanswered” Strawson writes, “is about what it would be 
rational to do if determinism were true, a question about the rational justification of 
ordinary inter-personal attitudes in general.”135  Most people will agree that we are 
not responsible for all of our actions.  Attributing responsibility to every action is not 
enriching, it is muddying.  One wants to know when and how reactive attitudes are 
justified. Fischer and Ravizza offer two general conditions for the appropriate 
attribution of reactive attitudes and thus for responsibility.  The first condition is 
epistemic, “It captures the intuition that an agent is responsible only if he both knows 
the particular facts surrounding his action, and acts with the proper sort of beliefs 
and intentions.”136  An agent is not an appropriate subject of reactive attitudes when 
she is ignorant of important facts about her action.  That ignorance can excuse 
moral responsibility is they think indicative of the importance of the epistemic 
condition for responsibility.  Put another way this epistemic condition holds that “a 
person must know (or be reasonably expected to know) what he is doing—he must 
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not be deceived or ignorant about the particular circumstances and manner in which 
he is doing it.”137 
The second condition Fischer and Ravizza offer for the appropriate attribution 
of moral responsibility they call the “freedom-relevant” or “control” condition.138 The 
key point regarding control is to identify the sort of control that is worth wanting.   
Fischer and Ravizza argue that the control worth wanting is the sort that allows for 
moral responsibility.  They describe libertarian and dispositionalist accounts as 
concerned with alternative possibilities because they assume moral responsibility 
requires “regulative control.”  To the contrary they suggest moral responsibility only 
requires “guidance control.”139   
To see this distinction consider Sally, a driver operating a normally functioning 
vehicle, in normal conditions, without any stipulation of determinism and with typical 
mechanisms of intentions, desire, etc in place.  Sally decides to make a right turn, 
intends to do so and on the basis of her decision, intention, etc. does in fact turn the 
car to the right.  Semi-compatibalists think that Sally is guiding or controlling the car 
in the relevant respect.  Thus, they say Sally has “guidance control.”  And, on their 
view guidance control is enough to suppose that Sally is morally responsible for 
turning the car.  To have "regulative control" Sally must not only have the power to 
turn in the direction she actually turns, she must also have the power to engage in a 
                                            
137 Cf. Fisher and Ravizza (1998) p. 13  
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counterfactual action (including turning left, stopping, etc.)   The point is that 
regulative control requires that Sally have both control over her action and control 
over an alternative possibility.140   
Fischer and Ravizza defend guidence control as adequate for moral 
responsibility using a Frankfurt-style example.  Again consider Sally, but this time 
suppose that Sally is behind the wheel of a “driver instruction automobile with dual 
controls…the instructor is quite happy to allow Sally to steer the car right, but if Sally 
had shown any inclination to cause the car to go in some other direction, the 
instructor would have intervened to cause the car to go right (just as it actually 
goes.)”  In such a case Sally has guidance control, but lacks regulative control.  The 
instructor has regulative control, but not guidance control.  The point of this example 
is twofold, first, it makes clear that real world cases exist which support the 
distinction between guidance control and regulative control.  Second, it makes a 
case for the plausibility of supposing that guidance control is the sort of control that 
ultimately warrants moral responsibility.  If Sally decides to turn right, intends to turn 
right and in fact does turn right, and in so doing passes her driving test, we suppose 
that she has earned or deserves her driving license by proving herself responsible 
driver.  But, if she is only responsible for her driving when the instructor is not 
present, there is no reason to suppose that she deserves responsibility for driving 
well when the instructor is present.  The ground for responsibility in such a case 
seems to rely explicitly on guidance control and explicitly not on regulative control. 
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If we think Sally had guidance control in her instructional vehicle and is thus 
morally responsible, what was it about this action that evidenced her control?  
Fischer and Ravizza write, "an agent has guidance control when the mechanism that 
actually issues in the action is his own, reasons-responsive mechanism.”141  So, 
guidance control includes two conditions, first “the mechanism must be 'the agent’s 
own'.”142  Roughly this means that an agent "takes responsibility" for the spring of 
her action. 143 The second condition is that the agent's action was guided in a way 
that is responsive to reasons for and against the action.  Roughly, reasons-
responsiveness entails that an "agent” for whom there could be no reason sufficient 
for her to do otherwise is not morally responsible, while an agent who is highly 
sensitive to reasons pointing toward contrary action is responsible.    
The idea that moral responsibility requires "taking" responsibility is fairly 
intuitive, but it is far from clear what it means. Fischer and Ravizza offer a three part 
account of taking responsibility borrowed in significant respect from Thomas 
Nagel.144   These elements represent a set of ingredients which taken together 
account for what it means for an agent to take responsibility for and thereby come to 
“own” the mechanisms that lead to action.  The first ingredient of taking responsibility 
is that the agent “sees himself as the source of his behavior.”145 This requirement 
amounts to agent recognition of the fact that his choices and actions effect the real 
world.  The second element of taking responsibility is that “the individual must accept 
                                            
141 Ibid. p. 39 
142 Ibid. p. 40 
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that he is a fair target of the reactive attitudes as a result of how he exercises this 
agency in certain contexts.”146  Of course, the agent need not have a full blown 
theory of moral responsibility, it will be enough that the individual sees praise or 
blame as appropriate moves in a “social game.”  The third element of ownership or 
taking responsibility is an epistemic requirement related to the first and second 
conditions.   As Fisher and Ravizza put the point, “taking responsibility requires that 
the individual’s view of himself specified in the first two conditions be based, in an 
appropriate way, on the evidence.”147  Although this requirement is left quite vague, 
the idea seems to be that an agent must have reasons for believing both that her 
choices effect the world and that she is an appropriate target of praise and blame.  
On their view taking responsibility is akin to asking to participate in an ongoing moral 
conversation.  Such a request is granted only if is believed that an individual is a 
suitable participant in the conversation.  One is thought a suitable participant if they 
ask to engage in the moral discussion at the appropriate time—that is, in response 
to a morally significant action.  This responsiveness to a morally significant moment 
is in their terminology responsiveness to “evidence.”  
Still, it isn’t enough that an agent recognizes the importance of her 
choices/actions and accepts the appropriateness of responsibility an individual’s 
ability to respond to reasons contrary to her action is also an important element of 
moral responsibility.  Suppose, an agent has taken responsibility for her actions in 
the sense that her acts spring from her own mechanism, and, second, suppose that 
she has sufficient reasons to act in a way other than she has chosen to act.  In such 
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circumstances an agent is strongly reasons responsive if she does three things.  
First, “the agent would recognize the sufficient reason to do otherwise.”  Second, the 
agent “would thus choose to do otherwise.”  And, third, the strongly reasons 
responsive agent would “act in accordance with the choice.”148   Strong reasons 
responsiveness is perhaps a laudable goal, but on Fisher and Ravizza’s view it is a 
more stringent standard than is required for moral responsibility.   
 In order to explain why they reject strong reasons responsiveness Fischer 
and Ravizza offer the example of Jennifer, who with an important paper due and a 
looming deadline decides she has sufficient reason not to go to tonight’s basketball 
game.  But, Jennifer goes to the basketball game anyway, despite realizing that she 
had sufficient reason not to go.  As they put it, “The failure of strong reasons-
responsiveness here stems from Jennifer’s disposition toward weakness of will.”149  
On their view it is reasonable to hold Jennifer morally responsible.  This leads them 
to conclude that strong reasons responsiveness is too demanding for moral 
responsibility.  Jennifer recognizes the sufficiency of her reasons to stay home, but 
chooses to and does otherwise.  Two of the three conditions for strong reasons 
responsiveness are missing and yet Jennifer appears to be morally responsible for 
going to the game instead of completing her assignment.  It should be noted at this 
point that the semi-compatibalist account of freedom not only accepts the possibility 
of weakness of will, but makes use of the concept in the process of honing the 
requirements for moral responsibility.  Fischer and Ravizza reject strong reasons-
                                            
148 Ibid. p. 41 
149 Ibid. p. 42 
 116 
 
responsiveness because they think that an account of moral responsibility must 
include cases of weak-will. 
Weak reasons-responsiveness allows that Jennifer is morally responsible if 
there is some possible world, no matter how remote, in which she would have 
responded to her sufficient reasons to stay home.  For instance, if the tickets to the 
basketball game had been a thousand dollars Jennifer would have stayed home, 
thus acting in the way she had most reason to act.  This coming together of reasons 
and actions in a possible world is enough to warrant reactive attitudes on the weak 
interpretation of reasons responsiveness.   Weak reasons responsiveness is a 
plausible requirement for moral responsibility and conforms to many people’s 
intuitions.  Consider the moral culpability of addicts for using illegal drugs.  People 
often describe the act as morally responsible using the following logic, “If there were 
a police officer standing next to the addict, she would not use the illegal drug.  
Therefore, the addict is in control of her behavior.”  This is, of course, a condensed 
version of the argument, but logic being used requires that control amounts to weak 
reasons responsiveness.  The argument is not that in the actual case a police officer 
is present, rather it depends on what would happen in another possible world where 
the officer is present.  The argument then extends the connection between action 
and reasons in the possible world to represent control in the actual world.  
The trouble with weak reasons responsiveness is just that it appears to allow 
too many cases of apparently unresponsive or unreasonable action count as 
sufficiently responsive to reasons.  As an example Fisher and Ravizza offer the story 
of a man who boards a ferry with a concealed saber and who intends to wait until the 
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ferry is underway and then kill all those on board.  They further suppose that the 
man is almost entirely unresponsive to reasons and no matter what reasons are put 
before him he will proceed to slay all the passengers.  The one exception to the 
lunatic’s single minded focus on violent murder is the possibility that a passenger in 
the lower cabin might be smoking a Gambier pipe.  There is nothing especially 
important about such a man smoking such a pipe, except that the murderous lunatic 
will recognize such a man with such a pipe as a reason to refrain from producing 
and using his saber.  Further, if the lunatic sees the man smoking a Gambier pipe he 
will not only recognize this as a reason to hold off on killing, he will respond to that 
reason and refrain from doing any harm to any of his fellow passengers.   
The preceding case is troubling to the view of moral responsibility which 
requires only weak reasons responsiveness because it seems that the lunatic with a 
fixation on Gambier pipes is weakly reasons responsive.  There is at least one 
possible world in which he both recognizes a reason to do otherwise and acts on 
that reason.  But the reason is by hypothesis the sort of reason that only a lunatic 
would find compelling.  We could of course fill in the story so that the Gambier pipe 
smoking man was actually meaningful, but the point of the example is that we need 
not tell such a story for the killer to be in control of his actions on the weak 
interpretation of reasons responsiveness.  There is nothing about weak reasons 
responsiveness that prevents attributing responsibility and control to people who 
respond to outlandish or bizarre “reasons” for acting in one way or the other. 
Fischer and Ravizza settle on an account of moderate reasons-
responsiveness because it preserves accountability in cases of weakness of will and 
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excludes accountability in cases of incoherent individuals.  The key to moderate 
reasons responsiveness is an appropriate balance between reasons receptivity and 
reasons reactivity.  Recall that reasons receptivity is the agent’s ability to recognize 
what reasons exist that are relevant to the agent’s actions or “the capacity to 
recognize that reasons exist.”  Reasons reactivity on the other hand is the agent’s 
ability to choose and act on the basis of reasons or “the capacity to translate 
reasons into choices and then subsequent behavior.”150  On their view the difficulties 
of weak and strong interpretations of reasons responsiveness can be overcome by 
supposing an asymmetrical relationship between reasons receptivity and reactivity.  
They argue that moral responsibility only requires a quite weak form of reasons 
reactivity, but requires a much stronger receptivity to reasons. 
The point of the asymmetrical relationship between reasons receptivity and 
reactivity is twofold.   First, a limited or very slight reactivity to reasons is needed to 
preserve the possibility of weakness of will.  And, second, a stronger receptivity to 
reasons is needed to preclude responsibility for incoherent behavior.  The 
requirement of weak reasons reactivity is met if the agent would act differently in any 
single other possible world.  In other words, if one would act differently in at least 
one scenario in which the circumstances were different, then one meets the 
requirement of adequately reacting to contrary reasons.  To help explain their view 
of reasons reactivity Fischer and Ravizza offer the example of Brown “a weak-willed 
individual with a strong craving for the non-addictive (not literally irresistible) drug 
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“Plezu.”151  Plezu is extraordinarily pleasurable and has relatively few short term side 
effects, but it does tend to leave one unproductive for long periods of time.  Brown 
knows that taking regularly Plezu will damage his job performance, family life and 
self-respect, and considers these sufficient reasons to refrain, but he is weak-willed 
and regularly uses Plezu first thing in the morning.  The only reason Brown would 
quit is if he were told that the next time he used Plezu it would kill him.  Brown is 
morally responsible because he is both sufficiently receptive to reasons and in at 
least one case those reasons would be sufficient for him to translate them into 
action.   
Gary Watson offers an account that is critical of semi-compatibilism based on 
the condition of weak reactivity.  On Watson’s view weak reactivity is an insufficient 
condition for reasons responsiveness because “it is arguably consistent with 
motivational compulsion.”152  Consider Mele's case of Fred, an agoraphobic whose 
condition is so severe that he has not left his home in more than ten years and 
cannot bring himself to leave even to attend his beloved daughter’s wedding in the 
church next door.  However, in a possible alternative scenario Fred would leave his 
home if it were on fire, and could in such a scenario have fled to the church next 
door, but only because his fear of fire is more compelling than his fear of leaving the 
house.  Semi-compatibalists seem left thinking that Fred is weakly reasons reactive 
and so can be held morally responsible for not attending his daughter’s wedding.  
However, some think, “if Fred’s fear is so debilitating that it takes something as 
frightening as a raging fire to him to decide to leave his house or to leave it 
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intentionally, then, it seems to me, he is not morally responsible for missing the 
wedding.”153  The worry is that Fischer and Ravizza are able to account for 
weakness of will only by eliminating the capacity for compulsion.   
There are however responses available to semi-compatibalists.  One might 
suggest that Fred is not engaged in a reasons responsive activity when he flees the 
fire, rather he acts on brute instinct.  Fred’s overwhelming fear response to both fire 
and the outdoors might be seen as making clear his lack of control. 154 Alternatively, 
the condition of reactivity be strengthened to only include reactivity to “weakly 
sufficient reasons.”  The point of such a suggestion is to limit the range of cases 
which count as relevant to the condition of responsibility to more typical or less 
radical cases.  The intuition at work here is that a person’s responsibility should not 
depend on what they might have done in a liminal case, but on what is typical for 
them.  This strengthening stops short of reducing to a dispositionalist compatibilism, 
but is heading in that direction. 155156   
Recall again the case of a weak-willed agent named Brown, for whom taking 
Plezu is a passion, but not an addiction in the sense of being a compulsion.  Brown 
will refrain from taking Plezu if and only if he will die with his next dose.  Fischer and 
Ravizza claim that Brown is responsible for his weak-willed actions, taking the Plezu, 
in part because Brown uses the same mechanism in order to both refrain from taking 
Plezu and in order to continue using under ordinary circumstances.  The difference 
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they say between Brown and Fred is that Fred is using a different mechanism when 
he misses the wedding than he uses when he flees the fire. Thus, Brown is culpable 
for taking Plezu, while Fred is not culpable for missing his daughter’s wedding? 
There is a very real and commonsense difference between Fred and Brown.  Fred is 
a compulsive agoraphobic; he lacks genuine control of his actions and so is not 
morally responsible.  Brown is weak-willed; he has control over his actions, but 
chooses wrongly.   
Conclusion 
The accounts of freedom and moral responsibility offered here are among the 
most philosophically attractive accounts available and they each accommodate the 
possibility of weakness of will and moral responsibility.  Robert Kane’s 
incompatibalist libertarian view is perhaps the most commonsensical account in that 
it straightforwardly denies the existence of a troubling determinism.  It also allows 
that an agent may be ultimately responsible for actions that run counter to their own 
better judgment and that such weak-willed actions can coexist with genuine 
alternatives.  Although traditional compatibalists reject a dismissal of determinism 
they agree that moral responsibility requires that agent’s have genuine alternative 
possibilities.  On their view alternative possibilities are compatible with determinism 
and with weakness of will.  Finally, semi-compatibilism, or narrow compatibilism 
rejects the importance of alternative possibilities but defends the existence of moral 
responsibility in a universe that may be casually determined.  The semi-
compatibalist is open to the possibility of weak-will on the grounds that agency 
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requires does not require acting on our best reasons, only that we act from a 
reasons responsive mechanism for which we take responsibility. 
Attractive as each of these views are, they all also have difficulties yet to face, 
challenges left unanswered and plausible reasons to believe that they are false.  I 
admit to being skeptical about the possibility of securing genuine ultimate 
responsibility in the face of the role luck surely plays in our lives. And there is 
something counter-intuitive about the dispositionalist's view that someone could 
have done otherwise because they ordinarily do otherwise, despite not having done 
so this time.  Finally, the semi-compatibalists reliance on mechanism individualtion is 
somewhat murky. But despite these worries I think there is good reason to believe 
that we are responsible for at least some of our actions.  Facing down what Ted 
Honderich calls the “darkness” of determinism is not a task that we can hope to 
complete here.   
The purpose of this paper is merely to reassure the reader (and author) that 
we have on offer a range of plausible views about freedom and moral responsibility 
on which weakness of will is a genuine possibility.  We need not dismiss the 
possibility of weakness of will due to the restrictions of defending moral responsibility 
more generally.  In fact quite to the contrary it seems to me that there is something 
about the possibility of weakness of will that is important for the existence of genuine 
moral responsibility.   
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Chapter 5 
Weak-Will Isn't Just Reckless 
At the heart of debate about weakness of will is a discussion about practical 
rationality .  Weakness of Will is possible only if there is a gap between reasoning about 
what one ought to do and what an agent actually does.  A person is weak-willed if she 
believes that she ought to do something, but then proceeds to not do that thing in 
practice.  So to understand if weakness of will is possible, we must understand the 
relationship between theorizing about action and the mechanisms that lead to action.  
When we are at our best theory and practice come together and we act on our beliefs.  
This chapter begins by explaining the distinction between reasoning about action and 
the mechanisms that lead agents to act and how they come together in strength of will. 
The second aim of this chapter is to explain how our beliefs can be effective at 
guiding action at one moment and impotent at another.  This section describes the 
conceptual space for weakness of will made through claims of mental partitioning 
advanced by Donald Davidson and then Al Mele.  Against these claims Gary Watson 
argues that purported cases of weak-will devolve into either compulsion or 
recklessness.  Having discussed compulsion in the previous chapter, here I focus on 
the possibility that weakness of will is reducible to recklessness.  I show that weak-
willed behavior is distinct from recklessness using a case study strategy illustrating 
situations in which an agent is both concerned to do the right thing in a way that 
reckless people are not, and follows something less than her best judgment.   
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Practical vs. Theoretical Judgment 
Traditionally questions of willpower have focused on how the various faculties of 
will—legislative and executive—cooperate to produce strength of will and come apart to 
produce weakness of will.  Kant described two essential roles that willing plays in 
guiding action—“Wille” and “Willkür.”157  Wille describes the legislative function of the 
will and the role of reason in guiding practical judgment.  This is roughly parallel to what 
I have been calling "theoretical judgment," what Michael Smith calls “normative 
reasons” or what Gary Watson calls “practical deliberation.”  The main concern of Wille 
is coming to understand the demands of reason, or, alternatively, coming to decide what 
one has reason or justification for doing or not doing; Wille is the activity of making up 
one’s mind about what course of action one should take. On the other hand, Kant’s 
Willkür is involved with executive issues of practical rationality; that is the reasons which 
lead to our actual action.  Smith calls these sorts of reasons “motivating reasons” 
because they move us beyond decision and into action.    The main concern here is 
coming to understand how practical rationality operates such that the motivations of 
Willkür stem from the evaluations of Wille.  A strong will requires that both Wille and 
Willkür function appropriately and that they come to function harmoniously together.   
Strength of will begins with the identification of one’s reasons for acting in various 
ways and sound evaluation of these conflicting reasons; which is to say strength of will 
requires a certain sensitivity or attention to one’s own reasons for action. In part this just 
means that an agent must be attentive to what Bernard Williams calls the “subjective 
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motivational set.”158  The subjective motivational set includes the myriad desires and 
beliefs that in some way excite the passions of the individual agent.  This set of 
impulses provides a corresponding set of reasons for action.  For example, if my 
motivational set includes a desire for chocolate cake, I have a reason to eat chocolate 
cake—I desire it.  An agent’s sensitivity to her own impulses is a baseline requirement 
for the legislative function of willing, but there is more to legislating action than 
recognizing one’s impulses. Evaluating the competing desires that one has at any given 
moment is a further matter of comparing and contrasting the relative worth of those 
desires and forming beliefs about how one ought to act in light of competing desires.   
The process of comparing competing reasons for action involves the weighting of 
one’s desires and the development of a conclusion about which course of action 
satisfies the most or most important desires.  The result of this process is what Al Mele 
calls a “decisive better judgment.”159  Such judgments are the product of the agent’s 
own evaluation of her desires in an effort to determine which is most in keeping with her 
own interests.  Several things distinguish simple desires from decisive better judgments.  
First, desires are necessary conditions of intentional action, but they are often 
insufficient conditions on their own.  This is because our desires are very often in 
conflict and we cannot simultaneously take conflicting actions.  Decisive better 
judgments adjudicate these internal disputes between our desires and thus produce 
sufficient conditions for action.  Second, decisive better judgments are not strictly 
speaking desires, rather they are beliefs about how one will best come to satisfy her 
desires. The formation of such beliefs is an important element of strength of will 
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because will-power requires more than impulse, it requires decision making—that is 
strength of will requires beliefs about which desires to pursue and which to allow to 
pass.  Without this sort of legislative function of the will impulsivity and conflict would 
guide our actions.  
Still it is not enough to describe the legislative function of willing as strong simply 
because one moves from desires to beliefs about those desires.  Two further elements 
are required for strong legislative functioning.  First, the accuracy of one’s evaluation of 
one’s own desires must be reasonably sound.  That is to say, a decisive better 
judgment contributes to strength of will only in cases where the judgment is sound with 
respect to the agent’s actual desires.  This is to say that someone who can reliably 
weigh her own desires will be advantaged in the exercise of will power because she will 
clearly see the alternatives before her and will not be easily confused about the merits 
of her actions.  For example, consider two college roommates Sam and Pam.  Suppose 
that Sam has some mild damage to his hypothalamus that causes him to only weakly 
consider his own desire for sleep.  Pam on the other hand has no such damage and 
appropriately weighs the value of sleep against her competing interests.  In this 
scenario Pam is likely to make much better decisions about her own interests.  This is 
not to say that Sam is incapable of regulating his own actions, it is just that this self 
regulation will be more challenging for someone who does not reliably evaluate his own 
desires.      
   Of course, one does need to have any lasting brain damage to compromise the 
evaluation of one’s desires.  In many instances much more mundane circumstances 
cause our evaluations to be out of sync with our actual desires.  Consider what happens 
 127 
 
when you go the grocery store while hungry.  The hunger should not affect your choice 
of groceries for the week, but perhaps should affect the pace with which you complete 
your shopping trip.  Yet, to the contrary, when shopping while hungry we tend to shop 
longer, and buy more and worse foods.  Things as simple as hunger, tiredness, 
distraction, etc. can lead to some serious challenges in evaluating the merits of desires 
we ourselves identify as clear and obviously motivational. 
Finally, not every genuine reason one has for acting is both immediately clear 
and obviously motivational. It is also important that one be able to consider reasons for 
acting that are more abstract or difficult to identify given one’s present context. For 
example, the moral imperative to respect persons is far too often absent from 
consideration in our beliefs and desires, but we nevertheless have a reason to respect 
others. It is not the case that eighteenth century slaveholders had no reason to reject 
slavery; they had such a reason and it was motivational (though not overridingly so.)  
However, in some cases they may have been sincerely unable to see the reason and 
it’s motivating force lay dormant. It would be a mistake to call an apparently self-
controlled slaveholder strong-willed, because he fails to exercise appropriate control 
over his own decision making process.  It is tempting to see the disciplined military man 
as the paradigm of self-control, sharp creases on his uniform, fresh shave, crisp 
physical movements, etc., but if this man is acting without adequately considering how 
he should act, there is something seriously missing.  Some will be tempted to split hairs 
here and say something like, “Even in the eighteenth century there was a reason to 
reject slavery” but “It is not the case that slaveholders themselves had a reason to reject 
slavery.”  This is a slippery move and contributes to a perniciously relativistic morality.  
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What we need is an account of reasons that is both sufficiently grounded in agency to 
explain the effectiveness of deliberation and abstract enough to provide some absolute 
principles—I have in mind here principles which would render decisions such as 
“Genocide is wrong,” “Sexism, Racism and the like are inappropriate.” These seem to 
be clear test cases about which an adequate morality could not fail to deliver correct 
answers.   
 
Willing and The Fact/Value Distinction  
Hume famously argued “Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the 
passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.”160 
Modern interpretations of Hume’s thought have developed his proposal into the view 
that desires (passions, in modern parlance, but not necessarily in Hume’s) are 
necessary and beliefs (again, reason, in modern parlance) are insufficient motivations to 
act.  In reference to its inspiration this principle is sometimes called the Humean theory 
of motivation or alternatively an internalist theory of motivation.  On the Humean view, if 
A has a reason, r, to ϕ, then A must have some desire associated with his ϕ-ing.  We 
can contrast this with the idea of there being a reason for A to ϕ, unassociated with A’s 
desires.  In the first case, A’s desire purportedly provides the motivation for acting on r 
and thus the link to one’s subjective motivational set explains the possibility of effective 
deliberation.  Humeans argue that the second case will lead to a failure of effective 
deliberation because the requisite connection to desire is missing.   To the contrary, 
acting on reasons removed from facts about one’s actual desires is possible when those 
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reasons are psychologically connected to an alternative counterfactual version of 
oneself. 
There can be a reason, r, for an agent, A, to act in some specific way ϕ, without 
A holding r in her actual motivational set, because, if there is an r to ϕ, and r is 
applicable to A, then A has an r to ϕ whether or not r stems from A’s actual motivational 
set.  The trouble with claiming that “A has an r to ϕ in case r applies to A and despite A 
having no desire to ϕ” (or that slaveholders had a reason to release their slaves, despite 
having no such desire) is that they appear to be in conflict with the source of agent’s 
motivations, i.e. their actual desires.161 While normative claims are not simple facts in 
the way that desires may be, nevertheless what one ought to do is a type fact about 
what one has reason to do.  
On the Humean view if there is a reason for someone to do something, then she 
must actually have some desire that would be served by her doing it.  However, a 
number of prominent philosophers have argued against the Humean requirement that 
reasons correspond with an agent’s actual desires, in favor of a counter-factual account.  
Counter-factual accounts come in several varieties but agree in the basic view that 
agent’s have a reason to act both when a reason corresponds to an agent’s actual 
desires and when certain counterfactuals are true of the actual agent.  So for instance, 
one has a reason to eat chocolate cake if one actually desires chocolate cake and one 
has a reason to eat cake if one would desire chocolate cake were one to know what 
chocolate cake tastes like.  Having a counterfactual reason to act is motivational in the 
same way that an unrecognized desire can be motivational, upon reflection and with 
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better awareness or sensitivity to one’s interests one comes to discover a hidden 
motivation. 
The motivational force of counterfactual reasons for action stems from the 
purported interaction of two simultaneous worlds, the real world in which the reasoning 
agent actually exists and an imagined world in which the deciding agent is idealized.  In 
this scenario we suppose that an agent confronted with a difficult choice might 
imaginatively look to her more ideal self for guidance in choosing between the available 
options.  The resulting guidance from what one imagines as one’s more ideal self 
constitutes a reason to act in accord with that guidance.  Further, reasons to act 
stemming from consultation with one’s more ideal self are motivational because they 
connect the subjective motivational set of one’s future more ideal self with one’s actual 
self.  Although this connection is imagined—one isn’t actually consulting a more ideal 
self—it represents a counterfactual motivating influence.   
In a recent series of four studies researchers tested the motivational effect of 
exposing subjects to imagined versions of their future selves and found that such 
exposure was significantly motivational.  The first study in the series involved outfitting 
participants with sophisticated virtual reality headgear and exposing them virtually to 
one of two conditions.  In the first condition participants met with and interviewed a three 
dimensional virtual image of their present selves.  In the second condition participants 
were exposed to age-progressed three dimensional versions of themselves and asked 
to interview their future selves.  Participants in both conditions then engaged in a money 
allocating task in which participants were told to imagine allocating an unexpected 
$1,000 windfall among four options: “Use it to buy something nice for someone special,” 
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“Invest it in a retirement fund,” “Plan a fun and extravagant occasion,” and “Put it into a 
checking account.”162  On average participants exposed to vivid images of their future 
selves saved more than twice as much as those exposed only to their current selves.  
Subsequent studies in the series inoculate these results against a priming bias and 
show that similar results can be obtained with less sophisticated equipment such as the 
inclusion of age-progressed avatars on a webpage.  On such a computer based page 
participants were asked to allocating savings and spending as before, but in this 
subsequent study allocation was based on moving a digital “slider.”  The slider could be 
moved right to allocate more money or left to allocate less.  Further, the allocation 
corresponded with the avatar’s perceived emotional response.  Thus, subject’s choices 
about allocating money to present concerns caused present-self avatars to smile or 
frown.  Likewise, choices about savings affected the perceived emotional response of 
one’s age-progressed avatar.  Participants exposed to their age progressed avatar 
allocated an average of 30% more of their income to savings, then did participants 
exposed to current-self avatars. This research is aimed at manipulating a phenomenon 
known as temporal discounting, but it also shows the way that exposure to an imagined, 
or counterfactual, version of oneself can alter one’s actual behavior.     
If being exposed to a virtual image of one’s older self can motivate savings at 
double the expected rate, then it seems that counter-factual reasons for action can be 
significantly motivational.  Christine Korsgaard offers a version of counterfactual 
motivating reasons arguing that practical reasons “are best thought of as establishing 
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ideals of character.”163  On this view an agent may come to act on a counterfactual 
reason when the principles that help to shape the agent’s actual character offer her a 
reason to act that is not in keeping with her current disposition.  This is to say, if one 
generally guides one’s behavior by a certain set of principles (call this character) but in 
some specific actual circumstance is inclined to act out of character, those general 
principles that ordinarily determine one’s actions constitute a set of reasons to act as 
one ordinarily would.  Put another way, even if you are not feeling quite yourself today—
and so seem to have no reason to act as you ordinarily would—you still have a reason 
to maintain your character.  Consider an example adapted from Gary Watson’s (1975) 
“Free Agency.”  Suppose that after a vigorous game of squash I am so defeated and 
humiliated that I am overcome with a powerful urge to smash my opponent in the face 
with my racket.  Ordinarily, I would have no such urge as this goes strongly against 
several principles constituent of my identity and which ordinarily guide my actions.  To 
the contrary, I would ordinarily be inclined to walk over and shake my opponents’ hand 
and thank him for the match.  On Korsgaard’s account I have a reason to walk over and 
shake my opponents’ hand despite not wanting to do so, it is what I would do if I was 
acting most like myself.       
Michael Smith describes Korsgaard’s view as an “example” theory of 
counterfactual reasons because the agent has a reason to act in accord with the 
example of her more idealized self.  In the case of the unusually angry squash player 
the player has a reason to follow the example of his more clam ordinary self and to walk 
over and shake hands.  However, Smith argues that the angry squash player does not 
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have a reason to walk over and shake hands; to the contrary he has every reason to 
smile politely and walk away.  This is precisely because the angry squash player is not 
his ordinary self and so should not follow the example of his ordinary self.  On Smith’s 
view trying to emulate one’s calm self when overwhelmingly angry is very likely to lead 
to actually smashing one’s opponent in the face—an unwanted outcome indeed.   
 However, Smith argues that counterfactual reasons for action can be 
rehabilitated under what he calls an “advice” model.  On Smith’s preferred version of 
counterfactual reasons, an agent has reason to act as her fully informed self would 
advise that she act in the agent’s actual situation.  Thus, the angry squash player does 
not have a reason to try to emulate the behavior of his calm rational self.  Rather, the 
angry squash player has a reason to follow the advice that his more fully informed self 
would give to someone in his actual situation.  Of course, the more idealized version of 
the squash player would have no need to walk away, he would be perfectly capable of 
politely shaking hands.  But, because the actual squash player could not do so, he has 
a reason (based on the counterfactual advice of his idealized self) not to attempt 
shaking hands.  In such a case the agent has a reason to act as his more fully rational 
self would advise he act, despite the disconnection of walking away from the agent’s 
actual desires.    Smith describes this view as an “anti-Humean theory of reasons” 
because the agent’s reasons for action are not relative to her actual subjective 
motivational set but are identified with an idealized version of the agent. 164  
 In accounts of counterfactual reasons the idealized agent acts as a bridge 
between justificatory moral norms and subjective motivational states.  On Smith’s view 
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this amounts to reasoning correctly from one’s given beliefs and desires to a more 
“coherent and complete desiderative profile and evaluative outlook.”165   This decision 
procedure is comparable, Smith thinks, to Rawls method of reflective equilibrium.  
Rawls notion is that reaching decisions about morality and other important concerns are 
best thought of as a negotiation, or working out back and forth, between our “considered 
judgments about specific cases” and more general principles.166  The upshot of 
reflective equilibrium is that it conveys the seriousness of conviction about one’s 
individual considered judgments without allowing that the truth of those specific 
judgments depends only on one’s conviction.  Rather, the adequacy of specific 
judgments depends on the degree to which those judgments fit with each other into a 
coherent set of beliefs.  For Smith, the counterfactual desires of our idealized selves 
bring together considerations about our actual desires with a reflective consideration the 
result of which is that “our more specific desires are better justified, and so 
explained.”167  
Counterfactual accounts of reasons like Smith’s are important here because they 
help to show how deliberation about general principles can be effective in producing 
actions.  The effectiveness of one’s conclusions about general principles of action is a 
significant part of strength of will because this is the space where the theoretical and 
practical elements of will meet.  At its limit strength of will requires that one be able to 
move beyond being motivated solely by an antecedently given set of desires and that 
one come to act on the basis of reasons that one would find compelling in a more ideal 
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situation.  Thus, in the really hard cases strength of will requires that one be able to act 
not on one’s actual desires, but on the imagined desires (or advice) of one’s more ideal 
self.  It is the act of identifying sufficiently with one’s imaginative reflections that imbues 
our idealized selves with motivational force and allows for significant shifts in one’s 
character.   
In summary strength of will requires a range of capacities and behaviors 
associated with the correct balance of legislative and executive components of practical 
rationality.  First, will-power requires a baseline sensitivity to one’s impulses, desires, 
and beliefs.  Without this identification with one’s self even trivial intentional action may 
be impossible, nevermind difficult acts of will.  Second, it is imperative that one 
competently evaluate competing elements of her subjective motivational set.  Without 
an evaluation of the relative significance of one’s desires, willing becomes a 
hodgepodge without any focus and without the strength that such an evaluative focus 
provides.  Of course, evaluation with a faulty faculty is nearly as problematic as a 
general failure to evaluate competing desires in the first place.  Finally, it is not enough 
that one considers the subjective motivations one already possesses.  It is important 
that one also consider the desires and beliefs about how to act that one ought to have.  
This assuming of a normative stance is crucial to making good decisions about how one 
acts and is thus an important element of strength of will. Strength of will requires that 
one be sensitive to all sorts of motivating reasons including desires, beliefs about those 
desires, principles of sound reasoning and counterfactual reasons one has for acting.168  
Of course, not every exercise of will power will require the same sensitivity to each of 
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these reasons for action, but each of these elements is important to some acts of will 
power.  
Strong Internalism: The Logical Impossibility of Weakness of Will 
One example of an especially strong connection between practical judgment and 
action is found in the account offered by R.M. Hare.   Hare writes, 
“It is a tautology to say that we cannot sincerely assent to a 
command addressed to ourselves, and at the same time not perform it, if 
now is the occasion for performing it, and it is in our (physical and 
psychological) power to do so.”169    
 
On Hare’s view, a sincere belief in the appropriateness of action and that action 
are indistinguishable because they define one another.  What it means to have a 
sincere belief in action is to act, and, an action simply is a sincere belief in the 
appropriateness of that action.  Hare’s account is sometimes referred to as “strong 
internalism,” where ‘internalism’ refers to motivation for action being internal (or 
necessary) to practical judgment.170  On this strong formulation, the prescriptions of 
practical judgment necessarily result in the motivation required to bring about the 
appropriate action.  Note that on this view it is not just that practical rationality entails 
some motivation in the general direction of a good action.  Rather, on the strong 
internalist view, practical judgment entails a sufficient motivation to ensure the specific 
action found appropriate.   Thus, if I think I ought to do X, then, necessarily, I will be 
motivated sufficiently to do X.  It seems to the strong internalist that if I think I ought to 
do X and am free to do X, then (ceteris paribus) I will do X.  This leaves little room for 
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acting against one’s better judgment and Hare is accordingly skeptical of weakness of 
will. 
In an effort to explain the appearance of putatively weak-willed agents, Hare 
suggests two compelling options.  On one account the ‘judgment’ that the weak-willed 
agent reports is not a sincerely held prescriptive judgment, but rather a description of 
external norms or expectations.  This is referred to as an “inverted commas” case 
because the judgment which the agent is unmotivated to follow is not her own.  Rather, 
she agrees that she “should” quit smoking, but is utterly unmotivated to do so.  The 
inverted commas signal the fact that she does not genuinely assent to the judgment.  
This sort of situation is surely commonplace, but the agent is not weak-willed because 
she does act on her best judgment.171  Hare’s other proposed explanation is that at the 
time of action the agent is overwhelmed by physical or psychological forces beyond her 
control.  In this case, although the prescriptive judgment is sincerely held, it is literally 
impossible for the agent to act on that judgment.  In cases like this one the apparently 
weak willed agent is really better described as compulsive, or lacking the appropriate 
faculty of free will.  Hare is right to suggest that in both the compulsive and inverted 
commas case the reportedly weak willed person is really better described in another 
way.  But, the key to Hare's skepticism is not that some prima facie cases of weak will 
are false alarms, but his view that genuine beliefs are always overridingly motivational.   
Moderate Internalism: The possibility of weakness of will 
 Donald Davidson argues against Hare that weakness of will is possible, on the 
grounds that practical judgment is a process occurring over time.  As Davison sees it, 
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the main skeptical concern with weakness of will is that a person’s judgment about 
action and her motivation about action cannot come apart.  This is the internalist thesis: 
practical judgment necessarily issues in motivation to action.  Davidson, himself is an 
internalist, so one might imagine that he would follow Hare and reject the possibility of 
weakness of will.  However, Davidson sees beyond the flat account of internalism and 
develops a more textured account of practical judgment.  As Davidson describes it 
practical judgment involves a myriad of what he calls prima facie or conditional 
judgments.  Such judgments are not themselves necessarily connected to action, that is 
to say, motivation is not “internal to” conditional judgments.  Because prima facie or 
conditional judgments are a vital element of practical rationality on Davidson’s view, we 
might describe his account as a moderate internalism.   
The texture in Davidson’s account of practical rationality involves three layers 
each of which contributes to a person’s reasoned motivation toward action.  The 
foundational layer of Davidson’s account are beliefs and desires , which he calls 
“primary reasons.”172  The interesting thing about primitive beliefs and desires is that 
they can and often do conflict with one another.  The second layer in Davidson’s 
account of practical reasoning is the formation of conditional or prima facie judgments. 
Conditional judgments are deliberations about a subset of beliefs and desires.  Imagine 
a swirl of beliefs and desires permutable and combinable in many different ways, each 
of which potentially leads to new conditional judgment. These evaluations working 
evaluations, not final decisions and are thus prima facie. Of course, with a smorgasbord 
of conditional judgments on the table it is best to prefer those judgments which account 
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for more of our beliefs and desires.  It is best of all to prefer those conditional judgments 
which account for all of the relevant considerations—these Davidson calls “All Things 
Considered” prima facie judgments.  Although the all things considered judgment is only 
one of the swirling mass of conditional evaluations, it is also the best evaluation among 
the bunch.  The final layer of Davidson’s account of practical judgment is the 
“unconditional” or “all out” practical judgment.  At this point one conditional judgment 
becomes a full blown intention and culminates in motivation/action.173  Here Davidson’s 
internalism returns to prominence and in the final step of the reasoning process one 
takes action.  In the best case scenario the final unconditional judgment, the action, is 
based on an all-things-considered conditional judgment.   
Unfortunately, there is no necessary connection between one’s best, all-things-
considered, conditional judgment and one’s unconditional judgment or action.  It is 
possible that one’s inferior, or less than all things considered, judgment will become 
unconditional.  There is no sufficient reason why one would choose to on an inferior 
judgment, but it is nonetheless possible.  Thus, on Davidson’s view weakness of will is 
possible when one’s best judgment remains conditional, while an inferior judgment 
becomes unconditional.  The fact that one has no sufficient reason to act on an inferior 
judgment makes weakness of will irrational.  However, if one's best judgment is only 
prima facie the logical difficulty Hare saw with weakness of will disappears. 
Davidson’s textured conception of what it means to make a practical judgment 
makes conceptual space for weakness of will, but it is not clear that it is the sort of 
weakness of will we ordinarily have in mind.  Many cases of weak-will involve an agent 
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acting against something stronger than a prima facie judgment.  For instance, Michael 
Bratman, a student of Davidson’s, offers the account of Sam, a depressed man who, 
despite recognizing clear better reasons to do otherwise, sits drinking a bottle of 
wine.174  Upon being reproached by a concerned friend Sam says,  
“I don’t think it would be best to drink.  Do you think I’m stupid enough to think 
that given how strong my reasons for abstaining are?  I think it would be best to abstain.  
Still, I’m drinking.” 
On Davidson’s account, either Sam cannot hold the unconditional judgment, “I 
think it would be best to abstain,” or his drinking is unintentional.  Sam’s drinking 
appears to be intentional. He means to be drinking; he just thinks it stupid.  The real 
trouble is that Sam’s drinking also appears to be in violation of an unconditional 
evaluation.  Sam does not think “Well, based on X, Y and Z, I ought to stop drinking.”  
Rather, he thinks, “All out—I really ought to stop drinking.”  But he doesn’t.  Bratman’s 
point is that it would be odd to suppose that weakness of will like Sam’s is based on 
merely a prima facie judgment.  It rather seems like people can and do act in ways that 
violate their stronger unconditional judgments.   
Weak Internalism: The possibility of strict weakness of will   
What is needed to make good on the commonsense account of weakness of will 
is something closer to what Al Mele refers to as “strict akratic action.” Strict akratic 
action is action, “performed intentionally and freely and, at the time which it is 
performed, the agent holds a judgment to the effect that there is good and sufficient 
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reason for his not performing [it].”175  On Mele’s view beliefs and desires still provide the 
considerations for an overriding reason for having a motivation, what he calls “decisive 
better judgment.”  But actually having the motivation to act involves the formation of an 
intention.  Intentions on Mele’s view amount to the motivation to act.  Mele writes, “just 
as Davidson maintains that there is a step between all things considered judgments and 
unconditional judgments, it is open to me to postulate a step between decisive better 
judgments and intentions.”176    
A step between decisive better judgment and intention makes intuitive sense of 
weakness of will because it provides an explanatory locus for the break between 
judgment and motivation.  Weakness of will is possible on this account because the bulk 
of the motivational force contained in beliefs and desires circumvent judgment and act 
directly on intention.  Distinguishing intention from judgment does not eliminate the 
motivational strength of judgment, but it does allow that motivational force may follow a 
path around, rather than through judgment.  Decisive better judgment maintains a 
strong motivational force drawn from the beliefs and desires from which judgment is 
formed.  This necessary connection between judgment and motivation maintains a 
weak internalism about practical judgment.  The connection is weak in the sense that 
judgment and motivation may not necessarily agree in strength.  A strong judgment, like 
a decisive better judgment, may be subverted motivationally when beliefs and desires 
act directly on intention.177  
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If motivations can effectively circumvent judgment acting directly on intention, 
then Davidson is wrong when he writes “If an agent judges that it would be better to do 
x than to do y, then he wants to do x more than he wants to do y.”  However, Mele can 
maintain a weaker commitment, “If an agent judges that it would be better to do x than 
to do y, then he wants to do x, though not necessarily more than he wants to do y.” 
Recall the case of Sam, the depressed drinker.  Sam’s reasons, all things considered, 
lead him to judge it better not to drink.  Yet he has a reason for being motivated to drink.  
He thinks rightly that drinking the bottle of wine will ease his depression for a little while.  
Mele contends that the trouble in cases like this is not trying to find a reasons-
explanation for akratic action.  Rather, the trouble is supposing that a reasons-
explanation alone is sufficient to account for all actions.  Clearly if the strength of 
reasons was perfectly related to motivational strength, Sam would act on his better 
judgment.  But the failure here is not failure to act on a reason; it is the failure to act on 
the best reason.178 
Watson’s Skepticism About Weakness of Will 
 Gary Watson offers a subtle account of weakness of will, maintaining that if 
there is no sufficient reason someone would act on desires against her better judgment, 
“we are entitled to be skeptical about the common view, and to conclude that the person 
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was unable to resist.”179  On Watson’s account there are two possible answers to how 
an agent’s desires may entice her to -act against her better judgment: either she, 
chooses not to resist those desires, or, her effort to resist is insufficient.  The first 
possibility presents a straightforward objection to akratic action.  If an agent chooses not 
to resist her desire, this choice is itself a shift in the original judgment and thus the 
action performed does not violate the agent’s better judgment.180  Further, Watson 
claims that if an agent chooses not to resist a desire she believes ought to be resisted, 
this is not a case of weakness, but recklessness.   
On the second possibility, an agent’s effort to resist desires contrary to her better 
judgment might be insufficient; Watson considers three reasons this might be so.  First, 
the agent might judge that the effort is not worth it.  But, again, this suggests that the 
agent’s better judgment has changed or was insincere in the first place.  Second, the 
agent might misjudge the amount of effort required to resist her recalcitrant desire.  
Here Watson seems to find that the action’s being caused by misjudgment implies that it 
is unintentional and thus not akratic.181  The final, and by elimination, leading possibility 
is that the agent makes an insufficient effort to resist her desires, because for her those 
desires are literally irresistible. 
Weakness of will is distinguishable from compulsion simpliciter by normative 
considerations about what is normally thought to be a resistible desire.  As Watson puts 
                                            
179 Watson, Gary, “Skepticism About Weakness of Will” in Agency and Answerability (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004) p.57 
180 This shift in judgment might however be derivatively akratic, if the original judgment at issue was 
meant to resist change.  It is this failure of a judgment to resist alteration, or, to be too easily revised, that 
Holton (1999) refers to as the commonsense understanding of weakness of will.  I disagree finding that 
the common view includes both strict and derivative akrasia.     
181 Watson also rejects the possibility of the misjudgment itself being intentional, but here Watson’s claim 
does not rely on the impossibility of doxastic akrasia.  Rather, the relevant point is that if misjudgment 
causes an apparently akratic action, the action seems to be unintentional.       
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it, “individuals we describe as weakly giving in to temptation are those who reasonably 
could be expected to have resisted or to have developed the capacities to resist.”182 
Thus, weakness of will is the culpable failure to develop appropriate capacities of 
resistance, and thereby become susceptible to compulsion.  Compulsion simpliciter is 
being, “subject to such strong desires that it is unreasonable to expect even a strong 
willed person to hold out.”183 
In Defense of Commonsense   
Mele focuses on refuting the claim that misjudging the effort involved in resisting 
a desire cannot lead to intentional akrasia.  He suggests, “misjudgment of the amount or 
kind of effort required to resist a pertinent desire quite properly enter into explanations 
of strict akratic actions.”184  This is right in that misjudgment might accompany an akratic 
act and thus help to explain the act as a whole.  For instance, I might misjudge the 
distance I need to keep from an apple pie to avoid being tempted.  Suppose that as a 
result of my misjudgment I walk within smelling distance and forgetting my diet eat a 
slice of pie.  By eating the pie against my better judgment I show myself to be weak-
willed and it was my misjudgment that led me into temptation.   
In general I support Mele’s effort, but it seems to me that the best strategy for 
defending the commonsense view of akrasia is to address Watson’s concerns about the 
weak-willed agent’s choice not to resist recalcitrant desires.   Recall Watson’s claim that 
in choosing not to resist a desire, the putatively akratic agent makes a new judgment in 
keeping with her action.  Watson’s argument depends on an exceptionally strong 
                                            
182 Watson, Gary, “Disordered Appetites: Addiction, Compulsion, and Dependence” in Agency and 
Answerability (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) p. 72 
183 Ibid. p. 73 
184 Mele, p. 27 
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internalism identifying choice with better judgment entirely.  If, on the contrary, it is 
possible for better judgment to be circumvented by motivations, the choice not to resist 
need not reflect a modification of judgment.  Rather, choice may be identified with 
intention, which is distinguishable from judgment.  On this model the choice (intention) 
not to resist need not reflect a new judgment, only the indulgence of a contrary desire.  
Certainly some motivational connection to judgment must exist, but this does not seem 
to imply that best judgment is always overriding.   
Consider for example the case of Sarah, a congenial and conscientious Kantian 
who works long hours and believes she has an imperfect duty to help others.  One day 
on her way home from work she notices a man slumped on the sidewalk.  She pauses 
and thinks to herself, “I should help this man.”  Perhaps she also has a desire to go 
home at once and put her feet up. It seems possible that Sarah chooses not to help, 
indulging her desire to put her feet up, against her better judgment.  The failure of her 
better judgment to tip the balance of her motivations is consistent with better judgment 
having some necessary motivational weight—just not with its always being overriding. 
At this point the skeptic is likely to recall that Watson also warns of collapsing 
akratic action into recklessness.  This is an important concern, but Sarah’s failure hardly 
seems reckless. On one account recklessness involves an agent taking “insufficient 
care making a judgment…but, having made her judgment, her desires match her beliefs 
perfectly.”185  Clearly on this account Sarah is not reckless, her desires do not match 
her beliefs and there is no evidence that her judgment is formed with insufficient care.  
Watson himself seems to have in mind something more like the preanalytic account of 
                                            
185 Smith, Michael and Kennett, Jeanette, “Philosophy and Commonsense: The Case of Weakness of 
Will” in Ethics and the A Priori (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) p. 70 
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recklessness as freely choosing poor consequences.  But even on this account it is 
unclear that Sarah was reckless.   
What if instead of going home to put her feet up, Sarah akratically goes to 
volunteer at a soup kitchen?  She judges that the consequences of helping the man are 
likely to be better, since the soup kitchen will likely run without her, but nevertheless she 
is moved by her enjoyment of the kitchen’s camaraderie.  It seems odd to call 
volunteering at a soup kitchen rather than helping the man on the sidewalk reckless.  
After all she has not decided to make sloppy judgments, or utterly disregard her 
considerate judgments, she only occasionally gives in to somewhat lesser desires.  This 
makes her weak-willed, but not reckless.  
Sarah’s case demonstrates the absurdity of collapsing all cases of intentional, 
non-compulsive choice of a lesser option into recklessness.  If all such cases are 
reckless, then Sarah is reckless and this conclusion seems so implausible that we ought 
to reconsider the reduction.  However, the strength of this argument against Watson’s 
view lays in the conviction that calling Sarah reckless would be absurd.   It certainly 
seems absurd to me, but others may have different views.  If one finds that Sarah 
recklessly disregards her judgment by walking past the man slumped on a sidewalk 
then the argument offered here will be unconvincing.  However, this seems unlikely 
precisely because Sarah clearly is at least moderately responsive to the reasons she 
has for acting one way or the other.   
Sarah’s choice to act in a socially responsible way, i.e. working in soup kitchen, 
suggests that she is not reckless, but this is not the main force of the example.  Rather, 
it is the reasoning on which Sarah’s actions depend that indicates most strongly that 
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she is not reckless.  Sarah forms a broad evaluation about her situation (perhaps even 
an ATC judgment) the conclusion of which is that she should help the man slumped on 
the sidewalk.  The act of consciously forming such a judgment indicates that Sarah 
values reasoning about her actions.  Further, the fact that Sarah responds 
motivationally to this and other judgments indicates that she takes her judgments 
seriously.  The paradigm of reckless behavior is the person who refuses to evaluate 
reasons for acting one way or another, the person who acts from caprice is reckless.  It 
is not reckless to treat ones judgments seriously, quite the opposite, and some weak-
willed people seem to take their judgments quite seriously. 
One might still think that Sarah is reckless to the extent that she discounts her 
own judgment in intentionally choosing the lesser of her options.  If Watson means to 
take this route it does indeed becomes impossible to distinguish between weakness of 
will and recklessness.  However, on this view it also becomes necessary to distinguish 
between an ordinary form of recklessness as acting form caprice and a special case of 
recklessness as an intentional choice of lesser options.  Watson’s move to collapse 
weakness of will into recklessness only succeeds at the expense of disintegrating the 
idea of recklessness.  It seems more reasonable to say that reckless behavior involves 
acting from caprice, while unduly limited responsiveness to judgment is better 
understood as weakness of will.  
Conclusion 
 Despite strong objections I believe that it is possible to maintain a commonsense 
account of weakness of will.  Of course, I have not here made an affirmative case for 
the existence of any actual cases of weakness of will.  What I have attempted to do is 
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outline the prominent arguments for the possibility of akratic action and contribute a 
small supplementary account.  My aim was to sketch a defense of the possibility of 
weakness of will against collapse into recklessness.  The suggestion was that it is 
neither impossible nor necessarily reckless to freely and knowingly act in ways that are 
somewhat less than best.   
In my view it is not impossible for one to freely and knowingly act in ways that are 
less than best because, as Mele suggests, one’s judgment can be circumvented by 
one’s motivation.  This circumvention is possible if one supposes the existence of a 
motivational faculty both weakly connected to and partially independent of judgment.  
Weak connection of the motivational faculty allows that motivations are often supported 
by judgments, and weak independence allows that motivations may not correspond to 
judgments in strength.  It is notable that this is a structural view of how mental events 
might occur and therefore not a claim about how the mind is structured, but about the 
conceptual possibility of akratic action.   
In summary the possibility of akratic action can be defended against a collapse 
into recklessness on two grounds.  First, there is at least one case, Sarah’s, in which it 
is absurd to think that purportedly akratic behavior could be appropriately described as 
reckless.  Second, as Sarah’s case reveals, akratic behavior is often deeply rooted in 
the agent’s conscientious judgments and calling such behavior reckless threatens to 
cause a fault in the idea of recklessness.  Together I take these to be convincing 
reasons to believe that weakness of will is both conceptually possible and 
distinguishable from recklessness.  Therefore, there is good reason to endorse the 
commonsense model of weakness of will.    
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Chapter 6 
The Value of Willpower and Weakness of Will 
We all know that willpower is a valuable thing, but we often fail to consider 
why.  Willpower is valuable because we want to do things that are hard—in 
particular we want to do things that go against our given desires by producing 
motivations to act that run contrary to our natural inclinations.   Strong-willed  people 
are more able to act in ways opposed to their own natural inclinations than are 
weak-willed people.  This chapter is a discussion of the ways that matters of moral 
value intersect with the phenomenon of willpower, including instances of weakness 
of will.  To be clear, this is not a chapter on moral issues, rather it is an analysis of 
how morally significant cases help to explain willpower and weakness of will. 
  The chapter begins with a brief account of the mental events that are 
necessary for willpower and weakness of will to be possible.  This section contrasts 
the elements of motivation that are given such as what we find pleasant or desirable 
with what we find good or important.  In cases where the two conflict willpower is the 
capacity to act based on the latter instead of the former. Of course, we do not 
always find the right things good or important and willpower can be used in the 
service of evil.  In the second section of this chapter I argue that in cases where 
willpower is used in the service of ill, there is good reason to think that it is bad on 
balance.  On the contrary, there are cases where weakness of will works in the 
service of the good.  cases of so-called "inverse akrasia" can be good on balance 
 150 
 
and begin to articulate several of the ways that this might be true.  In the thrid 
section I explore how failures of willpower are practical necessities in so much as 
willpower is a skill which must be developed over time.  Finally I conclude by 
exploring the implications of the forgoing account for the experience of regret for 
moral failures.  
Why we need willpower 
 Being self-aware entails that one has preferences, concerns, or interests in 
how things go--this amounts to having a perspective.  The mirror self-recognition test 
gives us reason to suspect that a range of animals including Chimpanzees, Magpie's 
and Dolphins, are self-aware.186  Current views of the self in psychology position the 
self as playing an integral part in human motivation, cognition, affect, and social 
identity.187  Beyond merely having a sense of self, a perspective, humans also take a 
metacognitive stance by evaluating and regulating our perspective.  This means that 
we engage in a process of self-criticism whereby we endeavor to change the way 
that we think and behave.  Self-criticism is an essential step beyond our natural 
selves, beyond the preferences and desires that we discover in ourselves and 
toward the preferences we create for ourselves.  Willpower is what we need to 
transcend our natural preferences in an effort to act in ways that we think are 
preferable.      
 Some will worry that self-criticism means self-denigration, or, that rejecting 
our "natural" selves is a recipe for disaster.  These are legitimate concerns, but are 
misplaced here.  By self-criticism I mean something more specific than a generalized 
                                            
186 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mirror_test 
187 Sedikides, C. & Spencer, S.J. (Eds.) (2007). The Self. New York: Psychology Press 
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rejection of oneself; I do not mean to suggest that self-control requires, or is 
benefited by, self-loathing.  Quite to the contrary, self-loathing is detrimental to self-
control.188  However, self-criticism, the identification of troublesome thoughts or 
behaviors in one's life, can be a constructive process.  Identifying one's own 
challenges and weaknesses is a valuable practice in the process of overcoming 
those obstacles.   In short, self-criticism is not antithetical to self-compassion.     
Consider that as infants we all learn rules of sleeping and eating, and 
eventually speaking and even "pooping" in the right ways and at the right times.  We 
are trained to be like others in our community.  Hubert Dreyfus describes this as the 
challenging but important first step in skill acquisition; it represents the beginnings of 
self-control.189  This early foundation in self-control is of course directed by others, 
but following these rules is our earliest training in the exercise of willpower.  It is by 
learning to follow our biological urges in socially approved ways that we begin to 
develop the skill of self-control.  But here, as latter in life, self-control is only 
necessary because there is a conflict between one urge and another.  On the one 
hand the young person has the urge to scream here and now, on the other she 
wants the approval and understanding of her family.  Balancing these concerns 
teaches us the skill of self-regulation and is an early step in becoming a full member 
of the moral community.   
                                            
188 Leslie Becker-Phelps (2013) "Self-Criticism Can Sabotage Your Happiness; and Productivity" 
Psychology Today, 
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/maki
ng-change/201309/self-criticism-can-sabotage-your-happiness-and-productivity 
189 Hubert Dreyfus & Stuart Dreyfus (1988) Mind Over Machine, Free Press  
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 It takes an act of courage to train a critical gaze at one's own biological or 
social predispositions.  To do so risks self-hatred, but it is not the only alternative.  
One can courageously risk looking at themselves reflectively with an eye toward 
acting on what they find.  For many of us, in many ways, we are unable or unwilling 
to even begin the process of self-examination—this choice of remaining whomever 
we are, as dictated to us by nature and society, is the safer choice in terms of 
avoiding internal conflict and weakness of will.  But, surely it is preferable to be self-
constituting and risk failure, then to meekly accept whomsoever one happens to be.  
Weakness of will is not possible for the blindly self-accepting, but it is a price worth 
paying for the promise of intentional identity formation. 
The courage to engage in honest self-examination is a vital evaluative 
component of a larger project: becoming our own people, taking responsibility for 
ourselves.  Reams of data indicate that we are, each of us, mostly directed by 
situational and biological forces that we do not create or endorse.190  This view has 
led some philosophers to conclude that we must accept determinism.  Derk 
Pereboom argues that the practical consequence of determinism is that social 
arrangements must reject moral responsibility.191   But, if we believe that we each 
have freewill, we can also hold out hope that we can choose our own lives despite 
the forces that push us around.  This is part of the activity of intentional self-creation.     
Libertarian accounts of freewill allow that people have an ultimate responsibly 
for at least some of their actions.  According to Robert Kane the source of this 
                                            
190 Smith, Kerri (2011). "Neuroscience vs philosophy: Taking aim at free will". Nature 477 (7362): 23–
5 
191 Derk Pereboom (1995) "Determinism al Dente" Nous Vol 9 No. 1: 21-45 
http://www.class.uh.edu/faculty/tsommers/Freewill%2012/determinism%20al%20dente.pdf 
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responsibility is that we are the "arche" of our  actions.192  Arche is a Greek term 
which means cause, motivation, or, more technically, a sufficient condition.  On this 
view  we are responsible for those actions that occur because we will them to occur.  
It is this choosing of something as a path that makes us responsible for it.  Freedom 
and responsibility are worth wanting because there are genuine choices to be made 
about one’s life.  We do not want to have freedom just to say that we are free.  It is 
not a matter of fiat that freedom is better than compulsion.  Rather, freedom is 
valuable and worth wanting because we have genuine choices to make about who 
we shall become.  And, making genuine choices involves struggling with our own 
internal conflicts, struggling with weakness of will.193    
Willpower Gone Wrong 
 The relationship between value and willpower is commonly thought to be 
straight-forward, having willpower is good and weak-will is bad.  But this account is 
mistaken in a number of ways.  The first way that this account is mistaken is that 
having willpower can be, on balance, a very bad thing.  It is also possible that 
failures of willpower can be, on balance, quite good things.  In its practical effect the 
exercise of willpower is by itself neither good, nor bad.  Willpower is a skill which by 
itself doesn't have a moral valence; rather willpower is a requirement of adopting a 
normative perspective.  Although making moral judgments requires at first that one 
believe the practical question of how to act is not determined by our desires, not all 
resistance of desire is noble and not all concession to desire ignoble.  
                                            
192 Robert Kane, The Significance of Free Will (OUP 1996) p. 224 
193 Frankfurt style examples make clear that making genuine choices cannot be reduced to having 
alternative possibilities.     
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 Consider first the possibility of resisting one's natural inclination and desire 
successfully, but immorally.   Imagine, for example, a dedicated assassin who stalks 
and eventually assassinates the President.  The successful assassin will have 
dedicated huge amounts of time to planning, preparing for and eventually executing 
his assignment.  This persistence of attention over time and avoidance of distraction 
require the kind of willpower that is unusual in people.  Clearly this sort of action 
requires great strength of will.  However, it is also clear that this is an immoral action.  
The fact that an action is difficult, that one must resist impulses of distraction, 
exercise great skill, etc. to perform an action, does not make it valuable. 
 It is tempting to say that we only exercise great effort on actions that we think 
are valuable (morally, prudentially, or otherwise.)  But that is almost certainly untrue.  
For example, I have spent countless hours learning to juggle balls, rings, and clubs 
with some degree of proficiency.  I am under no delusion that this is a prudent or 
practical way to spend time, let alone that this practice has any moral value.  
Nevertheless, the activity requires deferred gratification, concentration, impulse 
suppression and in general seems to take what we ordinarily call willpower.  The fact 
that I am able to muster these skills of willpower together in order to juggle does not 
mean that juggling is morally valuable.  It certainly is not valuable, but it does require 
willpower.   
 Consider an alternative type of case, one of so-called "inverse akrasia."  The 
traditional account of the inverse akratic involves Huck Finn helping to hide his friend 
the runaway slave "nigger Jim."  From the narrator's explicit perspective it was 
plainly the case that Jim should be arrested and returned to his owner.  However, 
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when the chance to turn the runaway slave over to authorities arose Huck did 
something else.  Jim and Huck were friends and it would have been hard for Huck to 
inform on Jim even though he clearly thought it was the right thing to do.  In this 
moment Huck is weak-willed, he chooses to do what comes easily instead of 
resisting that natural impulse.   Of course Huck was right not to turn over Jim, not 
simply because he was Jim's friend, because Jim was a person and people should 
not be held in slavery.  In this case Huck's weakness of will serves the interests of 
more moral decision making.     
Allison McIntyre and Nomy Arpaly have both contributed to discussion of 
inverse akrasia with incredibly interesting and novel approaches.  Arpaly claims that 
when weakness of will is based on unconscious reasons, it can be more rational 
than acting on conscious deliberation.  McIntyre’s claim is that weakness of will may, 
in some instances, be more rational than revising one’s better judgment without 
sufficient reason.  On my view it never makes sense to argue that weakness of will is 
rational. Rather, weakness of will is always less than reasonable, but may be seen 
as important for other reasons.     
 Arpaly’s view of weakness of will as "rational non-deliberative action" is 
plausible because deliberation can overlook overwhelming reasons to which the 
unconscious attends.  As Arpaly puts it, “There are cases in which people do not 
deliberate but still act rationally, and there are cases in which people act as a result 
of deliberation but are acting irrationally.”194  It is true that people often do what they 
have overwhelming reason to do without conscious deliberation.  In fact conscious 
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deliberation sometimes gets in the way.  This leads Arpaly to conclude that actions 
against our better judgment, but in keeping with our interests may be rational.  This 
shades toward a consequentialist account of reason and fails to acknowledge that 
weakness of will always involves the procedural error of failing to act as one believes 
one should.  The correct process of practical reasoning involves maintaining 
coherence between beliefs and actions.  The trouble is Arpaly’s account of rationality 
cannot explain why the failure to do so is a failure at all.195 This sort of radical 
externalism severs  judgment from motivation and mischaracterizes the value in 
weak-will. 
McIntyre’s account of rational weakness of will is closer to the mark and relies 
on the tension produced between procedural concerns and substantive concerns. 
On her view we are sometimes faced with a choice between sacrificing coherence or 
sacrificing our best judgment.  In such cases, she argues, it may be rational to act 
against our better judgment.  Of course, this counts against the action’s rationality, 
but it may count less than sacrificing better judgment. Consider the example of 
Dixon a houseguest who believes that he should confess to accidentally burning the 
rug in his room, but also believes that he will be unable to muster the courage to 
confess.  If Dixon forms the intention to confess, he does so knowing that he cannot 
follow through.  On the other hand, if he fails to form the intention to confess, he 
does not act as he believes he should.  It is clear that Dixon has an incoherent 
                                            
195 Despite her claim to the contrary, “I still agree that every agent who acts against her best judgment 
is…less than perfectly rational as the schism indicates a failure of coherence in her mind.” (Arpaly 
p.36)  It seems that a failure of coherence only tips us off to the real source of irrationality, the faulty 
deliberation. 
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mental state and we should be inclined to pity poor Dixon, but what should he do? 
Can he escape being irrational in such a condition? 
One option, a slippery one, is that Dixon might relinquish his judgment that he 
should confess.  This seems wrong, Dixon should confess, he just can't.  McIntyre 
argues, “lucid akrasia may well be Dixon’s best move in the circumstances.” (2006 
p.307)  This view is based on the premise that Dixon will not be confessing under 
any condition.  McIntyre seems to think that it is more rational for Dixon to know that 
he is failing, than to rationalize away his failure. There is something important and 
correct about the view it can be a poor decision to rationalize failures to behave as 
we believe we should.  To make an exception in a personal policy can open the 
floodgates of exceptions by shifting our attention to the exceptions and away from 
the policy.  It is a much better strategy to recognize that one has had a momentary 
failure, to recognize that this is perfectly normal and to seek out an opportunity to 
recommit to one’s goal.  That being said, it does not follow from a case of weakness 
being better than revision, that weak will is the most rational option in that case. 
The Practical Value of Weak-Will  
 McIntyre’s account goes a long way toward showing that in some specialized 
instances weakness of will can be more rational than some alternatives, but it does 
not show that weakness of will is ever a rational choice.  The central concern of 
Arpaly and McIntyre (with respect to WOW) is the question, “Is weak-willed action 
ever an instance of sound decision making?”  I think the answer is clearly "no."  
However, I do think that weak-willed action is valuable even when the agent is not 
mistaken about the correct course of action as is the case with the assassin or Huck.  
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In the first instance there is an advantage to weak-willed action in so much as it is a 
practical requirement of coming to be strong-willed. 
As I argued earlier, especially in chapter one, willpower is best thought of as a 
skill and skills are developed over time through repetition.  Just as there is no person 
who is born writing a philosophy paper well or hitting a baseball well, there is also no 
person born controlling themselves well.  Self-control and the willpower it requires is 
something that we develop through an iterative process and this process includes 
failure.  Imagine a person who practiced hitting baseballs for years, but never 
missed a pitch.  Or a student who wrote regularly for years without ever putting 
together a terrible thought.  Is it hard, perhaps impossible, to imagine such a 
person?  I presume such a person is impossible to imagine.  At first blush this seems 
ridiculous because we have never encountered anyone who practiced without failure 
at anything.   
Beyond the sense that an infallible person would be somehow inhuman, 
perhaps an angel or a god, there is something about failure that is practically 
important to how people learn.  Failures teach us the ways that an action can be 
thwarted and in turn teach us how to improve our technique in an action.  Consider 
the analogy to a great hitter like Henry Aaron, who, as a matter of fact, missed 
countless balls.   There is nothing necessarily true about the fact that Aaron missed 
lots of pitches.  It is technically possible that Aaron would be just as he is without 
ever having missed a pitch.  But, in the real world this is not how things work.  Aaron 
had to miss lots of pitches because he had to practice a lot before he became a 
great hitter.  But, beyond that, missing lots of pitches helped Aaron become a better 
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hitter because it showed him the ways that hitting can be confounded by pitching, 
wind, lighting, etc.  With willpower, like with hitting, our failures provide feedback on 
the ways that we can create successes.   
The formation of willpower is a process that requires time and effort.  There 
are instances of willpower that resemble the muscular account in that they occur 
once and then are over.  Some people also hit a baseball once and are done.  But, 
when we discuss hitters we are talking about a skill someone has developed in an 
iterative process over time and when we talk about strong-willed people, we are 
talking about people who have been through a similar iterative process.  As a 
practical matter developing a characteristic strength of will is something that requires 
failure.  In a practical sense we need failure both because we are not angels or gods 
and failures help to show us the ways that we can be strong. 
The A Priori Value of Weak-Will 
There is a second sense in which weakness of will is valuable and it is also 
practical in the sense that it involves the practical question of how one should act.   
When we take up the practical question "what should I do?" we are already 
presuming that the answer to that question might be different from the inclinations 
and desires that we already posses.  It is this distance between our inclinations and 
our judgments that makes willpower important and weakness of will possible.  
Therefore, taking up the practical question "what should I do?" presumes the 
existence of willpower and the possibility of weakness of will.  As R.J. Wallace puts 
the point, "We inevitably assume that we ourselves have this capacity when we 
undertake to deliberate about what we should do...the idea that we have it in our 
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power to determine what we shall do in ways independent of our given desires 
provides the natural context for our own deliberative activity."196 
Elsewhere Gary Watson writes, “If free will means the capacity to act 
irrationally, some will say, it is not a power so much as a liability, and it is far from 
clear that we should want it; it seems a weakness that we would be well rid of.”197  
From Watson's perspective, God, or, a perfectly virtuous man, would not need to be 
free.  This is because without any internal conflict about how to act or who to be 
there is no value in freedom.   And presumably neither God, nor, the perfectly 
virtuous man experiences any internal conflict about doing the right thing.  It is the 
internal conflict which makes weak-will possible that also makes freedom worth 
having.  As Kane puts this point, “To be sure, weakness in the presence of avowed 
purpose or better judgment is motivationally perverse and irrational from one point of 
view.  But the possibility of such “motivational perversity”—of having powerful 
motives to act against better judgments or to fail in sustaining purposes already 
formed—is, I think, the price to be paid for free will.”198  Of course, freedom is not 
enough for us to be the authors of our own identity, we must also take up the pen--
that is we must exercise our capacity for affirming and choosing who we are to be.  
R.J. Wallace describes our capacity for self-creation writing, “Human agents 
have the capacity for a sophisticated kind of rational agency, insofar as they can 
reach independent normative conclusions about what they have reason to do, and 
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then choose in accordance with such normative conclusions.  This capacity 
presupposes that we are equipped with the power to choose independently of the 
desires to which we are subject.”199  The point Wallace is making is twofold, first, we 
are not committed to act on antecedently given desires as the Humean tradition 
sometimes purports.  Second, Wallace argues that we are also not committed to 
every exercise of instrumental rationality being in support of our normative 
commitments as the Kantian tradition suggests.  Wallace’s view is that volitional 
attitudes are importantly distinct from both desires and normative commitment.  This 
is not to say that desires and normative commitments do not necessarily have an 
impact on choice; it is only to say that neither desires nor normative commitments 
area necessarily decisive in producing action.   
By distinguishing normative commitment from volition, Wallace aligns himself 
with a view much like Al Mele’s view that there is “a step between decisive better 
judgment and intention.”200  For both Mele and Wallace it is this step between 
judgment and intention or volition which makes weakness of will possible.  Wallace 
goes on to make this point explicitly saying, “once we have this power it can be put 
to use in ways that are at odds with our own practical judgments about what we 
have reason to do.  That is, we can treat our dispositions to do what we ought as a 
further desire from which we set ourselves apart, choosing to act in a way that is at 
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variance with our reflective better judgment.”201  Here we see Wallace essentially 
making the earlier point that weakness of will can be understood as the result of an 
internal conflict.   
Recall the self-sabotaging behavior of dieters, shoppers and addicts.  When 
they see themselves as successful at dieting, thrift, or kicking a habit, they are 
significantly more likely to “reward” themselves with the very thing they wish to 
avoid.  The only reason that this makes any sense is because the agents treat their 
own normative dispositions as distinct from themselves in the same way that they 
earlier treated their own desires as distinct from themselves.  It is the same capacity 
to distance oneself from desire in making normative judgments that produces 
weakness of will in those struggling with self-control.  Weakness of will is valuable 
because it is made possible by an important element of agency, internal conflict.  In 
discussions of freewill it also seems that this same internal conflict is what makes 
freedom worth having.  In the end then freedom is worth having because we have 
genuine choices about our internal conflicts and weakness of will is a byproduct of 
such conflicts that serves to signify our having choices.    
Weakness of Will as a Signifier 
 There is something extraordinarily valuable about our capacity to transcend 
mere impulse, habituation and desire in the effort to make rational judgments about 
our own actions.  We want to be able to consider reasons for not doing what we 
ordinarily would do and this capacity is crucial to our moral agency.  But the capacity 
to engage in this sort of self-evaluation also means that we sometimes distance 
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ourselves from our own evaluations.  When this cognitive distance between our  
motivation and our judgments is resolved in favor of some inferior motivation, we 
have weakness of will.   Of course, weakness of will is not a good thing, but it is 
something that we should want to be possible for ourselves.  The possibility of 
weakness of will indicates the capacity for self-determination and actual instances of 
weak-will indicate that an agent is making an effort at self-determination.    
 Weakness of will only becomes an issue for those individuals who take an 
interest in evaluating themselves and their commitments.  It is this self-evaluation 
that leads to making changes in our natural behavior and it is trying to make such a 
change that creates inner conflict.  For this reason weakness of will need not be 
seen as an exclusively troubling event in one’s life; rather, it is valuable to see 
weakness of will as a marker of one’s willingness to confront one's own cultural and 
personal baggage.  Weakness of will is only possible for those individuals who 
choose to courageously risk looking at themselves reflectively with an eye toward 
acting on what they find.  For many of us, in many ways, we are unable or unwilling 
to even begin the process of self-examination—this choice of remaining whomever 
we are, as dictated to us by nature and society, is the safer choice in terms of 
avoiding internal conflict and weakness of will.  But, surely it is preferable to be self-
constituting and risk failure, then to meekly accept whomsoever one happens to be.  
Weakness of will is not possible for the blindly self-accepting, but it is a price worth 
paying for the promise of intentional identity formation. 
A tidy summary of the point here is that "the capacity for rational self-
guidance necessarily contains the potential for self-alienation, because it requires a 
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capacity of motivational transcendence that can be turned against the disposition to 
be guided by normative conclusions.”202   Because weak-will and rational self-
guidance both require "motivational transcendence" we can use one as an indicator 
of the other.  Of course it doesn’t necessarily follow that "when these enabling 
capacities are misused their manifestations are themselves instances of self-
determination.”203  Some instances of purported weak-will may be coerced; but, so 
long as we accept the capacity for self-determination and the capacity for self-
alienation there is little reason to suppose that they only work together in ways we 
would prefer.  To the contrary, evidence suggests that in many cases it seems that 
our efforts to assess our own values have disappointing results.  These 
disappointments do not suggest a lack of self-determination.  The much stronger 
explanation is that changing oneself is hard.   Further, specific instances of  
weakness of will work as an indication of more than just a capacity for self-
determination; weakness of will is an indication that one is making an effort to utilize 
the capacity for self-determination.   
In summary, the link between self- determination and weakness of will is fairly 
well established and agreed to by many prominent and diverse thinkers.  Wallace 
establishes the connection especially clearly, but Gary Watson agrees that “The 
capacity for rational self-guidance necessarily contains the potential for self-
alienation.”  Of course, Watson and Wallace disagree about the implications of this 
connection, but that they agree on the connection is notable.  Likewise, this is the 
same point that Robert Kane makes with respect to freewill.  The same basic point 
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has also been made across popular culture from fortune cookies to the 
autobiographies of actresses.  These observations are accurate and when we have 
a point of agreement from such diverse perspectives we should look into its value.   
The importance of connecting weakness of will to self-determination has been 
overlooked for far too long.  It is possible to extend this important observation and to 
see that there is something valuable we can salvage from weakness of will because 
of its connection to the capacity for self-determination. When we are weak-willed we 
very often take our own failures as a sign that we cannot be trusted, that our 
judgment is poor, or that we are in some other way deeply flawed people.  These 
self-assessments may be in some ways accurate but they are also self-defeating, 
feeding into a cycle of failure and regret.  Self-criticism is an important element in 
self-determination, but ample empirical evidence reveals that we are most 
successful in improving ourselves when we see failure as a part of the process of 
self-improvement.  Before reviewing that evidence and showing how motivational 
failures can be harnessed to improve willpower I want to cover some alternative 
accounts of how weak-will might be valuable.     
Weakness and Self-Compassion 
 Weakness of will is not good per se, but it is a pitfall associated with our 
capacity for self-determination.   As a practical matter, if we make an effort to 
improve ourselves, we will fail sometimes, and, it is likely that we will fail more often 
than we succeed.  So how can we increase our odds of success?  And, what are we 
to make of our failures?  An earlier chapter some data on the successful exercise of 
willpower.  Some successful strategies focused on strengthening the brute force of 
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will by getting adequate rest and maintaining a healthy blood sugar level.  Other 
strategies were more, well, strategic, including predicting potential sources of 
difficulty and making arrangements to avoid temptation.  In this section we look at a 
difficulty that inhibits the successful exercise of willpower across a range of 
situations.  Specifically, we will address how failure to succeed in early attempts at 
self-control (weak-will) can negatively affect future attempts and what strategies 
have been associated with overcoming this common hurdle. 
 We know that self-control relies on the ability to look critically at one’s own 
desires and judgments, and but we can go too far in employing self criticism.  At a 
certain point one’s efforts at self-assessment can turn into feelings of regret, guilt, or 
remorse.  The evidence on such negative self-assessments indicates that they have 
a deleterious effect on future acts of willpower and avoiding future collapse of will 
power.  This is an unusual finding, but it suggests that all willpower challenges are 
effectively like dieting in one important respect.  Dieting is a particularly difficult 
challenge in part because we cannot simply swear off food, one must eat.  Similarly, 
in willpower challenges one cannot simply swear off self-criticism; rather, we must 
moderate our self-criticism and temper it with self-forgiveness and acceptance.  
Once we know that some specific behavior is in need of change, we are best served 
by not harping on our own failures in this regard.  A new strategy that I hope this 
essay can provide is to see willpower failures as reflective of some broader 
commitment to self-determination.  If we can think about our failures in terms of our 
overall positive commitment to the difficult challenge of taking responsibility for our 
own characters, we may be more successful in avoiding future failures of willpower.   
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 A range of data supports the claim that feelings of anxiety, guilt, remorse 
associated with weakness of will  tend to prime future failures of self-control.  For 
instance, one marketing study found that when exposed to anxiety and sorrow 
producing reports of death on the news people were more likely to respond favorably 
to advertisements for luxury goods.204  Likewise, a study on drinking behavior asked 
people to record the number of drinks they anticipated having and then to record the 
number of drinks they actually consumed.  Those who most regretted drinking 
heavily the night before, not those who drank most heavily, were the ones who were 
most likely to exceed their limits the following evening.205  A follow-up study also 
showed that those with more rigid limits tended to feel worse about consumption 
behaviors and accordingly drank more the following evening.206  Procrastination is 
another willpower failure about which we often feel guilty, and another case in which 
regret appears to lead to more procrastination, while self-forgiveness mitigates the 
problem.207  This effect has also been demonstrated in studies on gambling behavior 
and cigarette smoking.208 It seems that the harder you are on yourself after a will 
power failure, the more likely you are to have a relapse, psychologists call this a 
“disinhibition effect.”   
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So why it is that being critical of our own failures doesn’t help to correct those 
failures in the future?  Isn’t chastising oneself after failure meant to ensure that such 
failures do not reoccur?  Doesn’t saying nice things to oneself after failure license 
the failure?  To better understand how self criticism can lead to disinhibition and 
future failure it is helpful to return to the biology we discussed earlier.  Feelings of 
guilt and shame induce stress on the body with effects that are similar to low blood 
sugar or sleep deprivation.  When we stress ourselves out, we weaken the efficiency 
of the prefrontal cortex responsible for impulse control and strengthen the midbrain 
responsible for basic impulses.  Essentially, guilt and anxiety evoke a stress 
response in us that triggers increased desire and weakens self-control.  Baumeister 
et. al. attribute this link between emotional distress and poor impulse control to an 
effort to avoid negative self-assessment or other ego threats by replacing self-
awareness with awareness of more concrete elements of the environment.209 
Unfortunately, this is exactly the opposite of what we need for success in high 
willpower activities. What we need in order to accomplish our most challenging goals 
is an active prefrontal cortex and a relatively quiet impulse system.  
 In an effort to test the effectiveness of different willpower strategies Claire 
Adams and Mark Leary arranged a study in which dieters would be asked to break 
their diets temporarily and then either primed with self-forgiving thoughts or given no 
such priming.  The experimenters began by asking the subjects to pre-load by eating 
either a chocolate or glazed doughnut.  The subjects were also asked to drink at 
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least one entire glass of water to encourage a feeling of fullness. Then, subjects 
were asked to participate in what they were told was a separate “taste test” in which 
they would evaluate the flavor of various candies.  In reality the candy was provided 
to test the dieters willpower following indulgence.  Before the taste test began 
subjects in the “self-compassion” condition were told the following by a researcher. 
 “You might wonder why we picked doughnuts to use in the 
study. It’s because people sometimes eat unhealthy, sweet foods while 
they watch TV. We thought it would be more like the “real world” to 
have people eat a dessert or junk food. But several people have told 
me that they feel bad about eating doughnuts in this study, so I hope 
you won’t be hard on yourself. Everyone eats unhealthily sometimes, 
and everyone in this study eats this stuff, so I don’t think there’s any 
reason to feel really bad about it. This little amount of food doesn’t 
really matter anyway. Just wait a second and I’ll bring you the 
questionnaire.”210 
 
This passage was recited for each participant and was designed to elicit self-
compassion in three distinct ways articulated by earlier research, specifically, self–
kindness, mindfulness, and common humanity.211  The control and non-self-
compassion groups were simply told “Just wait a second and I’ll bring you the 
questionnaire.”    Then each person was given three large bowls of unwrapped 
candies and told to each as much as they needed to complete the evaluation.  
Participants in the self-compassion group ate an average of 28g of candy, whereas 
those without the self-compassionate priming ate an average of 80g of the candy. 212  
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This suggests that guilt or remorse may exacerbate weakness of will, while self-
compassion is a promising motivational strategy.  
 In a series of studies researchers at UC Berkeley tested the effects of self-
compassion on subjects motivation "to improve personal weaknesses, moral 
transgressions, and test performance.  Participants in a self-compassion condition, 
compared to a self-esteem control condition and either no intervention or a positive 
distraction control condition, expressed greater incremental beliefs about a personal 
weakness (Experiment 1); reported greater motivation to make amends and avoid 
repeating a recent moral transgression (Experiment 2); spent more time studying for 
a difficult test following an initial failure (Experiment 3); exhibited a preference for 
upward social comparison after reflecting on a personal weakness (Experiment 4); 
and reported greater motivation to change the weakness (Experiment 4). These 
findings suggest that, somewhat paradoxically, taking an accepting approach to 
personal failure may make people more motivated to improve themselves." 213  
 When we focus on chastising ourselves we fail to recognize the central 
element of our own failure, namely that it could never have happened if we weren’t 
trying to do something difficult.  By emphasizing the act of willing, as opposed to its 
failure or success we reorient ourselves toward the image of our better selves.  In 
some ways the problem is like missing a turn while driving.  Say that you know you 
need to make a left on to main street, but get distracted and miss the turn.  You can 
look back toward the street you just passed, but this will be a further distraction and 
is likely to cause you to miss the next turn as well.  In most cases this looking 
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backwards is also quite unnecessary, after all you know that you’ve missed the turn.  
A better strategy is to keep looking forward toward a new turn that may eventually 
get you where you need to go.   
 The importance of being weak-willed is that it reflects something valuable 
about us, that we are trying to engage our own failures.  It is counterproductive to 
dwell on those failures once they have been identified.  However,  if we take our 
failures as a signal that we are making an effort to something hard and worthwhile 
we are more likely to succeed.  Louis C.K. has made a point of highlighting that he is 
an ordinary person who tries and fails at all sorts of things.  For instance, when he 
sees a soldier getting on plane he thinks about giving the soldier his first class seat.    
Louis says, "The soldier "giving his life for his country (he thinks)...it's scary but he's 
doing it. I should trade with him--I never have, let me make that perfectly clear...--but 
I was actually proud of myself for having thought of it."214 Louis is pointing out the 
absurdity of feeling good about not doing what he thinks he should.  The experience 
of weak-will is commonplace and Louis is saying that it can feel good.  Of course, he 
is right, and I argue that this experience of feeling good about our judgments despite 
our weak-wills is important in our becoming better people. 
Weakness of Will and Moral Licensing 
Visualizing the process of reaching one’s goals is an important element of 
willpower, without setting goals for ourselves there would be no need for willpower.  
But, there are a number of ways that willpower can be weakened, we set unrealistic 
goals, are depleted by other challenges, “reward” ourselves by giving in to 
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temptation, sometimes we just get insufficient rest or food.  These reasons and more 
like them help to explain why we sometimes fail to maintain our resolutions or to act 
in the ways that we think we really ought to act.  We need willpower precisely 
because our actions are not what they should be, but resolving the tension between 
who we are and who we should be is a difficult balancing act.   On one hand self-
evaluation requires that we imagine ways in which we might be more ideal, perhaps 
even trying to imagine how our more ideal selves would advise that we should 
behave in our less-than-ideal circumstances.  On the other hand, an idealized self 
image is unattainable, imagining such a self threatens to generate an impossible 
goal, and for a variety of reasons imagining an idealized self can contribute to 
weakness of will.   
In one way the image of an idealized self can present us with a goal, 
something to strive for, a set of improvements on the way that we cope with life.  
However, one potential pitfall of noticing our own flaws and imagining ourselves 
differently is that the image we create may be so vastly different from ourselves that 
we can scarcely see how to get from where are to where we want to be.  Recall the 
people who thought that they would exercise more, despite the evidence that they 
had unrealistic expectations.  Those individuals, like us, ran into the problem of 
thinking about their future selves in ideal circumstances or with ideal powers of self-
control and judgment.  Studies like that one show clearly that a strategy of 
realistically imagining obstacles and challenges is vital to the exercise of willpower.  
Without identifying the specific hurdles one must face in order to change, the 
idealized self image is merely fantasy.  This kind of fantasy can be problematic 
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because it leaves one with the belief that one should act in some way quite removed 
from the ways in which one does in fact act; and, without a clear path from the 
present self to the imagined future self the agent is left in the akratic position of 
believing she should act differently, but not being able to scratch out exactly how to 
do so. In this context goals are valuable conceived of as a series of means.  
Otherwise, goals tend toward fantasy and rely on magic to produce change--this is a 
recipe for weakness of will.215 
Consider an example, a couch potato throughout college John has decided 
that he should be fit, in fact he thinks it important to be able to run a marathon.  John 
believes that he should run a marathon, not today of course, but eventually.  John 
sees that his present self is not able to run a marathon, but believes that in the future 
he should be able to do so.  In effect, John sees something in himself which needs 
improvement and has set a goal which will constitute successful self-improvement.  
The problem is that if John stops here he will always think that he should be able to 
run a marathon, but will never actually be able to do so.  Setting a distant goal is not 
going to bring results without a recognizing the intermediate steps to reaching that 
goal.  As the proverb says, “a journey of one thousand miles begins with a single 
step.”216 One problem of weakness of will is very often that we imagine the desired 
result, but not the process by which it comes about.   
A related difficulty is that imagining an idealized self is often enough to make 
people believe that they are acting in accord with their goals of improvement and 
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seeing progress toward one’s goals is strongly associated with weakness of will.  
The association between perceived progress toward a goal of self-improvement and 
the failure of willpower regarding that goal is one of the genuine oddities of human 
psychology.  It seems that we are willing to engage in what Kelly McGonigal calls 
“willpower hypocrisy” succeeding in self control only to see those successes license 
or justify future failures.217  McGonigal cites research by Monin and Miller who 
surveyed and then tested support for the use gender stereotypes in a group of 
students at Princeton University.  They first asked the students to answer one of two 
questionnaires. The first asked questions about women generally, such as, “Most 
women are better suited to stay at home taking care of the children than to work.”  
The second, asked more limited questions, such as, “Some women are better suited 
to stay at home taking care of children.”  Predictably, the students with the first group 
of statements tended to strongly disagree, while responses in the second group 
were more neutral.  Less predictably, when participants were then asked to rate 
candidates for a job, male and female, subject performance was associated with an 
anti-sexist bias.  Those who had strongly disagreed with sexist statements were 
more likely to discriminate against women in hiring then were those who responded 
more neutrally to more neutral statements.218  It seems that the earlier rejection of 
sexism granted permission to engage in subsequent sexist behavior, psychologists 
call this effect “moral license.” 
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What is especially notable about the Princeton sexism study is that the 
subjects were not licensed by doing anything to act in defense of women’s rights.  
Rather, the subjects apparently excused their own sexism because they disagreed 
with sexist statements.  A related study focuses on how considering donating to a 
charitable cause licenses consumer choices.  The study showed that when given the 
option between a utilitarian purchase, like a vacuum cleaner or strictly functional 
sunglasses, and a hedonic purchase, like designer jeans or posh sunglasses, a 
control group only made the self-indulgent purchase about twenty six percent of the 
time.  However, when subjects were asked to suppose that they had volunteered to 
work four hours a week doing community service and asked to decide between 
spending that time either educating children or improving the environment, the rate 
of self-indulgent purchase shot up to above sixty percent.  Likewise, rate of around 
fifty six percent self-indulgent purchases were obtained by telling participants to 
imagine having agreed to donate $100 to a charitable organization and then to 
determine which organization should get the money.  Part of why this is startling is 
that the participants did not actually donate any time or money to a charitable cause.  
Participants were twice as likely to indulge their own interest in frivolous or 
extravagant purchases because they had merely thought about charitable giving.219 
If thinking about doing something good leads to a failure of self-control we 
should have some concerns about the efficacy of imagining the ways that our future 
self could be better than our present self.  In part this might be addressed by simply 
focusing moral progress on the deficiencies we notice in ourselves at the present.  
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This has the advantage of focusing on obstacles to be overcome which we have 
seen tends to willpower enhancing.  The strategy of focusing on the present self also 
has the advantage of not presenting an idealized future self to license indulgent 
behavior.  But, there are two limitations to the strategy of focusing on the present 
self.  First it makes long term planning quite a challenge—this is important, because 
we tend to live quite a long time and focusing only on immediate goals can have 
detrimental long term effects. Recall for example the research on current rates of 
saving for retirement.  Second, focusing on one’s real successes also appears 
create a licensing effect, so it seems that the willpower challenge is not that we 
idealize ourselves but that we irrationally reward ourselves.  To see how this might 
be so, let’s begin by discussing the effect of reflecting on real success. 
In one study Ayelet Fishbach and Ravi Dhar surveyed a group of women and 
asked them to report, among other things, their desire for weight loss.  They were 
then asked to measure progress on this goal based in two different ways.  One 
group was asked to color in their progress on a wide chart another asked to color in 
progress on a narrow chart.  Earlier studies had revealed that coloring the wide chart 
makes people feel as if they have made greater progress as compared to the narrow 
chart.  Then, after the survey, participants were asked to choose a parting gift of 
either an apple or a chocolate bar. Eighty-five percent of those primed by reflecting 
on their high-progress chose the chocolate bar, while only fifty-eight percent in the 
low progress condition chose the chocolate.220  When we actively consider our 
successes toward a goal we are much more likely not exactly to lose control, but to 
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choose in a way that is opposed to our goals. This is a very similar effect to the 
licensing effect of merely imagining a charitable gift.  It is also related to an 
established “halo effect” in consumer behavior.   
When consumers associate something perceived as healthy with something 
unhealthy they are much more likely to purchase the unhealthy indulgence than they 
are when the healthy option is removed—this is called the halo effect because the 
healthy option seems to cast a halo around the unhealthy choice.  For example, 
when McDondald’s began to offer salads on their menu the sales of their least 
healthy option, the big mac, rose dramatically.  Some of this could be attributed to 
higher general sales, but sales did not account for all of the increases.  To test this 
effect a group of researchers set up a faux fast food restaurant and had people 
choose from menus with and without healthy items.  On one menu the subjects cold 
choose between a bacon cheese burger, fried chicken sandwich or fried fish 
sandwich; on the other menu a veggie burger was included as a healthy option.  
Subjects given the more healthy option tended to choose the least healthy option, 
the bacon cheese burger, at increased rates.221 A similar study confirms that 
picturing healthy items, like strawberries, arranged to complement unhealthy items, 
like a can of cola, dramatically raises the perceived value of the unhealthy item.  In 
fact, when pictured together the cola appears more valuable than the strawberries, 
while the opposite is true when they are pictured apart.222  This research shows that 
is that when we see ourselves as making progress toward our goals we tend to wrap 
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our decisions in a halo which ironically licenses behavior antithetical to our better 
judgment. 
It should be clear at this point that reflecting on ones progress or self-
improvement can have the effect of licensing self-indulgent behavior, but in 
concluding this section it is worth taking a pause to examine the sort of self-
sabotage that such licensing represents.  It is straightforwardly counterproductive for 
a dieter to “reward” her hard work with a chocolate bar.  The reward undoes a great 
deal of the hard work that went into dieting in the first place.  The sort of reasoning a 
play here borders on the irrational.  Consider how we would respond to a heroin 
addict who thought it reasonable to reward her sobriety over the course of two days 
by having a fix on the third.  Of course in many cases there is no conscious 
deliberation licensing the weak-willed behavior, but it is intentional nonetheless.  In 
some cases perhaps the dieter thinks “I have really shown tremendous resolve in 
sticking by my diet.  I deserve a reward for being so strong.”  So far this is 
reasonable enough.  I say reasonable enough because showing resolve in one’s 
commitments is really its own reward, but invoking a strategy of external reward can 
be motivational.  The wild leap in logic occurs when the dieter then supposes, “As a 
reward for being strong about my diet I will stop sticking by my diet.”  If being on a 
diet, or more likely losing weight, is what the dieter really wants, then a reward which 
undermines that goal is no reward at all.  This is like saying to a boy scout “Great, 
now that you have earned all of those merit badges your reward is that you get to 
throw them all away!”  This suggestion would be met with horror by many, perhaps 
most, Boy Scouts.  They worked hard for those badges and usually want to keep 
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them.  It is tempting to write off this sort of licensing behavior as a sort of weak-willed 
irrationality, but that would be hasty. 
Consider the example of “rewarding” the merit badge collecting Boy Scout by 
encouraging him to destroy his merit badges.  I have said that most would balk, but 
surely some boy scouts do this very thing.  What kind of Boy Scout would want to 
destroy his merit badges?  Perhaps the scout who secretly always detested wearing 
a uniform, tying knots, and meeting with other scouts?  It is not difficult to imagine a 
young man who under great pressure to be good scout completes many merit 
badges and finds at the end great satisfaction in leaving scouting altogether.  Such a 
person might relish destroying his merit badges as an act of rebellion or an 
expression of his true feelings toward the effort that he put in toward a goal that was 
not his own.  And this is the point, we are often tempted to act in ways that sabotage 
our own efforts because we do not particularly identify with those efforts.  Like the 
disgruntled Boy Scout, many dieters, addicts, and others struggle with tasks that tax 
the capacity for self-control because they identify with the temptation to quit putting 
forth the effort or to stop resisting the temptation.  Rewarding ourselves for working 
hard on a diet or addiction recovery by sabotaging that effort only makes sense if we 
see ourselves as basically committed to the unhealthy lifestyle and not to recovery.      
Kelly McGonigal captures this challenge of self-control when she writes, “Moral 
licensing turns out to be, at its core, an identity crisis.”223 
 
 
                                            
223 Kelly McGonigal (2012) The Willpower Instinct (Avery Publishing) p. 104 
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Conclusion 
We all have the capacity to direct our own lives for the better, but it is a scary 
thing to do.  In order to guide our own lives we must first take an honest look at 
ourselves with an eye toward improvement.  This step of self-awareness opens us 
up to the possibility that our self-esteem is based on a mistake--we want to like 
ourselves and this is much easier to do without self-examination.  For those who are 
courageous enough to try to improve things may get worse before they get better.  
Once we have identified ways to improve we are in the position of having to regress, 
to accept ourselves as less than we want to be, or, we must start the difficult work of 
change.  Change very often means failure, and again this can be painful.  The up 
side of failure is that it reflects something valuable in ourselves.  Those who try and 
fail are the courageous ones who are making an effort.  We depend for our 
improvement on two sorts of people, angels who display perfection and those mere 
mortals who try and fail and try again.  Since angels are in short supply mortal 
failures are tremendously important. If we can come to see that our weakness of will 
indicates a core strength we move closer to success.  Weakness of will is not the 
foundation of strength, but it is only possible because of our most important strength-
-the capacity for self-determination--and recognizing this connection when we fail 
makes us stronger.     
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Conclusion 
 Weakness of will is a perennial philosophical puzzle, a practical problem and 
something about which new empirical literature is available.  This dissertation uses 
the emerging empirical literature to help make sense of long standing questions 
about practical rationality and intentional action.  Philosophers often think that 
science should depend on philosophy for the identification of questions and 
determinations about what would count as good answers and methodologies.  I 
agree that these are proper roles for philosophy, but I do not engage science in that 
way here.  Rather, I rely on the scientific literature to help inform my conception of 
practical rationality.  
 Empirical literature on self-control or will power begins with Walter Mischel's 
marshmallow experiment.  The interesting thing is that the children then tried to wait 
using various strategies.  Some stared at the marshmallow, others, played in a 
corner, one even fell asleep.  These children were tracked into adulthood and the 
study revealed that children who were able to wait were also likely to have higher 
SAT scores, higher educational achievement, higher sense of self-worth, better 
ability to cope with stress and less drug use.  The most effective resistors were 
those who distracted themselves.  This result has been replicated in other contexts 
and it seems that willpower is a strategic faculty which depends on some 
physiological resources. 
 Compare willpower with another skill like hitting a baseball or writing a 
philosophy paper.  These activities depend on physiological resources, they are 
taxing in the short run and we can develop stamina at them.  People who are hungry 
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or tired do not perform especially well.  However, these are activities that reward 
practice for reasons beyond physiology.  We learn to anticipate the curve when a 
pitcher is ahead or to recognize the structure of philosophical arguments.  That there 
is a physiological component  to willpower is not a surprise, but reducing willpower to 
the physiological misses the point that some willpower strategies effectively cope 
with limitations on physiology.  
 Beyond offering an account of willpower as a skill I have tried to extend this 
model in making sense of the traditional problem of weakness of will.   On my view it 
is best to see weakness of will as on a continuum between compulsion on the one 
hand and recklessness on the other.  On the side of coercion I have argued that 
there are at least three plausible theories about freedom of will which are compatible 
with the possibility of weakness of will.  I have not taken a position on which account 
of freedom is best.  However, there is a convincing case to be made that we have 
freewill in a sense robust enough to support morality and that there is still room for 
the commonsense view that we can be weak-willed.  If none of the options outlined 
are robust enough to ground an adequate account of human freedom, the problem is 
much more widespread than any concern about willpower especially. 
 Against the other end of skeptical accounts I have offered a description of the 
mind and practical rationality that makes room for the commonsense conception of 
weak-will.  Strong internalism along the lines of Plato or Hare requires that purported 
cases of weak-will must be based on an error in understanding because evaluation 
and motivation are necessarily connected in terms of direction and strength.  The 
seed of internalism is the very important insight that one's evaluation has no 
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importance or meaning unless the evaluation can lead to action—not responding to 
our judgment is recklessness.  The trouble raised by weakness of will is that we 
need an account of evaluation that is not epiphenomenal and that is not physicalist 
in a strong enough sense to necessarily determine outcomes.  I have argued that 
there is room for multiple judgments with opposing directions for action.  Each 
judgment on my account must have some connection to action—each judgment 
represents a pathway to intention.  However, there is no reason to suppose that our 
best judgment from a rational perspective is the most motivational.  In sort, we can 
be motivated by lesser judgments without being reckless.  
 The value of motivational failure, weakness of will, is that it is only possible 
because of our attempts to do something difficult but worthwhile.  If we never try to 
do something difficult, than we might go without failure.  But, of course, we should try 
to do difficult things.  Weakness of will is not possible for those who merely drift 
along through life on whatever course they happen to be thrown.  Weakness of will 
is made possible when we make an effort to not simply follow along with our urges; 
we expose ourselves to motivational failure when we try to actively decide who we 
will become.  If intentional self creation is valuable (and it seems to be), weakness of 
will is also valuable.  Weakness of will is not a good thing per se (after all it is 
failure), but it does reflect something good about us.  As R.J. Wallace puts the point, 
weakness of will is "a hazardous byproduct of the capacity for self-determination."224  
Weak-willed people aim to take responsibility for their lives, to engage in intentional 
self-creation, and this is why they can fail.  As a practical matter it is important to 
                                            
224 R. J. Wallace (2001) “Normativity, Commitment, Instrumental Reason” Philosopher’s Imprint Vol. 
1, No. 3 p. 10 
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keep this in mind when we fail as a means of combating the self-doubt, guilt and 
regret which can often stand in the way of progress. 
 The end of this dissertation begins to touch on some themes of practical 
moral importance but for the most part this is an effort to engage with and clarify 
issues in metaethics and moral psychology.  On my view the work done here should 
be seen as laying ground work for some future projects of a more practical nature.  
Specifically, the conception of willpower as a skill which can be developed over time 
and dependant on strategies of implementation has a direct bearing on the ways that 
we conceive of addiction in the medical and political spheres.  Of special interest to 
me are issues of triage, addiction treatment, punishment and consent to treatment 
with addictive substances.   
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